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High levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment are some of the most substantial chal-
lenges facing post-apartheid South Africa. Most of the research addressing these questions has
used micro datasets to compare snapshots of welfare over time. Although these studies are
both interesting and useful, they have been unable to extend their analysis into a nationally-
representative dynamic setting, due to the lack of available data. The paucity of large lon-
gitudinal datasets has also limited the number of studies of economic mobility, which allows
researchers to track the welfare measures of the same individuals over time. This means that
while we know a great deal about how South Africans are doing at a particular point in time,
we know far less about how they are faring dynamically. Understanding how and why eco-
nomic mobility happens in South Africa is therefore a question that demands attention. From
both a distributive justice as well as a policy point of view, the distinction that arises when we
drop the assumption of anonymity and move from a cross-sectional measure of welfare to a
dynamic one is important. This is because many of the conclusions about longer-run welfare
are dependent on the level of economic mobility present in society.
This study contributes to the body of work on welfare in South Africa by addressing three
different aspects of economic mobility. The first of these is about how a particular kind of
measurement error in household surveys is best detected, and what effect its presence has on the
understanding of labour market mobility. The second is about how best to model money-metric
poverty dynamics in South Africa in order to better understand who escapes poverty and who
enters poverty over time. The third is about how the persistence of intergenerational earnings
should be calculated in a society with high unemployment, and what the role of education is in
shaping these mobility dynamics.
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1 Introduction
1.1. MOTIVATION FOR THIS THESIS 2
1.1 Motivation for this thesis
The central questions that motivate this thesis are, “Why are some people so poor, why are
some people so wealthy, and what should be done about it in the interests of advancing a just
society?” This is particularly apposite in a South African context, where centuries of legislated
structural poverty, inequality of opportunities and outcomes, and state-endorsed discrimination
were ended - in a political sense at least - in 1994. A great deal of recent research has shown
that the economic gains made by the majority of South Africans have been slow to converge on
the political gains made in the country since the end of apartheid.
Measuring progress requires data, and to this end there have been a multitude of snapshots
which compare South African poverty and inequality over time using post-apartheid micro
datasets.1 These studies, while both interesting and useful, have been unable to extend analysis
into a nationally representative dynamic setting due to the lack of available data. The paucity
of large longitudinal datasets has also limited the number of studies of mobility - tracking
welfare measures of the same individuals over time. This means that while we know a lot about
how South Africans are doing at a particular point in time, we know far less about how they
fare dynamically. Understanding how and why economic mobility happens in South Africa is
therefore a question that demands attention.
From the points of view of both distributive justice and policy, the distinction that arises when
we drop the assumption of anonymity and move from a cross-sectional measure of welfare to
a dynamic one is important. This is mainly because conclusions about longer-run welfare are
dependent on the level of economic mobility present in a society. For example, it is possible
to obtain identical measures of cross-sectional welfare, poverty and inequality at two points in
time, even if nobody’s welfare remained the same in absolute or relative terms. Once we drop
the assumption of anonymity and follow the same people over time, we are able to ask, and
answer, different questions.
There is a poignant motivation for studying how welfare2 changes intertemporally and inter-
generationally. In South Africa’s high-inequality society the degree of mobility over time may
1Micro in this context means data from individual, household and labour market surveys.
2Welfare in this context may refer to household income, household consumption expenditure, labour market
status, and labour market earnings, among other things.
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impact both the demand for redistribution and social stability, a point made in a South African
context by Pellicer et al. (2014), and more generally by Friedman (1962). Indeed, many of
the recent protests in South Africa that have taken place around tertiary education and service
delivery have been fuelled largely by participants’ concerns about inequality. Higher mobil-
ity (even if it is higher perceived mobility rather than actual mobility) may be coupled with a
higher tolerance for inequality, as a relative deficit today could easily be reversed tomorrow.
On the other hand, the median voter theorem implies that low mobility and persistently high
inequality will lead to stronger demands for redistribution, as well as a more fragmented and
fractious society. Determining who gains, who falls behind and who remains trapped over time
is therefore an important undertaking.
In a broad sense this thesis is about economic mobility in South Africa. More specifically, it
takes three different departure points on economic mobility and evaluates questions related to
these. Part of the reason for adopting different viewpoints of economic mobility is because, as
a concept, it is rather more fluid than poverty or inequality, and there is less consensus on what
exactly economic mobility is. When poverty and inequality are measured there is generally
a single concept in mind, with different indices used to derive a deeper understanding of the
research question. When economic mobility is the subject, however, it is common not only
to talk of different indices, but of different concepts entirely. As noted by Gary Fields, “Not
only do different people have different ideas about what economic mobility is, but they have
different clear ideas about what economic mobility is.” Fields (2010), (emphasis in original).
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The three main chapters of this thesis address distinct yet related aspects of economic mobility
in South Africa. In short, the first is about measurement error and mobility, the second is about
absolute mobility as understood through poverty dynamics,3 and the third is about intergener-
ational earnings mobility and the role played by education in determining the persistence of
3Absolute poverty in this chapter means using absolute poverty lines when analysing poverty dynamics, rather
than using a relative poverty line such as a fraction of mean or median income. It also means that ranking
individuals in the income distribution is not important, because the focus is where people are relative to a poverty
line, rather than relative to one another.
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earnings over time.
These chapters ask a number of distinct questions about economic mobility in South Africa.
Chapter 2’s investigation asks the following:
• What impact does measurement error from interviewers have on measures of economic
mobility?
• What is the most effective method for identifying this kind of measurement error?
• How does this error feed through to cross-sectional versus longitudinal estimators?
Chapter 3 asks:
• Who is escaping poverty, who is entering poverty, who is staying in poverty and why?
• What are the relative roles of income and demographic events in determining mobility
across the poverty line?
• How can we model poverty dynamics while accounting for initial conditions, endogene-
ity and selective attrition?
The central questions in Chapter 4 are:
• How should the persistence of earnings between parents and children be calculated when
there is high unemployment in both generations?
• What is the shape of the intergenerational correlation of earnings across the wage distri-
bution?
• What is the role of education in shaping these mobility dynamics?
Mobility, when understood as an empirical concept, needs to be measured after it has been
defined. Chapter 2 addresses the dual problems of how to detect a certain kind of measurement
error in survey data, and what effect that error has on how we understand economic mobility.
Of particular interest is a certain kind of measurement error - fieldworker fabrication of data
- and how this feeds into the evaluation of categorical mobility. This is applied to labour
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market transitions and the movement (or lack of movement) into and out of employment. The
focus is on non-classical measurement error, whereby an individual is assigned an incorrect
labour market status. The impact of measurement error on labour market status variables (and
categorical variables in general) in longitudinal data can be particularly problematic, as the
following simple example demonstrates. Suppose person M is employed in wave 1 and wave
2 of a panel dataset. Now suppose that person M is incorrectly classified in the data as being
unemployed in wave 1, and correctly classified as being employed in wave 2. This kind of
measurement error creates not only a cross-sectional misclassification (in wave 1), but the false
impression of labour market mobility (wave 1 to wave 2). As this chapter shows, there may be
situations in which this kind of misclassification is intentional, and this can have consequences
for our understanding of mobility over time. As will be demonstrated, this kind of measurement
error may have muted effects when on simple descriptive statistics, or even OLS regressions.
However, as researchers begin to exploit the time series properties of the data more and more,
the detrimental presence of this measurement error becomes increasingly apparent.
Chapter 3 retains the theme of absolute mobility, but shifts the focus from the labour market
to poverty. It does this by evaluating some of the reasons for why so many South Africans have
been unable, to paraphrase Carter and May (2001), to see the concomitant benefits of economic
freedom that should have come with political freedom in 1994.4 In doing so the chapter expands
the South African literature from a province-specific lens5 to a national perspective. To this
end, four waves of longitudinal household survey data from 2008 to 2015 are used to present
the descriptive statistics of poverty transition and persistence in South Africa. Following this,
the chapter assesses the relative importance of income events versus demographic events in
determining poverty transitions over time. Finally, the dynamics of poverty in the country are
estimated using an endogenous switching model that takes special account of the changing
composition of our longitudinal data, and the role of initial conditions in determining longer-
run poverty dynamics. This has important policy implications, as the nature of poverty, along
with the relative shares of chronic versus transitory poverty, can help shape how we tackle the
4Carter and May (2001) themselves base the title of their article on Ransom and Sutch (1977).
5Carter and May (2001), Cichello et al. (2005) , Woolard and Klasen (2005) and Agüero et al. (2007) all use
data from KwaZulu-Natal.
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problem in the future.
In Chapter 4 the focus shifts to earnings mobility across generations. Measuring the level of
persistence in the earnings of one generation to the next can be a challenging undertaking in a
developing country context. This is further complicated if unemployment rates are very high, as
they have been in South Africa over the last two decades. This chapter’s initial question is about
how the correlation of earnings between parents and children should be calculated given con-
ditions of high unemployment. It then moves on to investigate the role of education in shaping
this relationship. Intergenerational dynamics are investigated using four waves of household
survey data from 2008 to 2015 along with an additional nationally representative dataset from
1993. As will be discussed in depth, using both sets of data allows for the correction of possi-
ble biases that arise from co-resident parent-child pairs, and from selection into labour market
participation in a high-unemployment society like South Africa’s. The presence of intergenera-
tional poverty and inequality traps is investigated through using quantile regression techniques
to estimate persistence across the range of earnings, and a similar approach is taken in order to
determine the importance of educational attainment in driving the intergenerational correlation
of earnings across the wage distribution.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a summary of the key results of this thesis.
2 Genuine fakes: The prevalence and
implications of data fabrication in a
large South African survey
2.1. INTRODUCTION 8
2.1 Introduction
For anyone involved in the running of a survey, issues of data quality are of critical importance.
Surveys can cost millions of dollars, require years of planning by large teams of people and
need considerable levels of sustained effort. All of these resources are allocated for the sole
purpose of producing high-quality data. All empirical findings, in turn, are premised on the
assumption that the data being used are of a reasonable quality. This caveat applies to vast
literatures in economics, sociology, demography and political science, amongst others. Indeed,
it is so ubiquitous that it hardly ever gets stated explicitly.
In this chapter, we investigate one aspect of the data production process that might lead us to
question the quality of survey data in general, and its effect on the measurement of dynamics
in particular. Most survey organizations, either directly or indirectly, employ interviewers to
conduct their surveys. The interviewers, though, might not have the same objectives as the
survey organization. These principal-agent problems might result in interviewers ‘cheating’.1
Interviewers may engage in cheating behaviour for a variety of reasons. First, interviewers
may be reluctant to ask sensitive questions about topics related to income, wealth or sexual
behaviour. Second, some sections are very long and interviewers might want to leave them
out in order to save time. Third, the characteristics of the primary sampling unit (PSU) may
play a role. If the PSU is in an area that is considered dangerous (which is not uncommon in
the South African context) or is very far away, then interviewers may end up cheating rather
than visiting the PSU. Fourth, interviewers might be remunerated according to the number of
successful interviews that they have completed. In the case of refusals, or the case where it
is easier to fabricate an interview, this would incentivize cheating. Finally, the penalties for
cheating may be small. If the survey company is unable or unwilling to monitor the behaviour
of the interviewers, then the expected payoff to cheating might exceed the expected costs for
some workers.
There are also different ways in which cheating behaviour could manifest itself. First, and
1We use the word ‘cheating’ although in some cases a better word might be ‘negligence’. The former implies
intent whereas the latter could arise out of ignorance, incompetence or misunderstandings, and we cannot always
distinguish between the two. In either case, interviewers do something that they ought not to have done which
results in a deterioration of the aggregate quality of the data produced.
2.1. INTRODUCTION 9
most problematic, interviewers could fabricate entire interviews. In later waves of longitudinal
studies, there is usually some pre-population of the questionnaires based on data from previous
waves. This often includes a list of household members from the roster and their demographic
characteristics. Interviewers can view this information and use it to form the basis of their fab-
rication. Interviewers could also cheat by leaving out sections of interviews. For example, in
wave 1 of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) questionnaire, which is the longitu-
dinal dataset that we use in this study, the labour market section is substantial and has a total
of 89 questions.2 However, a respondent who is ‘not economically active’ will only answer
seven simple ‘yes/no’ questions. Interviewers could save time by setting respondents’ labour
market statuses to ‘not economically active’ when they are, in fact, working or looking for
work. A different way to save time would be to leave out certain people in the household. This
would be easy to implement in a cross-sectional study. In a longitudinal study, the interviewer
might ignore new members in the household, such as babies or in-migrants, or exaggerate the
number of people from the previous wave who have died. Our research findings presented in
this chapter are primarily concerned with the most problematic type of cheating listed, namely
the fabrication of entire interviews. We find that analysis of cross-sectional numerical pat-
terns and longitudinal anthropometric measures are the most effective means of detecting data
fabrication in our context. Our methods suggest that approximately 7% of the sample was
affected in this way. If the fabrication had not been detected, it would not have substantially
affected our cross-sectional estimates, but would have led us to reach different findings as more
complex, longitudinal, estimators are used. In particular, we would have systematically over-
stated transitions into the ‘not economically active’ labour market category, and systematically
underestimated transitions into employment and unemployment from any wave 1 base state.
Furthermore, the presence of fabricated data would have led us to reach substantially different
conclusions about the role of labour market mobility as a determinant of changes in BMI across
waves 1 and 2. A brief cost-benefit analysis of the data quality investigation suggests that the
benefit was more than 24 times the aggregate cost.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, we argue that the inci-
2This includes 10 sub-questions.
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dence of interviewer cheating is a common problem in the implementation of large household
surveys in several countries, including South Africa. In section 2.3 we turn our focus to the
first two waves of the NIDS dataset and evaluate a number of methods that we considered to
detect interviewer cheating.3 The two most successful methods, Benford’s law and anthropo-
metric diagnostics are dealt with in greater detail than the others. Section 2.4 analyses what the
consequences for future research would have been, had the cheating not been detected and cor-
rected for, and compares the benefits of the data quality investigation to the aggregate costs of
detecting fabricated data. Section 2.5 offers recommendations for future fieldwork operations
and provides some concluding remarks.
2.2 The prevalence of interviewer cheating in survey
data
The phenomenon of interviewers making up data is a global and persistent problem with a
sizeable literature dedicated to documenting and detecting it. A number of studies use data from
major surveys in the United States to detect whether data fabrication had occurred. Schreiner
et al. (1988) use Census Bureau Studies data from 1982 to 1987 to highlight the importance
of reinterviewing respondents as a means of fraud detection. In their study, 83% of suspected
falsifications turned out to indeed be a result of cheating. Most of the cheating was detected
through reinterviews, although some were picked up because of anomalies in the data. In
addition, most of the cheating involved total rather than partial fabrication of individual-level
data. The authors find that falsification rates range from 0.4% to 6.5% depending on which
one of the Census Bureau surveys is used.4 Finally, they note that interviewers who had served
for longer periods of time are significantly less likely to be data fabricators. Li et al. (2011)
make the point that the Census Bureau’s reinterview strategy for detecting falsification can be
improved upon. The conventional reinterview methods detect falsification in less than 0.1% of
the data. The authors use data from the Current Population Survey to try to design an alternative
3This work was done by the author while wave 2 of NIDS was still in the field. At the time, the author was
employed in the NIDS office.
4Fraud prevalence rates in this and future examples refer to the proportion of individual, rather than household,
interviews that contained falsified data.
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sampling method that should underlie the reinterview process. Using a combination of real data
and simulations, they conclude that alternative sampling methods could find up to 20% more
fabricated interviews than the current system. Murphy et al. (2004) use data anomalies from
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health to identify suspicious interviewer behaviour. In
particular, they flag relatively short or long interview durations as possible signs of falsification
and show how taking these durations into account adds to the power of the fraud detection
process.
Outside of the US, Schäfer et al. (2004) use data from the German Socio-economic Panel
(SOEP) to test the reliability of two methods of fraud detection. Data fabrication was low in all
waves and all samples of the SOEP, never exceeding 2.4% of all cases, with the overall share
of faked data at about 0.5% (Schräpler and Wagner, 2005). The authors use the fabricated data
that was removed from the publicly-released version of the SOEP and find that using Benford’s
law as the basis for detecting suspicious data correctly identifies all cases of fabrication. In
addition, they exploit the fact that cheating interviewers tend to have less variability in their
responses over all questions and all interviews than non-cheaters. Interviewer-level tests for
surprisingly low variance also correctly identified all of the cases of cheating. All confirmed
cheating interviewers were middle-aged and male, and the effect of education on the probability
of cheating was not statistically significant.
There are a number of other studies that use characteristics in the data themselves as a means
of identifying fabrication. These include, amongst others, Bredl et al. (2008) in an unspecified
non-OECD country, and Porras and English (2004), Cho et al. (2003) and Swanson et al. (2003)
in the US. A broad review on much of the literature related to the detection of fabricated data
can be found in Birnbaum (2012) who charts the methods used in twelve different datasets in
the developed and developing world.
Although the fabrication of survey data is an issue of concern to researchers throughout the
world, the remainder of this study narrows the focus somewhat by drawing attention to illustra-
tive cases of interviewer cheating in the South African context. These examples highlight the
existence, but not the prevalence, of data fabrication in South African household surveys. They
motivate our study by showing that there is enough prior evidence to take this phenomenon se-
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riously, even though they are agnostic as to how problematic or widespread this is in household
survey datasets.
2.2.1 KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS)
KIDS is a household level panel dataset that was conducted in 1993, 1998 and 2004. It re-
visited a subset of the households located in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa that
were included in the original SALDRU/PSLSD 1993 survey. Follow-up fieldwork in May of
2001 suggested that there may have been cheating by interviewers in some clusters. Subse-
quent investigations revealed that the fabrication was limited to two clusters and these were
permanently removed from the sample.5 Judge and Schechter (2009) compare data from the
deleted clusters to data from the retained clusters, and find large differences between the two in
the module on crop production and animal ownership.
2.2.2 Survey on time and risk preferences
Between 2010 and 2011, researchers from the University of Cape Town conducted a survey
on time and risk preferences in the three major metropolitan regions of South Africa,6 with a
budget of about 300 000 US dollars.7 They had a sample size of about 300 respondents and
visited each of them six times at three monthly intervals. The survey included a background
questionnaire as well as two experimental modules. In the experimental modules, respondents
were asked to choose between various alternatives in order to ascertain their appetite for risk
and their discount factors. In order to obtain truthful responses, all choices were incentivized
to have some probability of entailing an actual cash payout.
In the time preferences component, respondents answered 40 questions. They then rolled
a 10-sided die, and if it landed on 0, they would get paid for one of their 40 responses. The
relevant question was selected by rolling a 10-sided die and a 4-sided die simultaneously. In
the risk preferences component, respondents were also asked 40 questions, one of which would
5See May et al. (2007) with an earlier version available for download at
http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/catalogue3/index.php/catalog/286.
6These are Johannesburg/Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban.
7Information on the details of this study was obtained through interviews with Andre Hofmeyr. At the time,
he was a researcher actively involved in the survey.
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yield a cash payout with certainty. The relevant question was also selected by means of rolling
a 10-sided die and a 4-sided die simultaneously. The payouts varied by question and by the
choices made by the respondents in that question. The interviewer would then pay the amount
of the winnings in cash to the respondents.
After the data were collected, researchers found a suspiciously high rate of interviewees get-
ting paid out for the time preferences component. The ex ante probability of this occurring was
10% but the respondents were ‘winning’ 25% of the time overall. Moreover, respondents were
observed to have a disproportionately high probability of having ‘randomly selected’ questions
with relatively higher cash payouts in both the risk preferences and time preferences component
of the study. Further investigation indicated that these anomalies were driven by data from a
subset of interviewers who almost always paid out the maximum amounts permissible. People
involved in the study believe that some interviewers colluded with respondents so as maximize
the actual disbursements, which they could then share. The problem was identified only after
the 4th wave of data had been obtained, with the 5th wave already in the field, and both the
time preferences and risk preferences components of the study had to be abandoned.
2.2.3 Cape Area Panel Study: Wave 5
The Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) is a longitudinal study of young adults in the Cape Town
metropolitan area. Wave 1 was conducted in 2002 with a sample of about 4 800 young adults
aged 14 to 22. In the fifth wave of CAPS, conducted in 2009, part of the interview included
a finger-prick test for HIV status which was administered by the interviewer.8 The ex ante
expectation was that about 30% of the women interviewed would be HIV positive. For most
interviewers, the proportion of HIV-positive female respondents was indeed reasonably close
to 30%, but after a certain date, one interviewer returned HIV-positive results for every respon-
dent.
It took a considerable amount of the time for the lab results on the blood to be returned to the
operational headquarters. Thus, by the time that this was discovered, the interviewer in question
8The information on CAPS was obtained through interviews with Brendan Maughan-Brown, co-ordinator of
the fifth wave of CAPS. More information can be obtained in Lam et al. (2012) which can be downloaded at
http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/catalogue3/index.php/catalog/266.
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had already been paid and had left the survey. Investigations discovered that the interviewer
in question had not, in fact, taken blood samples from respondents, but had obtained blood
samples from some other source. The result was that all data collected by this interviewer after
a certain date was deleted and did not form part of the fifth wave.
A common method of monitoring interviewer behaviour is to phone respondents in the weeks
or months after the interview in order to verify that they were in fact interviewed. One of
the interviewers obtained the list of verification questions and set up a system in which her
sister-in-law pretended to be a respondent each time she was called by the survey company.
This suggests that interviewers who do cheat can use quite sophisticated methods to avoid
detection. This interviewer’s cheating was only discovered after the conclusion of fieldwork,
and all relevant data was deleted from the study.
Overall, a total of 8 interviewers had engaged in some form of cheating, out of an average
of about 40 interviewers over the course of the fieldwork. A total of 289 fraudulent interviews
were deleted from the public release version, which represented about 9% of the expected
sample at the start of wave 5.
2.2.4 Time Use Study: 2000
In 2000, StatsSA, the official statistical agency of South Africa, conducted a national time
use study over three different months in order to investigate how South Africans spend their
day. The total sample size was approximately 14 000. Household members were eligible to
participate if they were aged 10 or older. Interviewers were asked to fill in a household roster
in descending order of age, and if more than 2 household members were eligible, to select two
household members sequentially using a sampling grid.9 If the interviewer reached the end of
the grid, that is at the 11th such household, then she was instructed to ‘loop’ back to the start -
that is, to treat the 11th household with 4 eligible people as if it were the 1st household with 4
eligible people that she had encountered (Statistics South Africa, 2000).
The sampling grid yields an asymptotic distribution of the frequency with which household
9A copy of the sampling grid is included in Appendix 2.A as Table 2.A.1. To illustrate how it works, suppose
that an interviewer came to her first house with four eligible members. She should then select persons 2 and 4, i.e.
the 2nd and 4th oldest members of the household. In the second such household, she should select persons 1 and
3, etc.
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members of a particular age-rank ought to have been selected on aggregate, conditional on
the number of eligible persons. For example, in households with three eligible persons, we
would expect to find that person 1 was selected 50% of the time, person 2 was selected 70%
of the time and person 3 was selected 80% of the time.10 In the dataset, however, we find that
persons 1, 2 and 3 in households with three eligible persons were in fact selected 81%, 81% and
38% of the time, respectively. A Chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis that the realized
distribution corresponds to the expected distribution at any reasonable level of significance.11
We repeated the analysis for households with 4, 5 and 6 eligible members respectively, and
convincingly rejected the null hypothesis of equivalence of distributions in each case. We
interpret this as evidence that interviewers did not, in fact, follow instructions about whom to
select in households where they had some degree of choice.
An alternative explanation to interviewer cheating is that the asymptotic distribution is not the
correct distribution to use, since we would only expect it to be realized if each interviewer had
‘many’ households with more than two eligible persons. Nonetheless, at least in the case with
three eligible persons, there are more than 1 000 such households in total. If each interviewer
encountered 10 or more such households then the asymptotic distribution would provide a
reasonable approximation of the correct expected distribution. Moreover, the magnitude of the
divergence is so great that, unless the expected distribution that we use is grossly incorrect, we
would continue to reject the null hypothesis that the realized distribution corresponds to the
‘true’ expected distribution.
Note that in this case we are not claiming evidence of data fabrication. The ‘cheating’ that we
observe here is of a very different nature to those previously documented, and it is important to
draw the distinction between intentional and unintentional sources of data error. What explains
such cheating? We conjecture that interviewers violated the sampling instructions due to some
combination of the availability of respondents as well as variations in the time that it would
take for different respondents to complete the questionnaire.
Two empirical observations support this conjecture. First, in households where the inter-
viewer had some choice, 53.7% of those eligible were female, but 56% of those selected were
10The total adds up to 200% since two household members were selected.
11The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A.
2.2. THE PREVALENCE OF INTERVIEWER CHEATING IN SURVEY DATA 16
female. This difference is small in terms of percentage points but since it applies to just over 9
000 observations it is statistically significant. Moreover, there is nothing in the sampling grid
that suggests a clear gender bias in terms of who ought to be selected. A more plausible expla-
nation is that females are more likely to be available for an interview, since they are much less
likely to be employed in South Africa.12 Second, we observe that in households with 3 or more
eligible persons, 51% of those eligible are younger than 21 years of age. Of these potential re-
spondents, only 35% were selected to fill in a questionnaire. Teenagers are probably less likely
to be available due to being in school. Additionally, they might be less willing to participate in
interviews in the first place, and it might take longer for them to complete a questionnaire.
If our conjecture is correct, then the violation of the sampling framework has potentially
serious implications for analyses. Obtaining a disproportionate number of unemployed or ‘not
economically active’ people in the sample will bias measures of aggregate time use, and con-
ventional sampling weights, even if adjusted for non-response, will not correct this bias.
2.2.5 Labour Force Survey 2001
Devey et al. (2006) contains an interesting figure, reproduced below as Figure 2.1, that charts
the number of people in South Africa classified as ‘informally employed’. The authors use data
from October Household Surveys (OHS) and Labour Force Surveys (LFS) from 1997 to 2004.
The most striking feature of the data is the spike in February 2001, with a jump of almost 750
000 informal workers, before falling by approximately the same number to September 2001.
It is implausible that such a spike should be present in nationally representative data with a
consistent survey instrument. The authors point out that in the February 2001 LFS, interviewers
were offered additional incentives to interview informal workers in the households that they had
visited.
Although there is no established claim for cheating having taken place whereby interviewers
fabricated data on the informal economy, it is nevertheless very suspicious to see the spike when
finding informal sector workers was incentivized, and an immediate and equivalent reversal
12In StatsSA’s September 2000 Labour Force Survey (LFS), amongst prime working-age adults aged 21 to 59,
the employment rates for men and women were 61.6% and 45.5% respectively. This was a nationally representa-
tive survey with a sample size of about 50 000 working-age adults.
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when the incentive was removed. In addition, we cannot be certain as to whether the February
2001 data is incorrect, or whether all of the other data is reflecting a systematic under-counting
of informal employment, or both. The example nonetheless highlights that data quality is
potentially affected in a substantial way by fieldworker incentives.













































































Source: Reproduced from Devey et al. (2006).
In summation, we have provided evidence of interviewer cheating in four substantial South
African surveys and highlighted potential cheating in a fifth. These surveys have been both
cross-sectional and longitudinal, and span a time period from 1993 to 2011. The implementing
agencies include local and international fieldwork companies, as well as organisations that em-
ployed and managed interviewers directly. The cheating manifests in various forms, including
outright fabrication of entire interviews, falsification of responses to particular questions and
not following the sampling instructions. In some cases the cheating did not affect the overall
legitimacy of the study, whereas in one case an entire component of the study needed to be
abandoned. The research areas that have potentially been affected include time use, health, risk
preferences, labour market status, poverty, inequality and intergenerational mobility. Thus the
incidence of interviewer cheating is widespread and its effects are potentially far reaching.
In the next section, we discuss how we attempted to identify possible cheating in wave 2 of
NIDS.
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2.3 Interviewer cheating in wave 2 of the National
Income Dynamics Study
The second wave of NIDS is the main focus of this chapter. NIDS is a nationally representative
longitudinal study that collects data from respondents on many socio-economic topics including
education, labour market participation, fertility, mortality, migration, income, expenditure and
anthropometric measures. The survey starts with a household roster that documents all people
who are resident in the household at the time of the interview. From the information captured
in the roster, respondents are classified as either children (aged 0–14) or adults (aged 15 and
above). Interviewers are instructed to then administer either a ‘child questionnaire’ or an ‘adult
questionnaire’ for each household resident. In cases where the respondent refused or was not
available, interviewers were asked to try to get a knowledgeable person in the household to fill
in a ‘proxy questionnaire’ on behalf of the respondent who could not be interviewed.
The first wave, which took place in 2008, had a sample size of 7 301 households and about
17 000 people completed the adult questionnaire. In that wave, interviewers used paper-based
questionnaires and entered responses by hand. The completed questionnaires were then sent
from the fieldwork company to a data capturing company and, by the time the full dataset was
received by the survey operations team, fieldwork had already been completed. The primary
data quality control procedures thus occurred after the fieldwork had been completed in wave
1.
The second wave of NIDS was conducted over 2010 and 2011. Interviewers changed from
the paper-based questionnaires of wave 1 to a Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI)
system, whereby interviewers filled in responses on a hand-held computer. Data from com-
pleted questionnaires were then uploaded to a server on a daily basis. One of the advantages of
having data come in ‘live’ was that a verification process was undertaken while the interviewers
were still in the field. This allowed for corrections to be made as part of the ongoing fieldwork
operations, so that suspicious data could be verified or replaced, rather than deleted.
Our objective for the verification process was to create a measure that could rank interviewers
by decreasing levels of suspiciousness. Once interviewers were ranked, the respondents that
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they interviewed were called back to ascertain whether they had been interviewed or not, and
if they had indeed been interviewed, whether the entire questionnaire had been completed.
In creating the suspicion-based ranking of interviewers we considered using nine different
methods. The central idea in using each of these possibilities was that interviewers who do
cheat will do so either to save time, or to earn more money, or both. Interviewers could earn
more money as they received a performance-based incentive for each completed individual and
household questionnaire. This would result in systematic differences in some dimensions of the
data that were generated by cheating interviewers, when compared either to the data obtained
from non-cheating interviewers or to externally-motivated benchmarks. The usefulness of a
method was determined by its ability to identify anomalies in the data, and to rank interviewers
by the prevalence of these anomalies. The subsequent success (or lack thereof) of the method
in identifying fraudulent data was ascertained by callbacks to households which were recorded
as having been visited by each suspicious interviewer.
The most successful of these nine methods were the use of Benford’s law and anthropometric
comparisons, which we discuss in detail in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 respectively. Although the
other seven methods were not particularly useful for diagnostic purposes, we document what
did not work as it might still be useful to people running surveys in other contexts.
2.3.1 Unsuccessful methods of detection
Method 1: Number of deaths between waves
One way to speed up the process of completing an entire household would be to falsely clas-
sify a household member from wave 1 as deceased. This would allow a fieldworker to ‘com-
plete’ interviewing the household much faster. Alternatively, fieldworkers could falsely classify
someone who had died between waves as being still alive, and then fabricate the data. We com-
pared the mortality rates of respondents by fieldworker, and did not observe any anomalies in
the data.
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Method 2: Number of refusals/not available
The method and thought behind using this metric is identical to that for using deaths above.
Fieldworkers could save time by not interviewing everyone (for example, by fabricating re-
fusals and non-responses from respondents), or fabricate data for those who had, in fact, re-
fused to be interviewed. We compared the response rates by fieldworker, and did not observe
any anomalies in the data.
Method 3: Fieldworkers who are disproportionately likely to activate substantial
skip patterns in the survey
Our thoughts here were that one could save considerable time in some sections by capturing
certain responses. As already discussed, this incentive is strongest in the labour market section.
We abandoned this method as the levels of unemployment in South Africa are high, levels of
labour force participation are low, and these are concentrated in certain neighbourhoods and re-
gions (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). Since fieldwork was co-ordinated geographically, fieldworkers
could plausibly have genuinely encountered a pool of respondents with low levels of employ-
ment and labour force attachment in their allotted region. In addition, the unemployment rates
and percentage that were not economically active, by fieldworker, yielded several fieldworkers
with high values, so this was not a particularly useful tool for discriminating between suspicious
and non-suspicious fieldworkers.
Method 4: Using length of interviews to identify fabrication
If fieldworkers were fabricating data, we expected them to complete the surveys relatively
quickly. The software we used had time stamps for both when the interview began and was
completed, which theoretically allowed us to calculate the time per interview. We also ex-
pected that each adult interview would take between 45 minutes and one hour to complete.
Unfortunately, the time stamp for completion was activated manually, and several fieldworkers
only did so at night prior to uploading the data to the server. This rendered this component of
the investigation useless.
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Method 5: Using GPS co-ordinates to verify where the interview took place
Part of the survey captures the GPS co-ordinates of the household. This was required for all
households in both wave 1 and wave 2. The co-ordinates were obtained by means of a handheld
GPS device which was accurate to a radius of 100m. If interviews were being fabricated, we
would expect to find differences between the wave 1 and wave 2 co-ordinates. We encountered
two problems with this method. First, there was considerable measurement error in wave 1, so
not all differences could be attributed to wave 2 cheating. Second, fieldworkers were given the
GPS co-ordinates from wave 1 to assist them in finding the households. Instead of entering the
GPS readings from the GPS device in wave 2, a cheating fieldworker could simply re-enter the
co-ordinates that they had received.
Method 6: Comparing wave 1 and wave 2 signatures
Each completed questionnaire in each wave needed to be accompanied by a signed paper-based
consent form. We considered comparing wave 1 and wave 2 signatures to identify discrepan-
cies. We abandoned this approach very quickly, as signatures have some variability over time,
and the method was far too labour intensive.
Method 7: Low rates of in-migration or births between waves
If fieldworkers were fabricating entire households, then they would not be able to know about
any new household members that entered between waves. They would then either systemati-
cally under-estimate the number of new members, or else have to fabricate these new members
as well. We calculated the number of new members per household by fieldworker, but there
were no clear patterns or anomalies. If cheating fieldworkers did indeed fabricate new members
as well, or if cheating fieldworkers cheated only on some fraction of their households, then it
would be much harder for this diagnostic to yield usable information.
2.3.2 Using Benford’s law
In contrast to the methods used above, the use of Benford’s law as a ranking mechanism for
suspicious interviewers proved to be very useful. Following a paper by Schäfer et al. (2004),
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we used Benford’s law as the basis of a test of the distribution of the numerical data reported by
each interviewer. Benford’s law is an empirical law that was first described in Benford (1938).
It describes the probability distribution of leading digits in tables of numerical data and asserts
that the distribution is not uniform, as might be expected a priori, but rather follows a certain
logarithmic probability distribution given by:






, d = 1, 2, ..., 9
This implies that the probability of a leading digit being 1 is about 30%, the probability
of it being 2 is about 17.6%, with the corresponding probabilities of the subsequent leading
digits decreasing monotonically until we find that the probability of the leading digit being 9
is approximately 4.6%. The probability distribution of leading digits is shown in Table 2.1,
below.
Table 2.1: Benford’s distribution of leading digits
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
30.1% 17.6% 12.5% 9.7% 7.9% 6.7% 5.8% 5.1% 4.6%
For a long time this phenomenon was viewed as not much more than a numerical curiosity.
However, some practical implications began to emerge (Scott and Fasli, 2001; Durtschi et al.,
2004), and Benford’s law has since been used to detect fraud in financial statements of com-
panies (Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989). More recently, it has been used in a wide variety of
settings in the US (Durtschi et al., 2004). Judge and Schechter (2009) used Benford’s law to
compare the data from the deleted and retained clusters in the KIDS example discussed earlier.
The law has also been found to hold with a large number of other kinds of data, including
the population of towns, the length of rivers and the half-life of radioactive atoms. The basic
premise is this: If you have a relatively large dataset and you accept that Benford’s law holds,
then you can identify possible cheating by comparing the realized distribution of leading digits
for each interviewer, to the distribution of leading digits that would be expected if Benford’s
law holds.
Hill (1995) provided the first theoretical basis for the law and showed that the law applies
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most accurately to stock market data, some accounting data and census statistics. The intuition
underlying the proof is the following: Consider a variable which grows at some constant rate.
Regardless of the initial value or the growth rate, the asymptotic distribution of leading digits
of this variable (over time) will conform to Benford’s law.13 Thus, a random sample of such
variables at a moment in time will also conform to Benford’s law.
More recently, Schäfer et al. (2004) and Schräpler (2011) argue that certain survey data
also conform to Benford’s law, and use this for the express purpose of identifying cheating
interviewers in the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP). Schräpler (2011) summarises three
requirements that need to be satisfied in order for Benford’s law to be a useful diagnostic for
detecting fraud in survey data.14 First, the data should not have a built-in maximum value.
Second, there should be no externally assigned values in data. For example, the South African
old age pension is a rand amount that is assigned to an individual, and this is an example of
data that cannot be used in the diagnostic test. Finally, the distribution of the data should be
positively skewed with a median that is lower than the mean. Of all the variables in wave 2 of
NIDS, a number of those in the income and expenditure modules satisfied all of these criteria.
Some of these are reported at the household level (for example household non-food expendi-
ture), some are reported at the individual level (for example monthly wages), and others are
aggregated across respondents in the same household (for example household wages). Vari-
ables that included any systematic component, such as the value of government grants, were
not valid candidates for inclusion.
Figure 2.2, below, plots the distribution of leading digits of the variable reflecting the total
amount of labour market income received by respondents in the 4 705 households with posi-
tive wages in the wave 1 data. This distribution, shown by the bars, is plotted together with
the logarithmic distribution that we expect to observe, assuming that Benford’s law holds. By
comparing the two distributions, it seems that the leading digits of this variable fit the logarith-
13Informally, consider a variable that grows at a constant rate with an initial value of 1 (note that the initial
value does not have to be 1, it is used here for illustrative purposes). As this number grows, more time will be
spent between 1 and 2, than between 2 and 3, and more time will be spent between 2 and 3 than between 3 and 4.
This amount of time with each successive leading digit decreases until the value reaches 10, in which case more
time is spent between 10 and 20 than between 20 and 30, and so on. As the time period increases, the distribution
of leading digits converges to Benford’s distribution.
14The first two are validated through their presence in practical applications (see, for example Nigrini (1999)),
while the third is a requirement that is derived from simulated results in Scott and Fasli (2001).
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mic distribution very well. The observed proportions of each leading digit are very close to the
proportions that we expect to observe ex ante, and fall with each successive digit, except for
eight which is slightly higher than expected.15
Figure 2.2: Observed and expected leading digits - Wages in wave 1
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 1 2008.
Given that the data seem to follow this logarithmic distribution for some of the monetary
variables, we next sorted the wave 2 observations by interviewer and considered the conditional
leading digits of total household income as recorded by the interviewer. We ranked how far each
interviewer’s distribution of leading digits was from the logarithmic distribution, by computing
Chi-squared statistics. Ranking interviewers by this method yielded positive results for the
detection of cheating. Of the interviewers with the five highest Chi-squared values, four were
subsequently found to have fabricated entire questionnaires. The top ten Chi-squared rankings
are shown in Table 2.2, below. The cheating interviewers are highlighted in bold.16
15See Figure 2.B.1 in Appendix 2.B for a comparison of observed versus expected distributions of leading
digits for some other wave 1 and wave 2 monetary variables.
16The full table for all interviewers who collected data from at least 40 households can be found in Table 2.C.1.
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Table 2.2: Most suspicious interviewers by Chi-squared ranking
Ranking Interviewer Chi-squared(no. of interviews)
1 A 39.7 (80)
2 B 31.2 (49)
3 OK 28.0 (66)
4 C 27.3 (74)
5 D 27.1 (100)
6 E 24.7 (42)
7 OK 21.7 (64)
8 F 21.4 (73)
9 OK 21.2 (44)
10 OK 19.8 (67)
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Interviewers who were found to have fabricated data are identified by letter, and are in bold typeface.
Interviewers who were suspicious but did not fabricate data are denoted ‘OK’ and are not in bold typeface.
Number of interviews refers to the total number of household interviews submitted by the interviewer.
The fact that six of the top ten most suspicious interviewers were identified using Benford’s
law suggests that using this method is appropriate for survey data of this nature. Nonetheless,
some cheating interviewers may have left the monetary variables blank, or set them to missing.
In this case we would have the unique problem of missing fake data, which also happens to be
fake missing data. One of the ways of overcoming this problem is to use repeated observations
of the same respondents over time to pick up possible fabrication. We thus exploited the longi-
tudinal dimension of the data and evaluated variables that are difficult to fabricate convincingly
in a panel study – namely, height and weight.
2.3.3 Anthropometric measures
One of the advantages of a longitudinal dataset is that prior or future waves may be used to
calibrate data quality in other waves. Slow-moving variables such as anthropometric measures
are good candidates for this exercise. The first two waves of NIDS included modules in which
respondents were weighed and measured for height. Weights were obtained using digital scales
that were accurate to 0.1kg, while heights were obtained using a portable stadiometer. These
data were not pre-populated into the CAPI system, making it almost impossible for interviewers
to systematically fabricate values that were consistent with wave 1 measures for respondents
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that they had not seen.
Various diagnostic measures were used to rank interviewers according to their likelihood of
having cheated. These were:
• Mean adult body mass index (BMI), by interviewer.17 Our thinking was that inter-
viewers who were fabricating data might not be aware of the extent to which the height
and weight of respondents are correlated. This would result in ‘abnormal’ BMI mea-
sures. We considered interviewers who generated exceptionally high or exceptionally
low average BMI values as potentially suspicious.
• The mean growth in the height of adult respondents between waves, by interviewer.
We expected that the heights of adults would be stable over a two year span, on average.
If the mean growth in height for a particular interviewer differed substantially from zero
in either direction then we interpreted this as an indication of possible cheating.
• The mean BMI growth from wave 1 to wave 2, by interviewer. If this differed sub-
stantially from zero then this was a sign of possible fabrication.
• Spikeplots of the weight distribution, by interviewer. Given that the scales were
digital, and that no interviewer had interviewed hundreds of respondents, we expected to
obtain a uniform distribution of weights. Visual inspection of the spikeplots allowed us
to relatively quickly identify suspicious patterns such as ‘heaping’ at natural reference
numbers.
The diagnostics above were restricted to adults only, where adults were classified as respon-
dents 20 years old and above. Running the diagnostics on children would have presented a
problem as the height and weight variables for children are more volatile, even in a two to three
year period.
Table 2.3, below, shows the list of suspicious interviewers generated using the mean adult
BMI in the wave 2 cross-section. As before, interviewers who were found to have cheated are
highlighted in bold. Interviewer E, who interviewed 97 adults, had the highest mean BMI of
17BMI is calculated by dividing a person’s mass (in kilograms) by the square of their height (in meters). A
BMI above 25 is considered to be overweight by the medical profession.
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55.3. The highest mean BMI measure that we verified ex post was 43.3, but was based on only
20 respondents. At the other end of the distribution, interviewer H returned a very low mean
BMI of 21.7, much lower than the overall average of 28.6 from 9 821 adults.
Table 2.3: Suspicious interviewers and mean adult BMI









Total 9 821 28.6
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Interviewers who were found to have fabricated data are identified by letter, and are in bold typeface.
Interviewers who were suspicious but did not fabricate data are denoted ‘OK’ and are not in bold typeface. N is
the number of completed questionnaires submitted containing adult BMI data.
Many of the same interviewers also appeared to be suspicious when BMI growth, rather than
the mean of BMI, was used for identifying cheating. As shown in Table 2.4, six of the 12 most
suspicious interviewers were subsequently found to have fabricated either part of an interview
or the whole interview, for at least one of their interviews. The mean percentage change in BMI
for the entire adult sample was 9%. Interviewer G, who only interviewed 32 adults, returned a
BMI growth rate of 173%, followed by interviewers E and B with 109% and 99% respectively.
At the other end of the distribution, H’s 117 respondents showed a decrease in BMI of 19%, on
average.
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Table 2.4: Suspicious interviewers and adult BMI growth













Total 5 560 9
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Interviewers who were found to have fabricated data are identified by letter, and are in bold typeface.
Interviewers who were suspicious but did not fabricate data are denoted ‘OK’ and are not in bold typeface. N is
the number of completed questionnaires submitted containing adult BMI data.
We present the suspicious list obtained by using mean adult height growth between waves in
Table 2.5, below. Interviewers who were subsequently found to have fabricated data are shown
in bold once again. Of the 5 710 adults for whom valid data were recorded in both waves,
the mean change in height was a rise of 0.11%. Interviewers H and A recorded the largest
mean growth rates of around 5%. The four most suspicious interviewers at the other end of the
distribution, Interviewers E, I, B and G recorded very large negative growth in height ranging
from -4.95% to -14.70%.
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Table 2.5: Suspicious interviewers and mean change in adult height










Total 5 710 0.11
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Interviewers who were found to have fabricated data are identified by letter, and are in bold typeface.
Interviewers who were suspicious but did not fabricate data are denoted ‘OK’ and are not in bold typeface. N is
the number of completed questionnaires submitted containing adult height data.
The final anthropometric method used to detect suspicious interviewers was a visual inspec-
tion of spikeplots of the weight distributions. This allowed us to quickly observe heaping at
focal points. Moreover, one weakness of the three methods used above was that they would
only diagnose cheating if the proportion of interviews that were faked was ‘substantial’ enough
to affect the mean.18 This method was not dependent on the mean of the weight distribution
obtained by the interviewer.19 It could thus be informative even in cases where an interviewer
had cheated on only a small fraction of surveys.
We provide two spikeplots as illustrative examples of recorded weights for adults, with val-
ues restricted between 48 and 100. The upper panel of Figure 2.3 shows the spikeplot of the
weight distribution of a non-suspicious interviewer. This interviewer interviewed 39 adults
(with weights between 48kg and 100kg) and recorded two weight values for each of them,
hence the uniformity at a frequency of two on the y-axis. Only two adults out of the 39 had
the same weight; 52kg and 81.1kg. Contrast this to the spikeplot of a suspicious interviewer,
18We also considered interviewers who captured anthropometric data that consisted of a ‘high’ number of
outliers. This did not prove to be effective. Almost all interviewers had some outliers, which could arise because
the respondent really did have an exceptional height or weight, or due to measurement error in either wave 1 or
wave 2.
19An additional approach that we used was to sort interviewers by the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th per-
centiles of their obtained distributions of height, weight, BMI and the growth of these variables. These did not
yield substantially new insights beyond those obtained from the methods already described and employed.
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shown in the lower panel of Figure 2.3. This interviewer interviewed 125 adults and there is
significant spiking at 65kg, 70kg, 75kg, 80kg and 85kg with relatively few of the other observa-
tions having different values. Note that the y-axis goes up to 44, compared with the upper panel
where it only goes up to 4. This distribution immediately raised suspicions that the interviewer
had made up the anthropometric data at best, and had fabricated the entire interview at worst.
Figure 2.3: Spike-plot of weight distributions
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
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Bringing the three anthropometric measures together allowed us to create a crude index of
suspicion. Interviewers were assigned scores of zero to three, depending on how many times
they were flagged as suspicious in each of the diagnostic methods. Table 2.6 shows the top 12
most suspicious interviewers according to the three anthropometric diagnostics. Every inter-
viewer who scored three out of three was later found to have fabricated data. Of the interview-
ers who were flagged as suspicious using the anthropometric measures, interviewers A and B
were also flagged as the two most suspicious interviewers using the Benford’s law method.
Constructing a joint index of the Benford scores and the anthropometric scores did not prove
fruitful, as some of the highly-suspicious interviewers according to the Benford method did not
provide much anthropometric data - they tended to record refusals in this section - while, in
general, the suspicious interviewers according to anthropometrics failed to provide many data
points for income and wage variables.
Table 2.6: Combined anthropometric suspicion index
Interviewer BMI BMI Growth Height Growth Row Total
H 1 1 1 3
E 1 1 1 3
B 1 1 1 3
G 1 1 1 3
I 1 1 2







Col. Total 7 8 7 21
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Interviewers who were found to have fabricated data are identified by letter, and are in bold typeface.
Interviewers who were suspicious but did not fabricate data are denoted ‘OK’ and are not in bold typeface.
An important issue to consider is that data in wave 1 could have been fabricated as well. If
interviews (or parts of interviews) were faked in the first wave of data, this could feed through
and make large changes in anthropometric data look suspicious. This would be problematic as
the error is entering in the first period, rather than in the second period, which was the focus
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of our investigation. On average, however, even if the first wave contains fabricated data, this
should be diluted as different interviewers interviewed different respondents in both waves.
The probability that the majority of a wave 2 interviewer’s valid interviews are combined with
mostly fake wave 1 data is small but non-trivial, given the spatial logistics under which field-
work was conducted in both waves. Our assumption, therefore, is not that the wave 1 data are
perfect, but rather that there is no perfect overlap between respondents who were interviewed
by cheating interviewers in waves 1 and 2.
One implication of the possibility that we are identifying wave 1 cheating instead of wave
2 cheating, is that we needed to be more cautious about our conclusions. The diagnostics that
we employed are inherently probabilistic, not deterministic, and this lack of determinism is
exacerbated by any wave 1 cheating that occurred. This provided an important motivation for
the second stage of our auditing process, which we discuss below.
2.3.4 The NIDS operational response
A meta-list of suspicious fieldworkers was drawn up using a combination of the Benford’s law
rankings and the anthropometrics rankings. The NIDS operations centre initiated an intensive
set of telephonic callbacks in order to verify whether or not the interviews of suspicious field-
workers had actually been conducted. Priority was given to calling back respondents who were
interviewed by the most suspicious fieldworkers and the NIDS team worked down the list sys-
tematically, calling every household for which data had been collected by that fieldworker, until
there was a high level of confidence about the veracity of the data.20
The callbacks comprised a set of questions intended to establish initially whether an inter-
view had taken place or not, and whether the entire interview had been completed. A copy of
the list of questions asked in the verification process can be found in Figure 2.D.1 in Appendix
2.D.
Where fraud was evident, all data from those interviews were rejected at the expense of the
company conducting the fieldwork. This was true regardless of whether there was partial or
total fabrication of the relevant interview. During the data collection phase, fieldworkers were
20Additional random callbacks to households interviewed by non-suspicious fieldworkers were also under-
taken, and these did not result in any additional fraud being uncovered.
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sent out in teams of three, with a team leader and two additional interviewers. The intensive
auditing revealed that data fabrication was generally a team-specific phenomenon. That is to
say, if one fieldworker in Team A was found to have cheated, there was a fairly high probability
that the other two team members also cheated. In all cases in which the team leader was found
to have cheated, the other two fieldworkers also fabricated their data, to a greater or lesser
extent. The auditing turned up one interesting case where a suspicious fieldworker was found
to have used the scale and measuring device incorrectly for the anthropometrics. In this case,
only the anthropometric data was flagged as invalid and the fieldworker was sent for additional
training.
Once the NIDS callback team had reached the point where fraud was no longer being un-
covered, a new phase of data collection was put in place to re-interview the appropriate re-
spondents. Instead of deleting data that was fabricated, thereby reducing the sample size in
the second wave, correctly collected information was re-integrated into the dataset. Figure 2.4
describes the different outcomes of the verification process. Overall, we identified 991 house-
holds that needed verification. Of these, 781 households were successfully contacted, meaning
that over 10% of the total sample was called back in the verification process.21 Of these 781
households, 234 were verified as having been validly interviewed. Furthermore, it was found
that 547 households had data that was not valid, either because of partial or total fabrication.
These 547 households were made up of 223 partial fabrications, 322 total fabrications and 2
which could not be classified.22
In summation, of all the households on the suspicion list that were successfully contacted,
over 70% had large data quality concerns that were driven entirely by fieldworker cheating.
This represents 7.3% of the wave 2 households at the time that the verification process started.
Of the 547 households with problematic data, a total of 394 households were successfully re-
interviewed and re-integrated into the dataset. Thirteen fieldworkers, or approximately 10%
of the total number of fieldworkers that were employed to conduct fieldwork for wave 2 of
21The NIDS team was unable to incorporate 210 households into the verification process either because invalid
phone numbers were provided and respondents could not be contacted, or because respondents refused to take part
in the verification process.
22These two households were successfully contacted and the reference person indicated that there was a prob-
lem with the interview process, but refused to provide further information.
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NIDS, had produced some data that was entirely fabricated.23 The rates of fabrication across
fieldworkers who were found to have cheated ranged from 10% to 67% of all households inter-
viewed.
Figure 2.4: Verification process and outcomes
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release and public release NIDS wave 1 and wave 2 data, 2010/2011.
2.4 Implications for analysis
By how much would the presence of the fabricated data have affected our estimates, had the
cheating interviewers not been discovered? Assuming that some fabrication is probably present
23Note that not all of their data was fabricated, but that some positive proportion of the data that they generated
certainly was fabricated.
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in most surveys, and simultaneously, that most interviewers are probably honest, should we be
wary of most empirical results? Alternatively, does the measurement error caused by inter-
viewer cheating have relatively small effects on our estimates, such that, for practical purposes,
we may ignore its implications with respect to research findings? In addition to the resources
invested in the production of data, considerable time, energy and resources are invested by users
of these data, and research findings subsequently feed into important policy making discussions
and debates. Measuring the effects of interviewer cheating on the validity of empirical findings
is the objective of this section of the chapter.24
From an econometric perspective, data fabrication leads to measurement error for potentially
all of the variables in some subset of the data. A priori, we cannot make a general prediction
about the effects of data fabrication on subsequent estimates, as the effects, if any, will de-
pend on multiple factors. These factors include the fraction of the overall dataset that is fab-
ricated, the difference between the fabricated data and the true data that it represents, the type
of estimator being implemented, whether the fabrication results in classical25 or non-classical26
measurement error in the variable or variables that are being used, and the magnitudes of such
measurement error. Moreover, if one is using a multivariate estimator, the empirical effects will
depend on the relationship between the variables being used in the fabricated dataset, relative
to the true relationship between those variables. Any theoretical predictions thus need to be
restricted by quite a specific set of criteria.
Nonetheless, there are some well known and fairly general effects that measurement error in
a regressor will have in a regression analysis. First, measurement error in an independent vari-
able will result in a violation of the orthogonality condition. This will induce biased estimates
24Note that this is a different kind of question about measurement error and mobility to the one asked in Burger
et al. (2016), in which measurement error of continuous variables such as household income poses a serious
concern for researchers of mobility who use South African household survey data.
25Assuming the true model is y∗ = X∗β + ε but we measure X = X∗ + µ and y = y∗ + v, under the
conditions of classical measurement error, u and v are i.i.d. and uncorrelated with X∗, y∗ and ε and the estimated
β coefficients are biased in the direction of zero. See Bound et al. (2001) for a comprehensive overview of the
literature on bias due to measurement error.
26Of course, the misclassification of a categorical variable such as labour market status or a dummy variable
such as employed/unemployed cannot be thought of in the same way as classical measurement error, as the error
itself cannot be mean zero. In fact, for dummy variables, the measurement error must be negatively correlated with
the true value of the variable. The case for measurement error in categorical variables is not as straightforward,
but a thorough treatment is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Krueger and Summers (1988) for a discussion of
the results of measurement error in categorical regressions.
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of the β̂ vector obtained from an OLS regression (Wooldridge, 2002). In the case of classical
measurement error, this will result in an attenuation bias, that is, a bias of the estimated coeffi-
cient towards zero. Second, some common estimators, such as fixed effects estimators and first
difference estimators, are more sensitive to a particular endogeneity problem than a standard
OLS estimator (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
In addition, Schnell (1991) and Schräpler and Wagner (2005) find that univariate statistics
such as means, medians and variance are generally robust to the presence of fake data, where
the prevalence of fake data is less than 5%. However, the negative effects of fake data be-
gin to compound as analysis moves to a multivariate setting, particularly when some of the
commonly-used panel data estimators are used (Schnell, 1991; Schräpler and Wagner, 2005).
We should mention again that our focus in this study is data that were totally fabricated by
interviewers, and not questionnaires that were partially correct and partially fake. As such, our
findings should be interpreted as lower bounds of the problem of cheating in this dataset.27
In order to provide an illustrative example of the effects of cheating in our dataset, we chose
to investigate the broad theme of understanding the effects of finding employment on health,
as measured by BMI. We chose this area of investigation for two reasons. First, we have spent
some time documenting the fabrication that took place in the labour market module as well as
the height and weight measurement module. The extensive discussion of the weight, height
and BMI variables in Section 2.3.3 provides context for the analysis that follows. Looking at
the effect of finding employment on a measure of well-being such as BMI complements our
section on detecting fabrication, and speaks directly to the labour market transitions matrices
that follow. Second, the determinants of BMI as well as the effect of employment on BMI
are topics that have received a great deal of attention in the recent South African literature
(Wittenberg, 2013, 2009; Ardington and Gasealahwe, 2012; Ardington and Case, 2009) and our
study provides an important addition to these.28 Indeed, some of this research uses NIDS data
to investigate the relationship between labour market status and BMI, and so the implications
of fabricated data for analysis are clear beyond this chapter. We then needed to choose a
27We use the term ‘lower bound’ in a non-technical sense. That is, we mean that the extent of fieldworker fraud
that was uncovered is almost surely less than the full extent of fieldworker fraud in the data.
28We also modelled the effect of receiving the state old age pension on labour force participation using the
Dirty and Clean datasets. The results of these analyses are available from the authors on request.
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set of variables and a set of estimators for our analysis. For the variables, we include BMI,
age, education and labour market status. Following the theoretical discussion in the preceding
paragraphs, we calculate the mean BMI, the labour market transition rates and finally, we fit
OLS and First Difference regression models of BMI on age, education and employment.29
2.4.1 Data
To implement the analysis, we constructed two datasets. The first, which we refer to as the
‘Dirty’ dataset, is a combination of the ‘Always Correct’ data combined with the ‘Fake’ data
at the time that our verification process was completed. Essentially, it represents what the
NIDS wave 2 dataset would have been if the cheating had gone undetected, and the survey was
completed at the date that our verification process drew to a close. The second dataset, which
we refer to as the ‘Clean’ dataset, is composed of the same ‘Always Correct’ data, combined
with the subsequently corrected data where such correction was possible.
The variables that we use are all at the individual level. They are:
• BMI - This is calculated as a person’s mass in kilograms divided by height in metres
squared. Since each respondent had either two or three measures of height and weight
each, we used the average of all recorded measures. There was no pre-population of this
variable in wave 2.
• Age - This was measured in integer years. The variable triggered a data confirmation
question for interviewers if the respondent had aged by less than 1 year or by more than
2 years between wave 1 and wave 2. Interviewers had access to the wave 1 roster, hence
even fabricated surveys would likely have appropriate data in wave 2.
• Years of education - This variable is bounded between 0 and 15. The wave 1 informa-
tion on education was also given to interviewers. Moreover, if the education levels had
increased by more than 2 years, or had decreased between wave 1 and wave 2, the soft-
29We collapse the four labour market states into a binary employed variable for the regressions. We did this as
it made more sense theoretically and it made the discussion of the regression results simpler. We also performed
the estimations with the labour market states disaggregated and the overall findings do not change substantially
(not reported).
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ware would ask for confirmation from the interviewers. Thus, we expect to have only a
small amount of measurement error on this variable in the fabricated data.
• Male - This is an indicator variable that captures the sex of the respondent. It was pre-
populated based on the wave 1 dataset.
The labour market status variables are comprised of four mutually exclusive indicator vari-
ables,30 which represent the labour market state of respondents. These are all derived from the
labour market section of the survey. These variables were not pre-populated. They are:
• Employed - This is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the respondent
had any form of employment at the time of the interview.
• Unemployed (searching) - This is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if
the respondent was not employed but was actively looking for work in the month prior to
the interview.
• Unemployed (discouraged) - This is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one
if the respondent was not employed and was not actively looking for work in the month
prior to the interview, but stated that he/she would like to have a job. The difference
between the searching and non-searching unemployed conforms to the standard ILO def-
initions for these categories (International Labour Office, 2011).
• Not economically active - This is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the
respondent was not employed, was not actively looking for work in the month prior to
the interview and stated that they would not accept a job offer.
There are a few additional data issues that require elaboration. First, for our entire analysis,
we restrict our estimation sample to include only the adult African sub-population aged 18 to
65.31 Second, we restrict the sample to include BMI values of less than 50, as we were con-
cerned that some of the extremely high BMI values were due to the scales being inadvertently
30There are some cases where the questions used to derive a person’s labour market status were not answered.
In these cases, we cannot define their status. Otherwise, the four variables would be mutually exclusive and
exhaustive.
31This is because we have small sample sizes for the other race groups, especially when using the balanced
panel members from wave 1 and wave 2. Wittenberg (2013) applies a similar restriction to the NIDS data.
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set to pounds instead of kilograms. In addition, we exclude any observation with any covari-
ate missing from our samples, as they would not survive into our regression analyses. Third,
we do not make use of either the sampling weights or attrition-corrected weights in any of the
subsequent analysis. Our objective is not to replicate population level analyses, but merely
to compare the differences between estimates obtained from the Dirty and the Clean dataset.
Moreover, we would have had to recalculate all of the post-stratification weights, as the datasets
that we use do not represent the full sample due to the time at which we completed our audit.
Fourth, in our regressions we re-weight the subsequently corrected data by the inverse of the
ratio of the number of corrected fakes to the number of fakes. We do this because we want the
weighted fraction of data from the ‘Always Correct’ data to be the same in the Dirty and Clean
datasets. The implicit assumption here is that the group of corrected fakes are representative of
the group of fakes that we were unable to subsequently re-interview.32
The sample sizes, and how they are affected by our restrictions, are displayed in Table 2.7
below. We observe that the BMI cutoff of 50 is not too onerous. We lose 106 and 84 obser-
vations from the Dirty and Clean datasets respectively. This represents less than two per cent
of either sample, and a substantial fraction of these are observations from the ‘Always Correct’
subset of the data. Our final sample sizes for the OLS and First Differences analysis are 6
768 and 5 388 observations for the Dirty dataset, and 6 576 and 5 263 for the Clean dataset,
respectively. The sample sizes for the First Differences regressions are substantially smaller
for two reasons. First, new household members would not have been interviewed in wave 1.
Second, any missing data in any covariate in wave 1 would have resulted in that observation
being dropped from the First Differences sample as well.
32We test the assumption that the corrected fakes are representative of all fakes by testing for the equality
of means between the corrected fakes and the uncorrected fakes, from the corresponding wave 1 data, for the
variables used in the regression section of the chapter. We find that we are not able to reject the hypothesis of
equal means for any of these variables at the 10% level of significance.
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Table 2.7: Sample sizes
Number Dirty Clean
All 6 874 6 660
BMI<50 6 768 6 576
Cross-sectional OLS 6 768 6 576
First differenced 5 388 5 263
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Sample restricted to African adults aged 18 to 65 in wave 2.
2.4.2 Summary statistics
The means of the variables in each of the sub-datasets, as well as the Clean and Dirty datasets,
are provided in Table 2.8 below. Note that the mean of a variable in the Dirty dataset will be
a weighted average of the corresponding means in the Fake dataset and the Always Correct
dataset, with the weight being determined by the proportion of the data in the Dirty dataset
that originates from the Fake and Always Correct datasets, respectively. Similarly, the mean
in the Clean dataset will be a function of the means in the Corrected Fake and Always Correct
datasets. Any differences in the means between the Clean and Dirty datasets must therefore
reflect differences in the means between the Fake and Corrected Fake datasets, combined with
the differences in their respective sample sizes.
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Table 2.8: Means of variables used in analysis
Fakes Corrected Always Dirty Clean
Fakes Correct Dataset Dataset
BMI 26.73 25.76 26.94 26.92 26.89
Age 35.45 37.08 36.16 36.11 36.20
Education (years) 6.74 7.47 8.12 8.03 8.09
Employed 19.82% 28.40% 33.99% 33.05% 33.77%
Unemployed (searching) 5.12% 15.56% 10.98% 10.59% 11.16%
Unemployed (discouraged) 0.69% 3.50% 5.93% 5.59% 5.84%
Not economically active 73.27% 52.53% 48.60% 50.24% 48.75%
Male 40.98% 39.69% 40.26% 40.31% 40.24%
Number 449 257 6 319 6 768 6 576
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release and public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Samples are restricted to Africans aged 18 to 65 in wave 2, with BMI values less than 50.
The number of fakes do not equal the number of corrected fakes because not all faked respondents were
successfully re-interviewed. The means in the Dirty and Clean dataset do not precisely correspond to the
weighted means obtained from the first three columns due to rounding effects.
For the BMI, age, male and years of education variables that we use, the difference in means
between the Fake and Corrected Fake datasets is relatively small. Thus, in the aggregated
Dirty and Clean datasets, the difference in means for these variables is very small, at less than
0.15 units in each case. For some of the other variables, such as Unemployed (discouraged),
the difference in means between the Fakes and Corrected Fakes is somewhat larger, at 2.81
percentage points, but the aggregate difference in means for these variables remains relatively
small. This is because the relative weightings contributed by Fakes and Corrected Fakes to the
means in the Dirty and Clean datasets are also small.
In contrast, for the Employed, Unemployed (Searching) and NEA variables, the difference in
means between the Fakes and Corrected Fakes is substantial. Even these differences, however,
get substantially moderated when we calculate the means of the Dirty and the Clean datasets.
For example, let us consider the percentage that are employed in the Fakes and Corrected
Fakes datasets. The difference in the means is large, at 8.58 percentage points. Nonetheless,
the weight that these contribute to the Dirty and Clean datasets is relatively small, at 6.6 and
3.9 percent. Thus the aggregate difference in mean percentage employed between the Dirty
and Clean datasets is only 0.72 percentage points. This is substantially smaller than the corre-
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sponding difference in means between the Fakes and Corrected Fakes dataset, and depending
on one’s interest, may or may not be considered to be ‘substantial’. Overall then, we confirm
the finding by Schnell (1991) that a univariate statistic such as the mean is generally robust to
the presence of a small amount of fake data.
2.4.3 Transition matrices
We next consider labour market mobility by calculating transition matrices across labour mar-
ket states. Each row in the transition matrix in Table 2.9 contains the distribution of labour
market states observed for respondents in wave 2, conditional on their wave 1 state. For ex-
ample, of the 2 348 people who were not economically active (NEA) in wave 1 in the Dirty
dataset, 73% were NEA in wave 2, while 12.27% had found employment.
The differences between the Dirty and Clean datasets are contained in the third matrix in
Table 2.9, below. A clear pattern emerges, even though the magnitudes are not too large in
absolute value. The presence of the faked data would cause us to systematically overstate the
likelihood of transitioning into the NEA state, and underestimate the probability of transitioning
or remaining in any of the other states, regardless of the initial wave 1 state. This reconciles
well with the cross-sectional differences in means from Table 2.8, where the difference in the
mean percentage that were NEA between the Fakes and Corrected Fakes was more than twenty
percentage points, and the corresponding difference between the Clean and Dirty means was
about 1.5 percentage points. It also seems consistent with the time-saving hypothesis that we
postulated would accompany cheating behaviour.
Nonetheless, the magnitudes of the differences are generally below 1 percentage point, and
only one entry is above 2 percentage points. Whether one considers these differences to be ma-
terial or not will, once again, depend on one’s perspective. If one were interested in population-
level dynamics, or in long run forecasting of retirement behaviour, then they could well be
material. On the other hand, if one were simply interested in the conditional probabilities of
transitioning across labour market states, then the Dirty and Clean data would not have yielded
a very different understanding of the aggregate levels of churning in the South African labour
market.
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Table 2.9: Transition matrices across labour market states (%)
Wave 2 State (Dirty Dataset)
Unemployed Unemployed





e NEA 73.00 6.05 8.69 12.27 100 2 348
Unemp. D. 53.13 10.34 12.26 24.28 100 416
Unemp. S. 43.32 6.62 22.42 27.64 100 861
Employed 30.16 4.31 7.48 58.05 100 2 205
Wave 2 State (Clean Dataset)
Unemployed Unemployed





e NEA 71.47 6.32 9.58 12.63 100 2 296
Unemp. D. 52.06 10.65 12.59 24.7 100 413
Unemp. S. 41.04 6.96 23.47 28.54 100 848









e NEA 1.53 -0.27 -0.89 -0.36
Unemp. D. 1.07 -0.31 -0.33 -0.42
Unemp. S. 2.28 -0.34 -1.05 -0.90
Employed 0.69 -0.07 -0.05 -0.57
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release and public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
2.4.4 Regression results
Our final set of analyses involves estimating the regression coefficient of employment on BMI.
We first present the cross-sectional regression results using wave 2 data, and compare the coef-
ficients from the Dirty and Clean datasets. One weakness of this approach, if we think that BMI
is a proxy for health, is that we are likely to have a selection problem since healthier people
will probably be more likely to find employment. A natural extension would be to estimate a
fixed effects model of employment on BMI. We thus also present the First Differences (FD)
form of the regression.
We do not have strong priors regarding the differences between the Dirty and Clean datasets
based on econometric theory. The measurement error in the employment dummy cannot be
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classical measurement error as the variable is a binary variable (Aigner, 1973). Moreover, in
the FD model, the error has a particular distribution that is not symmetric. Nonetheless, we do
expect that we have a measurement error problem due to the misclassification of the employ-
ment dummy, and that this will cause an endogeneity problem because this misclassification
enters the error term in the estimating equation. We also know that the FD estimator is more
sensitive to measurement error than the OLS estimator, so we might expect that the presence
of fabricated data will have a stronger effect on the FD coefficients than the OLS coefficients
(Hausman, 2001).
In Table 2.10, we present the regression outputs from estimating the OLS model on the
Dirty and Clean data. Our dependent variable is BMI and our regressors are age, gender,
education and employment status. The overall finding is that the regression results look very
similar. The R-squared values differ by 0.01 units, and none of the coefficients are statistically
significantly different at any reasonable significance level. The education variable, where we
do have something that resembles classical measurement error within a limited range, is indeed
slightly smaller in the regression using the Dirty dataset, but the difference is only 0.03 BMI
units, which is quite negligible. The coefficients on the employed dummy are both positive and
significant. The coefficient is slightly larger when using the Dirty dataset (0.76 versus 0.70),
but again they only differ by 0.06 BMI units.
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Table 2.10: Cross-sectional and first-differenced regressions
Cross sectional First differenced
Dirty Clean Dirty Clean
Variables W2 BMI W2 BMI ∆ BMI ∆ BMI
Age 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.00*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Male -4.52*** -4.60***
(0.15) (0.15)
Education 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.08** 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Employed 0.76*** 0.70*** 0.31** 0.18
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
Constant 22.50*** 22.00*** 1.03*** 1.00***
(0.37) (0.38) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 6,768 6,576 5,388 5,263
R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release and public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Samples are restricted to Africans aged 18 to 65 in wave 2, with BMI values less than 50. Columns 2 and 3
present results from cross-section OLS estimation. Columns 4 and 5 present results first-differenced regressions,
and the regressors should be read as differences, rather than levels.
The similarities are not surprising given what was observed in Table 2.8. In the cross-
sectional datasets the differences in the means of the relevant variables were all very small,
and most of the data in both the Dirty and Clean datasets are obtained from the Always Correct
dataset.
Our final set of results are obtained from the FD regressions and are presented in the last
two columns of Table 2.10. Note that the male dummy gets dropped as it is a time invariant
variable. Our findings from this component of our analyses are a bit more nuanced than those
from our earlier analyses.
When we compare the differences in the FD results between the Dirty and Clean datasets, we
notice that the Dirty coefficients on education and employment are larger than those obtained
from the Clean dataset, and they are statistically significant whereas those obtained from the
Clean dataset are not statistically significant. On the other hand, the differences in magnitude
are 0.06 and 0.13 BMI units for the education and employed variables, which are not particu-
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larly large. Moreover, the differences in the coefficients are not statistically significant. From
this perspective, the fabricated data does affect our estimates, but not in a meaningful way.
Alternatively, when we compare the OLS and FD results within each dataset, we observe
that the coefficients from both the Dirty and Clean datasets are reduced quite substantially. For
example, in the Dirty regressions, the coefficient on education is 0.13 in the OLS regression
but decreases to 0.08 in the FD regression. The decrease obtained in the Clean dataset is from
0.16 to 0.02, and also results in a change in the statistical significance of the coefficient.
A similar comparison between the OLS and FD coefficients focusing on the employed
dummy yields larger decreases in the coefficients (in absolute value) for both the Dirty and
the Clean datasets. If our only dataset had been the Dirty dataset, we would have concluded
that using a longitudinal estimator results in a decrease of our estimated coefficient from 0.76 to
0.31, that is a decrease of 0.45 BMI units, although both coefficients are statistically significant
at the 5% level. In contrast, if we had performed the identical exercise using only the Clean
dataset, we would have concluded that using a longitudinal estimator results in a decrease of
our estimated coefficient from 0.70 to 0.18, that is, a decrease of 0.52 BMI units. Moreover,
we would observe that the FD coefficient, unlike the OLS coefficient, is not statistically signif-
icantly different from zero.
One question that comes to mind is why the coefficients in the regression output are larger
for the Dirty data than for the Clean data. If there is classical measurement error in the X
variables, then one expects the point estimates to be biased downwards towards zero. However,
in our study, the opposite is true. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case.
First, the results of regressions on the Dirty dataset presented in Table 2.10 are not subject to
the usual assumptions about classical measurement error. For example, the education variable
approximates a continuous variable, but given the computer check when recording this variable,
it is not clear what the realized measurement error will look like. Second, the Dirty dataset in-
cludes measurement error of the dependent variables as well. With classical measurement error
affecting a dependent variable, we would expect larger standard errors corresponding to the
coefficient estimates, but our point estimates should be unaffected in expectation. However, the
possible non-classical measurement error on the Y variable in our study means that this expec-
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tation is no longer valid. In addition, the setting of our study is different to the majority of the
literature on measurement error. Instead of presenting a model in which we consider the error
of an X variable or a Y variable in isolation, the Dirty dataset potentially has non-classical mea-
surement error in both the dependent and independent variables simultaneously. The possible
correlation between errors associated with these variables means that the standard framework
is not applicable to this study. Extending from the cross section to the first differenced regres-
sions, it is also unclear what one should expect if one begins with non-classical measurement
error in the X variables and then estimates a longitudinal model using these variables.
2.4.5 Discussion
We are aware that we are probably not getting the true ‘causal’ estimate of labour market status
and change in labour market status on BMI, but our focus is primarily on measuring the differ-
ence between the estimates obtained by using the fabricated data instead of the subsequently
corrected data. This is the main contribution of this section of the chapter. To our knowledge,
all previous research on this topic has amounted to comparing an ex ante dataset containing
fabricated data to an ex post dataset where the fraudulent data has been deleted, but not re-
placed. In our case, where households with fabricated data were re-integrated into the NIDS
dataset, we are in a unique position in that we observe both the fabricated data as well as the
subsequently corrected data.
The overarching question that we set out to answer was whether the fabricated data would
have affected our estimates in a meaningful way. Our findings suggest that the answer to this
question depends on the estimator being considered and the purposes for which the analysis
is being conducted. The general picture that emerges, which is consistent with econometric
theory, is that the cross-sectional estimates of means and OLS regressions are not substantially
affected by the presence of a relatively small amount of fabricated data. At the same time, the
identical amount of fabrication does affect the longitudinal estimators. For the FD regressions,
the difference in the estimates would have led us to reach quite different overall conclusions.
It is useful to try to perform a cost-benefit analysis of our data quality investigation. Chal-
lenges arise in terms of attributing financial costs to the various activities that were undertaken,
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as well as on placing a financial value on the better quality data. Nonetheless, even the most
conservative calculations suggest that the investigation was worthwhile in that the value of the
benefits was at least 24 times the aggregate costs associated with the related activities. For
example, the overall budget for the entire wave 2 operation was approximately R34 million.33
If the deliverable of the entire project is a dataset, and we use the 7.3% fabrication rate that
we identified, and we assume that fabricated data has no value, then the cost of the fabrication
would have been about R2.48 million rand. In contrast, the costs associated with the investiga-
tion were primarily driven by the time invested by various members of project staff. In total,
we estimate the salary costs to have been not greater than R100 000. This results in a ‘benefits-
to-cost’ ratio of greater than 24, and we believe that this is a conservative estimate.34 As such,
undertaking active steps to quickly identify cheating interviewers is easily justifiable.35
Better quality data is always desirable. Thus, other things being equal, we should always
get the best quality data that we can. Unfortunately, running a survey is a costly and complex
task, and the costs of auditing and monitoring interviewers competes with several other tasks for
resources in a finite budget. Thus, the ‘other things being equal’ assumption is not very realistic.
Nonetheless, given the overall costs and effort invested in running a large survey, the marginal
cost of performing some generic data quality checks for fabricated data seems to be highly
warranted, especially in an environment where we now have evidence of fabrication in several
studies. In our study, the estimators that were most affected were the longitudinal estimators.
At the same time, the marginal cost of detecting fabricated data can be substantially lowered
when one has longitudinal data, as one can then look for inter-temporal data anomalies in
addition to cross-sectional data anomalies. This makes an even stronger case for the argument
that adequate resources be allocated for identifying data fabrication in longitudinal studies.
33At the existing 2010/2011 exchange rate, this was approximately 4.25 million US dollars.
34The estimate is conservative for several reasons. First, we have been generous in accounting for the time spent
by the staff on these specific activities, as most staff were working on several other tasks at the time. Second, the
proportion of fabricated data would potentially have increased with time in the absence of our investigation, as the
cheating interviewers were completing interviews at a relatively fast rate. Third, assuming that fabricated data has
no value is itself conservative. The point of the survey is to obtain data that will assist in evidence based policy
making, and thus fabricated data, insofar as it leads to false research findings, has the potential to have a strictly
negative and potentially large value.
35The benefits-to-cost ratio calculated in this section is from the perspective of the survey organisation (NIDS)
and not from the perspective of the company implementing fieldwork.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we argued that the incidence of interviewer cheating is widespread. We docu-
mented cheating and potential cheating in five substantial South African surveys. Of the various
methods that we considered to detect fraudulent data, two were more useful in our context than
the others. These were Benford’s law and the identification of anomalies in the anthropometric
data of respondents.
Looking forward, there may be ways to improve on our process for identifying fabrication.
First, survey companies that are using computers with built-in GPS devices to fill in question-
naires can use the software to capture the time and place that a survey was conducted. This can
be done without the knowledge of the interviewer, which will aid in detection. Using a GPS
software will allow much better monitoring of interviewers’ whereabouts while they are in the
field. In addition, interviewers that fabricate data are likely to complete entering the data much
faster than an actual survey would take to complete. These two pieces of information alone
would greatly improve the data quality auditing process.
Second, wireless networks and cellular technologies are now widespread even in developing
countries. It is thus not unrealistic to expect to get data with just a day’s lag. Previously,
while using paper questionnaires, it would take months to obtain data in an electronic form.
With the real-time uploading of the data, one can now check on each interviewer much earlier
in the process, and constantly monitor each interviewer’s performance. This enables survey
organisations to fire cheating interviewers, as well as compel the fieldwork company to redo
the interview.
The incentive structure facing interviewers is also an important part of reducing the proba-
bility of data fabrication, even before going to field. It is easy to see how a system of paying
interviewers immediately for completed questionnaires could lead to higher rates of fabrica-
tion. These perverse outcomes could be mitigated by delaying payment to interviewers until
a certain proportion of each batch of completed questionnaires has been verified. This incen-
tive structure is also reflected in potential principal-agent problems between the organisation
commissioning data collection (the research organisation) and the organisation responsible for
collecting the data (the fieldwork company). One possible way of mitigating this is to assign
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funds in the fieldwork budget that are specifically dedicated to verification checks. Another is
to make part of the payment to the fieldwork company conditional on the successful implemen-
tation of fraud minimisation and data verification exercises. Given that surveys such as NIDS
are longitudinal and require data collection over multiple years, the potential for repeated in-
teractions between the research organisation and the fieldwork company also serves to align
incentives.
One important part of obtaining high quality data relates to interviewer selection and train-
ing. In NIDS, fieldwork was outsourced to a survey company under the condition that all
interviewers had at least completed secondary school. In addition, all interviewers were re-
quired to attend an intensive week-long training course, during which they received repeated
assessments and feedback. Fieldworkers who did not meet the required standards were not
allowed to proceed with actual interviews. Despite this, the probability of fabrication cannot
realistically be assumed to be zero. Thus, ex post data quality checks remain an integral process
with which we can verify the data quality. This should be thought of as complementary to the
other efforts at maintaining data quality that occur prior to fieldwork.
Other possibilities might be to use built in cameras to take photographs of survey respon-
dents, real-time callbacks to ensure that the interview did in fact take place, and to strategically
not pre-populate certain variables in longitudinal studies so that sizable deviations from time-
invariant or slow-moving variables are flagged immediately. In summation, it seems that there
are several relatively low cost ways in which survey organizations can use modern technology
to minimise both the likelihood of interviewer cheating, as well as the impact of such cheating




2.A Time Use Study
Table 2.A.1: Time Use Survey selection grid
Persons
10 years + HH1 HH2 HH3 HH4 HH5 HH6 HH7 HH8 HH9 HH10
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
3 1 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 3
4 2 4 1 3 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4
5 3 5 1 4 1 3 2 4 1 5 2 4 2 4 4 5 1 2 2 4
6 5 6 4 6 1 2 1 2 1 5 4 6 1 5 3 5 4 6 1 3
7 2 6 4 6 2 5 5 7 2 4 4 7 5 7 1 4 2 6 1 4
8 1 5 1 3 6 8 2 5 1 4 5 6 2 3 5 7 6 8 2 8
9 4 9 1 3 4 9 1 5 2 7 2 9 2 3 4 5 7 8 2 6
10 3 9 1 6 2 3 4 9 1 3 8 10 5 6 3 7 2 5 8 9
Source: Time Use Survey Fieldworker Manual.
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Table 2.A.2: Chi-squared tests for difference in distributions
Number Number Person Number
Eligible of HHs 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total Chi-sq.
3 1 045
Expected % 50 70 80
Expected # 523 732 836 2 090 χ2(2)
Actual # 845 844 401 2 090 CV: 5.99
Difference 323 113 -435 0 Test stat: 442.7
4 1 104
Expected % 50 50 50 50
Expected # 552 552 552 552 2 208 χ2(3)
Actual # 738 731 530 209 2 208 CV: 7.91
Difference 186 179 -22 -343 0 Test stat: 334.7
5 901
Expected % 40 50 20 60 30
Expected # 360 451 180 541 270 1 802 χ2(4)
Actual # 529 434 476 265 98 1 802 CV: 9.45
Difference 169 -17 296 -276 -172 0 Test stat: 815.4
6 590
Expected % 50 20 20 30 40 40
Expected # 295 118 118 177 236 236 1 180 χ2(5)
Actual # 293 214 263 193 140 77 1 180 CV: 11.1
Difference -2 96 145 16 -96 -159 0 Test stat: 403.9
Expected numbers rounded to closest integer.
2.B Leading digits of other monetary variables
Figure 2.B.1: Leading digit distributions for other monetary variables
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 1 2008 and Wave 2 2010/2011.
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2.C Full fieldworker Chi-squared table
Table 2.C.1: Interviewers by Chi-squared ranking
Ranking Interviewer Chi-squared(no. of interviews)
1 A 39.7 (80)
2 B 31.2 (49)
3 OK 28.0 (66)
4 C 27.3 (74)
5 D 27.1 (100)
6 E 24.7 (42)
7 OK 21.7 (64)
8 F 21.4 (73)
9 OK 21.2 (44)
10 OK 19.8 (67)
11 OK 19.7 (43)
12 G 18.7 (47)
13 OK 18.0 (58)
14 OK 18.0 (73)
15 OK 17.0 (49)
16 OK 16.0 (52)
17 OK 15.9 (53)
18 OK 15.8 (53)
19 OK 14.9 (81)
20 OK 13.6 (41)
21 H 13.2 (51)
22 I 12.3 (53)
23 OK 11.8 (48)
24 OK 11.5 (56)
25 OK 10.9 (64)
26 OK 10.7 (48)
27 OK 10.5 (43)
28 OK 10.3 (44)
29 OK 8.4 (51)
30 OK 8.1 (41)
31 OK 7.2 (62)
32 OK 6.7 (57)
33 OK 6.4 (82)
34 OK 6.3 (41)
35 OK 6.1 (49)
36 OK 5.8 (66)
37 OK 5.7 (47)
38 OK 4.5 (71)
39 OK 4.5 (58)
Source: Own calculations using pre-public release NIDS Wave 2 data, 2010.
Interviewers who were found to have fabricated some or all of their data are emphasized in bold.
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2.D NIDS verification questionnaire
Figure 2.D.1: NIDS verification questionnaire




There is general consensus that the extent of money-metric poverty in South Africa has declined
over the last decade and a half. Various cross-sectional studies of poverty using household
survey data have chronicled a decline in the poverty headcount that is largely attributable to
the role of state support of household incomes (Leibbrandt et al., 2010; Bhorat et al., 2012;
Leibbrandt et al., 2012; Leibbrandt and Levinsohn, 2016). However, far less is known about
contemporary poverty dynamics in the country.
In the current South African policy milieu there is a rising emphasis on understanding how
and why people enter and exit poverty. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the dynamics
of poverty in South Africa using the first four waves of the National Income Dynamics Study
(NIDS). The focus is on absolute, rather than relative, poverty transitions. In this chapter
absolute poverty refers to using absolute poverty lines when analysing poverty dynamics. That
is, a line is chosen that is agnostic both to how many people are above or below it, and to
its position in the distribution of income. This line is held constant in real terms over the
different years for which data are available. A relative poverty line (for example some fraction
of mean or median income) is not used. The use of an absolute rather than a relative poverty
line is preferred as it is based on a cost-of-basic-needs approach, which attempts to quantify
the minimum amount of household per capita income required to cover basic food and non-
food costs. This is thought to be more informative than a relative line such as 50% of the
median, given how unequal South African society is, and given the large proportion of South
Africans who fall below any reasonably defined absolute poverty line. Furthermore, the focus
on absolute rather than relative poverty lines is in keeping with much of the preceding poverty
literature in South Africa, and allows for a more natural comparison with previous findings.
One of the key features of NIDS is the ability to model these dynamics of poverty over time. We
are less interested in describing cross-sectional poverty and more interested in understanding
the extent of movements into and out of poverty, who is making these transitions and the reasons
for these changes.
This chapter has two distinct sections. In the first we present a wide-ranging descriptive
analysis of poverty in South Africa using the balanced panel sample of respondents from the
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first four waves of NIDS. In doing so we uncover how much absolute mobility (both upwards
and downwards) was experienced by balanced sample members between 2008 and 2014/2015.
We also document the poverty-time interaction by breaking down poverty into chronic and
transitory components. In the second section we move beyond the simple enumeration of
poverty by shifting our focus to an econometric analysis of welfare dynamics using the full
sample available to us over the four waves of NIDS. In doing so, the focus changes from an
analysis of four wave poverty transitions using the balanced panel to an analysis of transitions
using a pooled dataset of all respondents. Our modelling strategy allows us to model poverty
dynamics while controlling for initial conditions and non-random attrition. It also allows us to
separate genuine state dependence from aggregate state dependence, and this has potentially
important policy implications.
This chapter contributes to the existing South African literature by being the first to use
nationally representative data to study changes in money-metric welfare over this extended time
period. It also takes seriously the questions of how to model these dynamics. This means being
cognizant of two phenomena that need to enter our estimation. First, we ask how important is
state dependence - whether or not an individual is initially poor or non-poor - in determining
poverty dynamics. Second, we ask how important is selective attrition in our panel sample in
determining poverty dynamics. It is also the first South African study that attempts to separate
genuine state dependence from aggregate state dependence - that is, it measures the relative
importance of initial poverty status versus individual-level unobserved heterogeneity in driving
dynamics.
Section 3.2 of this chapter follows Finn and Leibbrandt (2016) by briefly outlining the South
African literature on poverty dynamics,1 and section 3.3 discusses the data and weights used
in the first part of the analysis. Section 3.4 develops a number of univariate and multivariate
measures of poverty transitions, with inter-wave poverty entry and exit being treated separately.
Section 3.5 elicits the relative contributions of trigger events that are associated with poverty
transitions. The chapter shifts focus to a Markovian model of poverty transitions in section 3.6,
1The working paper cited undertakes an earlier analysis of some of the transitions contained in the first section
of this chapter, but with only the first three waves of NIDS. This chapter extends that analysis by considering data
and transitions over a longer period of time, and by explicitly modelling poverty transitions over the 2008 to 2015
period in a Markovian framework.
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while section 3.7 provides some concluding remarks.
3.2 The South African literature on poverty dynamics
Although there have been many studies of cross-sectional poverty in South Africa since the end
of apartheid (see Finn, Leibbrandt and Ranchhod (2014) for a short review), there is a relative
paucity of literature using panel data to analyse transitions. The best known study of poverty
dynamics in post-apartheid South Africa is Carter and May (2001). The authors use the first two
waves (1993 and 1998) of the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) to decompose
poverty transitions into what they term ‘structural’ and ‘stochastic’ components, using a sample
of approximately 1 200 African households in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The authors find
a significant increase in poverty rates in African households in the province, and also find that
the economic processes driving poverty dynamics served to increase inequality. That is to say,
upward economic mobility was stronger for those at the top of the income distribution than it
was for those at the bottom. The authors find that approximately one fifth of the sample was
poor in both 1993 and 1998, with a further 35% transitorily poor (that is, poor in at least one
wave).
Woolard and Klasen (2005) also use the first two waves of KIDS to model the determinants of
mobility and poverty transitions for just over 1 000 African households in KwaZulu-Natal. The
authors identify the main event associated with a transition into or out of poverty in a univariate
sense. These events are themselves split into demographic (household composition) changes
and income changes. It is found that about one quarter of transitions into and out of poverty are
due to demographic effects. The most important income effect for transitioning into poverty is
the household head losing a job, while the most important income event for transitioning out
of poverty is another household member finding employment. The importance of demographic
effects is confirmed in a multivariate regression analysis, though the sample sizes are quite
small with 129 households entering poverty and 223 households exiting poverty over the two
waves.
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Agüero et al. (2007) add the third (2004) wave of KIDS to the study of dynamics. Parts of
the paper are a natural update to Carter and May (2001), as the third wave is added as a new
data point. The authors complement the income analysis by calculating poverty rates using
expenditure data, though there are some serious misgivings about using the 1993 expenditure
data (see Leibbrandt et al. (2010)). The study finds that access to basic household services
improved significantly between 1993 and 2004, and this improvement is in contrast to the
backward steps taken on the poverty front in the mid-1990s. Finally, the authors highlight
the importance of government grants and, particularly, the child support grant, in shifting the
bottom of the income distribution to the right, and find that the impact of grants as inequality
reducers increased over time.
Finn et al. (2013) use the first two waves of NIDS to explore absolute and relative transitions
over the 2008 to 2010/2011 period. They find that almost three quarters of those who were
below the poverty line in 2008 were still below it in 2010/2011. This equates to approximately
34% of the total sample being poor in both waves for their poverty line. Poverty exits slightly
outweighed poverty entries over the period, and this resulted in a small fall in the national
poverty headcount ratio.
Finally, Finn and Leibbrandt (2013) expand on this previous study by adding a third wave to
the analysis. They find that although the rate of exiting poverty was higher between waves 2 and
3 than between waves 1 and 2, a large percentage of the South African population was trapped
in severe poverty (defined as living in a household with income per capita of less than half the
poverty line) in all three waves. They also document that the reduction in non-money-metric
(multidimensional) poverty was significantly larger than the concurrent reduction in income
poverty over the period.
3.3 Data and summary statistics of the balanced panel
The data used in this part of the chapter come from the first four waves of NIDS, covering 2008-
2014/15 (SALDRU, 2016a,b,c,d). The four waves of NIDS were collected in 2008, 2010/2011,
2012 and 2014/2015, respectively. NIDS is a nationally representative longitudinal dataset of
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individuals. Respondents are tracked over time, even if they change residence. In order to be
considered a resident member of a household, an individual must usually reside in a dwelling
unit for at least four nights a week, and must share food and resources from a common source
with other household members. As the focus in this first part of the chapter is on describing
poverty dynamics and transitions, the analysis is restricted to the balanced panel – those for
whom we have complete interview data in all four waves.2
Although the focus of this chapter is on the use of micro data to understand poverty transi-
tions, it should be noted that South Africa’s macroeconomic environment between 2008 and
2015 was not conducive to the reduction of poverty. Table 3.1 presents GDP and GDP per
capita numbers as well as their growth rates for the country covering the same period as the
first four waves of NIDS. The effect of the recession which lasted from the final quarter of 2008
until the end of the second quarter of 2009 is clear, with GDP per capita shrinking by 2.7% in
2009. Even though the recession technically ended in 2009, growth rates thereafter were gen-
erally quite low and were barely above zero during the collection of the fourth wave of data.
Trends in unemployment over the same period were equally concerning. Essers (2017) shows
how unemployment increased as a result of the recession and remained high at least until the
end of wave 3, and this was driven by reduced inflows of workers into jobs, rather than increase
outflows of workers from jobs. The post-apartheid trend of the economy shedding low skilled
jobs continued over the late 2000s and early 2010s, and the labour market failed to pull poor
households into employment (Leibbrandt et al., 2016).
2The sample includes adults and children for whom we have interview information in all four waves. For
children aged 0 to 14 a child questionnaire is administered to the mother or primary caregiver of the child, or to
another household member who is knowledgeable about the child. An adult questionnaire is administered directly
to respondents who are aged 15 and above.
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Table 3.1: Macroeconomic trends in South Africa: 2008 to 2015
Year GDP GDP growth GDP GDP per capita
(ZAR million) (%) per capita growth (%)
2008 2 708 600 3.2 54 322 1.9
2009 2 666 939 -1.5 52 838 -2.7
2010 2 748 008 3.0 53 823 1.9
2011 2 838 258 3.3 54 968 2.1
2012 2 901 076 2.2 55 543 1.0
2013 2 973 292 2.5 56 234 1.2
2014 3 023 826 1.7 56 469 0.4
2015 3 063 101 1.3 56 449 0.0
Source: Data from South African Reserve Bank (2017)
The timing of the collection of NIDS data raises two immediate points of concern. First is the
relatively long intervals between waves. Given that the time between waves was generally more
than a year (and, on average, more than two years), it must be the case that NIDS underestimates
the prevalence of short spells of poverty. The average number of months between interviews
for balanced panel members between wave 1 and wave2, wave 2 and wave 3, and wave 3 and
wave 4 were 30.0, 21.4 and 30.6, respectively. The second concern is the unequal nature of the
spacing between interviews over waves. For example, some of the balanced panel members had
only 8 months in between being interviewed for wave 2 and wave 3. At the other extreme, other
members of the balanced panel had 42 months in between being interviewed for wave 1 and
wave 2.3 It does not appear that differential intervals between waves are systematically related
to different population subgroups, though, of course, the longer the time between interviews,
the less likely we are to pick up short run dynamics.
Selective attrition over the successive waves of NIDS is something that has been a concern
– see, for example, de Villiers et al. (2013) and Baigrie and Eyal (2013) who note the dis-
proportionate loss of white respondents and relatively wealthy respondents (as separate from
race) between the first and second waves of NIDS. The attrition rates for NIDS are relatively
high compared to those in other countries with national longitudinal surveys (though these are
almost all OECD countries). This is particularly true for the wave 1 to wave 2 interval. Chin-
3Figure 3.A.1 in the appendix presents the distributions of time in between interviews for balanced panel
members for wave 1 to wave 2, wave 2 to wave 3, and wave 3 to wave 4.
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hema et al. (2016) provides the overall attrition rates for wave 1 to wave 2, wave 2 to wave 3,
and wave 3 to wave 4. These stand at 21.95%, 15.82%, and 13.75% respectively. These high
attrition rates mean that constructing attrition-corrected weights for the balanced panel sample
is an important undertaking. In order to adjust the balanced sample for the presence of selective
attrition between waves 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4, we constructed a balanced panel weight.
This was done by adjusting the original wave 1 post-stratified weight to account for unfolding
attrition. For each successive wave a probit model was run with the dependent variable being
a dummy indicating whether the individual attritted or not. Wave 1 to wave 2 balanced panel
members then received a new weight which was the product of the original wave 1 weight and
the inverse of the conditional probability of re-interview. The same process was applied to the
wave 2 to wave 3, and the wave 3 to wave 4 periods. Given that the original wave 1 weight
was multiplied by the inverse of the probability of re-interview, those belonging to groups that
were more likely to attrit in between waves received a relatively higher weight. This means the
attrition corrected weights are higher for, for example, white respondents, wealthier respon-
dents, and the elderly, all of whom were relatively more likely than their counterparts to drop
out of the sample, albeit for differing reasons. In some cases a high wave 1 calibrated weight
was multiplied by a high attrition weight, resulting in an extremely high panel weight. In light
of this, and in line with the NIDS methodology outlined in Chinhema et al. (2016), the panel
weights were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
There are 17 265 members of the balanced panel, and Table 3.2 presents some summary
statistics for this subsample. 83% of our sample is African, with coloured and white proportions
standing at about 8% and 7% respectively. The Indian part of the balanced panel is very small,
with only 151 respondents being successfully interviewed in all four waves. For this reason,
racial breakdowns including this group are generally avoided, because of the lack of power
associated with such a small sample size.
As expected in a subsample that is ageing, the average level of educational attainment rose
with each successive wave.4 The large decrease in the proportion of the balanced panel with no
education is because of the inclusion in wave 1 of children of all ages, many of whom started
4The education columns do not sum to 100% within each wave due to missing values for some respondents.
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primary school over the course of the first four waves of NIDS. The share of the balanced panel
with no schooling dropped from 20% in wave 1 to 6% in wave 4, and almost a quarter had
obtained at least a matric by wave 4.
The evolution of the household size variable is interesting to observe. The share of the bal-
anced panel living in single-person households rose by almost four percentage points between
wave 1 and wave 4. This category and the next smallest (2 to 3) were the only two to grow
between 2008 and 2015. The proportion of balanced panel members living in households with
4 to 6 people was 39% in wave 4, down from 44% in wave 1. The trend to smaller household
sizes in the balanced panel is reflected in the cross-section as well. In the cross-section, average
household size decreased from 3.53 in wave 1 to 3.20 in wave 4.
Turning to the three geo-types we see that the proportion of balanced panel members living
in urban areas rose from 57% in wave 1 to 60% in wave 4, while the shares in traditional areas
and farming areas decreased between 2008 and 2015. The provincial breakdown of balanced
panel members was relatively stable over the period, with small decreases in the share living in
the Eastern Cape and Limpopo, and a rise in the proportion living in Gauteng (not shown).
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of the balanced panel









Age 26.47 28.89 30.70 33.21
Education
None 20.33% 16.33% 12.71% 5.76%
Primary 32.73% 31.77% 30.75% 29.56%
Inc. Sec. 28.70% 31.88% 34.55% 38.57%
Matric 16.27% 17.92% 19.68% 22.25%
Tertiary 1.48% 1.71% 1.99% 2.39%
Household Size
1 5.46% 6.17% 7.19% 9.25%
2-3 21.75% 19.59% 22.18% 23.94%
4-6 43.85% 41.71% 41.27% 39.04%
7-10 20.60% 23.85% 21.94% 20.61%
>10 8.33% 8.68% 7.43% 7.16%
Geo-type
Traditional 37.55% 37.65% 36.82% 35.53%
Urban 57.23% 56.92% 58.44% 59.85%
Farming 5.22% 5.43% 4.75% 4.63%
N 17 265
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Before presenting poverty transition matrices, it is worth spending some time looking at the
composition of household income of poor and non-poor households in each of the four waves.
Our welfare measure in this chapter is real monthly household income per capita.5 We make use
of the household income variable in the public-release dataset which was adjusted to remove
imputed rent from owner-occupied housing in each wave. This was done because the imputed
rent variable in each wave contained a high percentage of missing values, making it a very noisy
component of income (even after single regression imputations were used to predict the missing
5We remain agnostic to the dynamics of non-monetary measures of well-being, which, by all accounts, have
improved more rapidly than improvements in household income (Finn and Leibbrandt, 2016).
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values). This follows the practice in many papers using the household income variable in NIDS
(for example see Leibbrandt et al. (2010)). Disposable household income is defined as the sum
over individuals in the same household of wages, remittance income, grants and income from
investments. Wages include the net income received from primary jobs, secondary jobs, self-
employment and casual work. Remittance income includes all monetary transfers received by
the household from non-resident household members. Grant income includes the state old age
pension, the child support grant, the disability grant, the care dependency grant, the foster child
grant and the war veteran’s grant. The sum of these components across all individuals in the
household is then divided by household size in order to reach a measure of monthly household
income per capita.
The choice of any equivalence scale when defining a welfare measure is going to involve
some trade-offs. In this thesis, dividing total household income by the number of resident
household members in order to reach the chosen welfare measure assumes that there are no
economies of size within the household. This approach continues the precedent set in the
analysis of poverty in South Africa (see, for example Woolard and Leibbrandt (2006)). Al-
though the assumption of no economies of size is quite an extreme one, it is not clear that
any of the alternatives offer a superior approach. For example, an equivalence scale such
as the one used in Woolard and Klasen (2005) in which household income is divided by
(adults+ 0.5× children)0.9. However, as noted in Budlender et al. (2015), defending the
choice of these parameters is far from easy, and their use may raise more questions than an-
swers. Woolard and Leibbrandt (2006) provides some evidence that poverty analysis in South
Africa is generally robust to the choice of equivalence scale, although there is still some debate
about the issue (see, for example, the analysis in Posel and Rogan (2016). Given the number
of issues that would be raised by the choice of any equivalence scale, the chapter proceeds by
appealing to precedent and to the simplest option, and simply divides total household income
by the number of resident members.
We used Statistics South Africa’s (StatsSA) headline CPI index to deflate the nominal income
data to their real values. The base period is January 2015, as this was the modal month of
interview for wave 4. All analysis that follows reports the income variables at their January
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2015 price levels. The use of headline CPI assumes that price changes facing people in different
parts of the country, and in different parts of the income distribution are the same. This is almost
surely a simplification of reality, as in practice different households consume different bundles
of goods, and therefore face different inflation rates. The use of plutocratic weights in the
construction of CPI means that the fixed basket of goods underlying CPI is more representative
of households with relatively higher expenditure. Leibbrandt et al. (2016) calculate percentile-
specific inflation rates for South Africa and show that price changes between 2005 and 2010
were anti-poor. That is, the rate of inflation faced by poor households was higher than that faced
by non-poor households, and also higher than the inflation reflected in headline CPI. However,
it is far from clear that deflating prices for urban and rural households separately would lead
to an improved measure of household income over time. As noted in Finn, Leibbrandt and
Oosthuizen (2014), the rural price indices released by StatsSA are calculated on the basis of
combining urban prices and rural expenditure weights. This creates a rather murky version of
rural inflation, as it would only be accurate if the prices faced by rural households were exactly
the same as those faced by urban households. For this reason we choose to use a single headline
price index to deflate incomes over time. If one extends the findings in Leibbrandt et al. (2016)
to the NIDS dataset, then choosing headline CPI rather than a percentile-specific CPI is likely
to slightly underestimate the true prevalence of poverty in the country.
In Figure 3.B.1 in the appendix, we present eight bar charts - four for poor households in each
wave and four for non-poor households in each wave. The y-axis represents the proportion of
total household per capita income made up of each component of household income. These
components are wages, government grants, remittances and investment income. Investment
income comprises stocks, rentals, private pensions and retirement annuities.
A comparison of the share of wages in total household income for poor versus non-poor
households shows that labour market income is substantially more prominent in the latter than
in the former. The wage share in poor households for this period ranged from 46% to 52%,
while in non-poor households it was stable at around 86%. The importance of income from
government grants for poor households is clear in this figure, with the share of income coming
from this source in the mid 40%s. As we show later, in Table 3.7, an increase in income from
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government grants was a very important trigger leading households to exit poverty between
wave 1 and wave 4. Remittances play a more important part in the composition of income
for poor households versus non-poor households - reaching a peak of 11% compared to 3% in
wave 4. Finally, investment income makes up between 7% and 10% of household income for
non-poor households in waves 1 to 4, compared to between 1% and 3% for poor households.
3.4 Descriptive poverty transitions
The NIDS wave 3 poverty transitions report (Finn and Leibbrandt, 2013) used a cost-of-basic-
needs poverty line of R636 per capita per month (in August 2012 price levels) which itself
was based on the line in Özler (2007). In this chapter, however, we use a poverty line that
was derived by Budlender et al. (2015) of R1 283 in January 2015 rands.6 This poverty line
was calculated by first deriving a nutrition poverty line to reflect the minimum cost of a daily
caloric intake of 2 100 kilocalories. This food poverty line was added to the average amount
of non-food expenditure of households with food expenditure at the nutrition line in order to
reach the amount of R1 283. In adjusting the original Budlender et al. (2015) line to its real
January 2015 equivalent, we deflate the food and non-food components separately using CPI
reports from StatsSA.
Transition matrices
In Table 3.3 we present poverty transition matrices for the balanced panel members. The four
panels of the table show transitions from wave 1 to 2, 2 to 3, 3 to 4, and 1 to 4 respectively.
Focusing on the wave 1 to wave 4 transition (shaded in grey) we see that of those balanced
panel members who were poor in wave 1, almost three quarters were also poor in wave 4. Of
those who were non-poor in wave 1, 79% were also non-poor in wave 4, while 21% transitioned
into poverty between 2008 and 2014/2015. The probability of transitioning out of poverty over
the four waves was therefore approximately five percentage points higher than the probability
6There is some sensitivity analysis to the choice of poverty line through the use of a measure of ‘severe’
poverty later in this chapter. Additional sensitivity tests using the StatsSA upper bound poverty line of R945 are
available from the authors.
3.4. DESCRIPTIVE POVERTY TRANSITIONS 68
of transitioning into poverty over the same period for the balanced panel members.
Table 3.3: Transitions into and out of poverty across waves
Wave 2 Wave 3
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 1 Poor 88.40 11.60 Wave 2 Poor 84.09 15.91
Non-poor 26.48 73.52 Non-poor 20.26 79.74
Wave 4 Wave 4
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 3 Poor 79.30 20.70 Poor 73.40 26.60
Non-poor 20.74 79.26 Wave 1 Non-poor 21.36 78.64
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
In Table 3.4 each cell within each panel gives the total proportion of balanced sample mem-
bers in each transition state. The four cells in each panel sum to 100%, rather than each row
summing to 100% as was the case in Table 3.3. Focusing on the shaded panel once again, we
see that almost 54% of the sample of balanced panel respondents were poor in both wave 1 and
wave 4. Just over 21% of respondents had real per-capita household incomes above R1 283 in
both wave 1 and wave 4. Almost one fifth of respondents were poor at the start of the period,
and non-poor at the end, while the opposite is true of 5.7% of the balanced panel.
Table 3.4: Poverty transitions: Proportion of sample by transition status
Wave 2 Wave 3
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 1 Poor 64.69 8.49 Wave 2 Poor 60.37 11.42
Non-poor 7.10 19.71 Non-poor 5.71 22.49
Wave 4 Wave 4
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 3 Poor 52.41 13.68 Poor 53.72 19.47
Non-poor 7.03 26.88 Wave 1 Non-poor 5.73 21.09
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Our final set of transition matrices, shown in Table 3.5, draws on the definition of ‘severe’
poverty used in Carter and May (2001), and classifies individuals as being in severe poverty
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if their real per-capita household income is less than half of the poverty line. Therefore the
threshold for severe poverty in this context is R641.50, and the threshold for poverty is between
R641.40 and R1 283 in January 2015 rands.
Of those who were in severe poverty in wave 1, 78.4% were either in severe poverty or in the
‘poor’ category in wave 4, implying that just over one fifth of the severely poor in wave 1 were
non-poor in wave 4. The transition rates for those who were poor in wave 1 are higher when
compared to the severely poor category, and this is to be expected as respondents could move
in two directions if they were in the middle category at the beginning of the time period. Of
those who were poor in wave 1, 27.5% transitioned down into the poorest category in wave 4,
while just over 40% escaped poverty in the 2008 to 2014/2015 period. The non-poor/non-poor
cell shows the highest level of stability, with 79% of respondents remaining non-poor in wave
4, conditional on being non-poor in wave 1. The proportions of non-poor wave 1 respondents
transitioning into poverty or severe poverty by wave 4 are 13% and 8.5% respectively.
The final panel in the bottom left section of the table contains cells that sum to 100%. This
allows us to see the overall proportion of respondents in each of the nine cells corresponding
to different poverty transitions. 53.72% of the members of the balanced panel were in poverty
or severe poverty in both wave 1 and wave 4.7 This table highlights that most of those who
were trapped in poverty were in fact trapped in severe poverty - 29% of all the balanced panel
members were in this category. The proportion of the sample that was severely poor in wave 1
and non-poor in wave 4 stands at 11.5%, while 8% were poor in wave 1 and non-poor in wave
4. Just over one fifth of balanced panel members were non-poor in both waves, while about 6%
transitioned from being non-poor into being either poor or severely poor.
7This corresponds to the proportion in the upper left cell of the shaded area in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.5: Transitions with finer poverty levels
Wave 2 Wave 3
Severe Poor Non-poor Severe Poor Non-poor
Wave 1
Severe 73.16 19.48 7.36
Wave 2
Severe 63.14 25.64 11.21
Poor 42.31 34.77 22.92 Poor 35.49 37.33 27.18
Non-poor 12.25 14.23 73.52 Non-poor 8.30 11.95 79.74
Wave 4 Wave 4
Severe Poor Non-poor Severe Poor Non-poor
Wave 3
Severe 60.21 24.36 15.43 Severe 53.88 24.55 21.57
Poor 33.35 36.87 29.78 Poor 27.47 32.48 40.04
Non-poor 9.36 11.38 79.26
Wave 1
Non-poor 8.52 12.83 78.64
Note: In this panel the cells sum to 100%
Wave 4
Severe Poor Non-poor
Severe 28.69 13.07 11.49
Poor 5.48 6.48 7.98Wave 1
Non-poor 2.29 3.44 21.09
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Roughly 83% of balanced panel members are African, and although this group drives the
overall results discussed in the previous three tables, it is interesting to highlight the results for
African respondents in isolation. This analysis can be found in Tables 3.C.1, 3.C.2 and 3.C.3
in the appendix. A comparison of Table 3.3 to Table 3.C.1 shows that approximately three
quarters of the full sample of balanced panel members (including Africans) were poor in wave
4 if they were poor in wave 1. The proportions transitioning out of poverty were therefore
also approximately the same. There is a fairly large difference when comparing those who
started off non-poor. 78.64% of the full sample who started off non-poor remained non-poor,
but for Africans this proportion was lower at 71.52%. Although the transitions out of poverty
were similar for African and non-African panel members, Africans were far more likely to
transition into poverty than the rest of the sample. Of course, with Africans making up more
than 83% of the balanced panel sample, the overall numbers are largely driven by this group.
Comparing Africans with non-Africans (rather than with the full sample) reveals some starkly
different numbers. Table 3.C.2 in the appendix shows that 60.36% of Africans were poor in
wave 1 and wave 4. This compares to only 21.82% of non-Africans.8 On the other hand,
8This table is not shown in the appendix. Full tables of comparisons are available from the author.
3.4. DESCRIPTIVE POVERTY TRANSITIONS 71
56.58% of non-Africans were non-poor in both wave 1 and wave 4, while the corresponding
number for African panel members was only 13.68%. Finally, as can be expected given the
previous results, the proportion of Africans who were in severe poverty in both wave 1 and
wave 4 was higher than for the rest of the balanced panel (see a comparison between Table 3.5
and Table 3.C.3). African respondents were more likely to transition from severe poverty into
non-poverty (12.69% of the African sample experienced this transition), but were also more
likely to transition from non-poverty into either poverty or severe poverty.
Poverty over four waves
Presenting all possible combinations of poverty status for balanced panel members across
four waves is a significant challenge. There are 16 different possible states (PPPP, PPPN,
PPNN,...,NNNN), compared to 8 different states if three waves are used, and 4 different states
if two waves are used. The approach of presenting the different combinations of states of
poverty and non-poverty over four waves as 16 possible paths can be found in Table 1 of Jarvis
and Jenkins (1997), who provide all 16 possible combinations for the first four waves of the
British Household Panel Survey. In this chaper a different approach is taken, and in Figure 3.1
and Figure 3.2 we use poverty transition trees to show the proportion of the balanced sample
that was in each possible state over each of the four waves. The choice to show poverty transi-
tions in this way is made because the trees contain more information than a table of 16 states, as
the proportion of sample at each node is reported, rather than only the proportions who end up
in each of the mutually exclusive final 16 categories. Showing the paths as a single table can be
thought of as a special case of the transition tree approach, with the 16 terminal nodes in Figure
3.1 and Figure 3.2 representing the 16 possible final states. Each node of the tree represents an
unfolding combination of possible states that a respondent could be in. For example, the top
node in Figure 3.1 shows that 73.2% of balanced panel respondents fell below the poverty line
of R1 283 per capita per month (P) in wave 1. Moving down a node, 64.7% of balanced panel
members were poor in wave 1 and in wave 2 (PP). Moving down another node and going to the
right this time, we see that 8.2% of balanced panel members were poor in wave 1, poor in wave
2, and non-poor in wave 3 (PPN). The terminal nodes show the final four wave combinations,
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along with the proportion of sample members in each. The PPPP node (the first terminal node
in Figure 3.1) shows that 46.7% of balanced panel members were poor in each wave in which
they were interviewed. Almost 10% of the sample was poor in the first three waves but exited
poverty in the fourth wave. Going right from the initial node, we see that 8.5% of the balanced
panel transitioned out of poverty between wave 1 and wave 2 (PN). Of that 8.5%, just over
5% remained non-poor in wave 3 (PNN), while 3.4% transitioned back into poverty between
wave 2 and wave 3 (PNP). Finally, 3.8% of the balanced panel was in poverty in wave 1, but
transitioned out of poverty in wave 2 and remained non-poor in all subsequent waves (PNNN).












































































Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel. P = Poor, NP = Non-poor.
Figure 3.2 adopts the same approach, except this time for the 26.8% of balanced panel mem-
bers who were non-poor in wave 1. The eight terminal nodes of this tree combined with the
eight terminal nodes of the previous tree provide all 16 possible poverty transition states. The
same goes for the eight possible states in wave three, and the four possible states in wave 2. In
this figure we see that only 16.3% of all our balanced panel members were non-poor in each of
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the four waves. In fact, 7.1% of the total sample was non-poor in wave 1 and fell into poverty
in wave 2 (NP). A slightly higher proportion of those on the NP path remained in poverty by
wave 3 (3.9% at the NPP node) than exited poverty by wave 3 (3.2% at the NPN node). The
terminal node of the far right of the tree shows that 2.7% of the balanced panel were non-poor
in the first wave, but then feel into poverty and did not transition out in any subsequent wave
(NPPP). Just under 1% of the sample transitioned at each wave, conditional on starting off non-
poor (NPNP), and this is roughly the same proportion as those who started off poor and also
transitioned in every wave (PNPN). 7.7% of the balanced panel sample started off non-poor in
wave 1, but experienced one wave of poverty during either wave 2, 3 or 4 (calculated as the
sum of NPNN, NNPN and NNNP). This is in contrast to 3.8% of balanced panel members who
were in poverty only in wave 1 (PNNN).












































































Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel. P = Poor, NP = Non-poor.
Although the unconditional poverty rates of the balanced panel in each wave are of less
interest to us than poverty transitions between waves, they are nevertheless embedded in the
transition trees, and can be calculated by summing the percentages at each ‘P’ node. Doing so
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reveals the unconditional poverty rates as 73.2%, 71.8%, 66.1% and 59.5% in each of the first
four waves respectively.9
Another way of displaying poverty states across four waves is presented in Table 3.6 which
shows the number of times respondents were recorded as being in poverty and severe poverty
over the total time period. Although this is a simpler display of poverty states, we sacrifice the
ability to show every possible state over every wave, as was done in the previous two figures.
As we have already seen, only 16.28% of the sample of balanced panel respondents were
classified as non-poor in every wave in which they were observed. This is in stark contrast to
the 46.7% of respondents who were living below the poverty line of R1 283 per month in each
of the four waves in which they were interviewed. The proportion of respondents who were
in severe poverty (living on less than half the poverty line) ranges from 29% who were never
recorded as being in severe poverty to 16% who were recorded as being in severe poverty in
a single wave. Just over 18% of respondents were recorded as being in severe poverty in all
four waves, though 55.3% experienced severe poverty in at least half the waves in which they
were interviewed. The middle column of the table presents the proportion of African balanced
panel members who were poor between zero and four times over the first four waves of NIDS.
As expected, given the analysis of the transition matrices earlier in the chapter, dynamics in
the African subsample drive the overall findings. Although just over 16% of the full sample
did not experience poverty in any wave, the corresponding proportion for African respondents
was just under 9.5%. The proportion of African respondents experiencing poverty in either 2
or 3 waves lines up relatively closely with the overall numbers, but significantly more Africans
were poor in every wave compared to the full sample (53% versus 46.7%). Perhaps a more
telling comparison is between African and non-African respondents. As already noted, only
9.5% of African sample members were non-poor in all four waves of NIDS. The proportion in
this category amongst non-African sample members was close to 50%. At the other extreme,
over one fifth of African respondents were in severe poverty every time they were observed,
while the corresponding proportion for non-Africans was a little under 4%.
9The unconditional poverty rates of balanced panel members should not be treated as being representative of
national poverty rates, which can be calculated by using each separate wave as a cross-section.
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Table 3.6: Number of times observed in poverty between 2008 and 2014/2015
Overall African Non-African
Poverty Severe poverty Poverty Severe poverty Poverty Severe poverty
0 16.28 28.81 9.48 20.77 48.89 67.38
1 8.51 15.89 7.79 16.2 11.98 14.37
2 10.30 17.74 9.86 19.23 12.42 10.61
3 18.24 19.41 19.8 22.67 10.73 3.76
4 46.67 18.15 53.07 21.13 15.98 3.88
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Chronic versus transitory poverty
We have seen that a large proportion of the sample remained in poverty in all four waves.
It would be useful to complement this finding by considering the extent to which the overall
poverty rate is made up of chronic versus transient poverty in each of the four waves.
This is, in some ways, an extension of the two-period conception of chronic poverty in
South Africa that is presented in Carter and May (2001). The authors find that 18% of African
households were in chronic poverty in KwaZulu-Natal between 1993 and 1998, and reinforce
the fact that a large proportion of South Africans were unable to take advantage of the early
post-apartheid economy.
Carter and May (2001), focus in particular on the role of assets in driving poverty over time
using the KIDS dataset. The authors use a combination of money metric and asset measures
in order to classify households as being either stochastically poor or structurally poor. von
Fintel et al. (2016) use the framework developed by Carter and May (2001) in order to inves-
tigate child poverty in general, and chronic child poverty in particular in South Africa. Other
studies that deal inter alia with chronic poverty in South Africa (also using the KIDS dataset)
are Roberts (2001) who delineates chronic and transitory poverty by demographic characteris-
tics, and Aliber (2003) who discusses chronic poverty in light of some of the macroeconomic
strategies adopted by the South African government in the late 1990s.
Given that we have four waves of data to work with, we can characterize the poverty-time
interaction in a number of ways. We follow Hulme and Shepherd (2003) who conceptualise
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different five types of poverty in an adaptation of the methodology found in Jalan and Ravallion
(2000). The original Jalan and Ravallion (2000) study of chronic versus transient poverty in
China uses longitudinal data over a six year period. The transient component of poverty in
that study is thought of as the contribution of inter-temporal variability in living standards to
poverty, while the chronic (or non-transient) component is thought of simply as time mean
consumption/income for all dates. The authors use the squared poverty gap as their poverty
measure and find that just under half of poverty in China can be explained by the transient
component. However, only 6% of individuals lived in households which were persistently
poor, and 54% were classified as never-poor. The five different characterisations of poverty
over time are applied to NIDS in the following way.
• Always poor: household income per capita measures are below the poverty line in all
four waves of NIDS.
• Usually poor: mean household income per capita over the four waves of NIDS is less
than the poverty line, but the panel member is not poor in every period.10
• Churning poor: mean household income per capita over the four waves of NIDS is in
the neighbourhood of the poverty line11 but the panel member is sometimes poor and
sometimes non-poor in different periods.12
• Occasionally poor: mean household income per capita over the four waves of NIDS is
above the poverty line, but the respondent is poor in at least one wave.
• Never poor: household income per capita is above the poverty line in all waves of NIDS.
These five characterisations of poverty are represented graphically in Figure 3.3:
10This is effectively the same definition used by Jenkins (2011) in defining chronic poverty.
11In this study we choose a window of 10% below the poverty line.
12This can be thought of as a special case of ‘usually poor’ with the additional restriction being that the
respondent’s average household income per capita is close to the poverty line.
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Figure 3.3: Five different characterisations of poverty over time
Source: Reproduced from Hulme and Shepherd (2003).
In Figure 3.4 we present the five different poverty states for members of the NIDS balanced
panel. The single largest group is the 46.67% of panel members who were poor in all four
waves. This proportion, added to the 18% of respondents who were usually poor, gives a
‘chronic poverty’ percentage of almost two-thirds over the period of 2008 to 2014/2015. By far
the smallest group is those who we have defined as ‘churning’ poor - their average household
income per capita was within 10% below the poverty line, but who were non-poor in at least two
waves. The second category comprising ‘transient poverty’ is made up of those panel members
whose average household income per capita was above the poverty line, but who were poor
in at least one wave. These made up 17.2% of respondents, meaning that almost one fifth of
the balanced panel members were in the ‘transient poor’ category. Finally, only 16.28% of
respondents were non-poor in every single wave.13
13This corresponds to the number presented in the leftmost terminal node of Figure 3.2.
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Always poor Usually poor
Churning poor Occasionally poor
Never poor
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
3.5 Trigger events associated with movements into
and out of poverty
Demographic versus income events
Given that our poverty line is a threshold of real monthly household income per capita, we
can expect changes either through the numerator (income events) or through the denominator
(demographic events). The trigger events that we use in this chapter are a combination of those
found in Jenkins (2011) and Woolard and Klasen (2005), both of which are based on the original
exposition in Bane and Ellwood (1986). The first kind of demographic event is a change in the
household head and/or a change in the composition of the household. This is typically one or
more people entering/leaving the household due to birth, migration or death. Thus the dynam-
ics of household composition affects our sample, even though the people entering/leaving the
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household may not be balanced panel members.14 The first category of ‘head or composition
changed’ therefore includes headship changes as well as other household formation changes.
The second category is assigned to cases where the head of the household did not change in
between waves, but the composition of the household did. Given that the head did not change, it
was necessary to determine whether changes in needs outweighed changes in income. This was
accomplished by comparing the proportional change in the household size for each individual
compared to a proportional change in total household income, following Jenkins (2011). If the
proportional change in needs was larger (in absolute terms) than the proportional change in
income, then the trigger event ‘needs > money’ was assigned to all individuals in the relevant
household.
There is, of course, a link between demographic events and income events affecting the
welfare of household members. This takes place primarily through the migration of household
members. Changes in the composition of the household may themselves be driven by changes
in income sources, as some research on the role of the South African old age pension on labour
supply suggests (Posel and Casale (2003), Posel et al. (2006) and Ardington et al. (2009) find
positive labour supply effects, while Bertrand et al. (2003), Ranchhod (2009) and Sienaert
(2008) find negative effects). Although this form of physical mobility is not the focus of the
chapter, it is worth highlighting some key findings about migration that have been uncovered
using NIDS data. The literature on physical migration and mobility in South Africa is very
thin, as noted in Posel (2010), which uses NIDS data to investigate some of the correlates
of physical mobility in the country. The paper compares findings from 1993 PSLSD data to
2008 NIDS data and concludes that a larger proportion of those who migrated around 2008 did
so for employment reasons, compared to those who migrated around 1993. Another, perhaps
surprising, finding is that although migration was driven by perceptions about labour market
access, the connection to origin households via remittances was weaker in the NIDS data than in
the PSLSD data. Clarke and Eyal (2014) use the first two waves of NIDS to study migration and
find that receipt of the state old age pension and, to a lesser extent, receipt of the child support
grant is negatively associated with the probability of migration of co-resident, non-eligible
14Each wave of NIDS collects data on all members of the household in which panel members reside, whether
or not these members were part of the base wave in 2008.
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adults in the household. They also find an inverse-U relationship between the probability of
migrating and household income. Respondents aged between 18 and 30 are the most likely to
migrate, while those with school-aged children and those living in rural areas are less likely to
move.
There are five types of income trigger events. The first three are: changes in formal earnings
of the household head, formal earnings of the spouse of the household head, and formal earn-
ings of any other household members. The final two income triggers are changes in remittance
income received by the household, and changes in income from government grants received by
the household.15 Income events are ranked according to the size of the change between waves.
So, for example, if the household head’s real formal earnings fell by R200, the spouse’s real
formal earnings fell by R800 and there was no change in the other income triggers, then the
appropriate trigger event is ‘fall in spouse’s formal labour market earnings’. Finally, there is
an ‘inconclusive’ category which indicates households in which no clear ranking can be estab-
lished.
More formally (and assuming that all trigger events are assigned), we borrow notation from
Jenkins (2011) to show that the probability of exiting poverty16 is made up of mutually exclu-




Pr(exit poverty via trigger j) (3.1)
Given that each event 1 to J can be formulated as the product of the probability of poverty




Pr(exit poverty|trigger j)× Pr(trigger j) (3.2)
15The state old age pension and the child support grant make up by far the largest share of household income
from state grants. The pension is means tested and is paid to eligible recipients who are aged 60 and above. It
is a relatively high amount at about 1.75 times the median of income for African respondents (Clarke and Eyal,
2014). The child support grant is also means tested and is paid to the primary caregiver of the child until the child
reaches 18 years old. The amount of the child support grant is approximately one quarter of the amount of the old
age pension.
16The notation for the probability of entering poverty via trigger k is easily seen from this example.
17Jenkins (2011) and Jenkins and Rigg (2001) also provide estimates that do not assume mutually exclusive
trigger events, though these do not form part of this chapter.
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It is important to note that although this analysis of demographic versus income events is
interesting and useful, we should be very cautious about assigning causality from the trigger to
the transition. As Jenkins (2011) notes, it is tempting to say that losing an employed member
caused a particular household to enter poverty, but it could also be the case that a household
entered poverty first, and this stress caused the household to break up.
The role of trigger events
The first feature to note about Table 3.7 is the fact that demographic events were more heavily
weighted than income events in terms of their importance in explaining transitions both into
and out of poverty during the period under study. A demographic change in the household was
the main trigger for 56% of individuals who entered poverty between wave 1 and wave 4. A
fall in the real formal labour market earnings of the household head was the primary income
correlate of entering poverty. This was the primary trigger for poverty entry for about one
fifth of those who entered poverty between wave 1 and wave 4. Falling earnings for household
members who were not the household head or spouse of the household head triggered poverty
entry for between 10% and 14.5% of balanced panel members, depending on which transition
is the focus. The shares of falling remittances and falling income from government grants were
relatively similar for poverty entry during each of the three time periods under study, and were
generally the relevant triggers for between 3% and 5% of balanced panel members.
For those respondents who exit poverty, the head change/compositional change share from
wave 1 to wave 4 is almost 14 percentage points higher than its counterpart in the poverty entry
category. It is interesting that the needs > money category (no change in the household head
but a compositional change in the household) contributes relatively little to the total explanation
of poverty exit – dropping to as low as 0.4% for the wave 1 to wave 3 transition.
The income triggers tell quite a different story for poverty exit than they do for poverty entry.
An increase in the earnings of the household head is the main poverty exit trigger for almost
one quarter of those who left poverty between wave 1 and wave 2, but its importance falls to
only 4% for the full wave 1 to wave 4 period. The importance of the earnings of the spouse of
the household head is relatively muted over the whole period, reaching a high of 3.9% for the
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wave 2 to wave 3 transition. An increase in labour market earnings from household members
who are not the head or married to the head is the main poverty exit trigger for about 10%
of balanced panel members for the wave 1 to wave 4 transition. This share is similar to its
counterpart in the poverty entry panel. The importance of increased remittance income is fairly
muted for poverty exit triggers, as it was for poverty entry triggers. One significant difference
between wave 1 to wave 4 poverty entry and poverty exit triggers is the role of income from
government grants. A drop in grant income was the main poverty entry trigger for only 3.5%
of those who entered poverty. In stark contrast, an increase in income from government grants
was the main trigger precipitating poverty exit for 23% of balanced panel members. This is a
reflection of both the success of the targeting and expansion of the state’s grant system, and the
failure of the labour market to act as the main driver of poverty reduction in the country.18
Table 3.7: Trigger events associated with poverty entry and exit
Poverty entry Poverty exit
W1 to W2 W2 to W3 W3 to W4 W1 to W4 W1 to W2 W2 to W3 W3 to W4 W1 to W4
Demographic
Head changed 34.83 49.49 52.02 42.10 34.34 47.50 50.55 55.91
Needs > money 11.70 6.75 12.96 13.73 3.75 0.62 0.37 2.64
Demographic share 46.53 56.24 64.98 55.83 38.09 48.12 50.92 58.55
Income
Head labour earnings 18.86 15.72 10.02 19.11 23.57 16.99 4.60 4.00
Spouse labour earnings 4.64 1.75 2.82 3.15 2.70 3.86 3.59 1.38
Other labour earnings 14.47 12.45 9.56 10.60 17.58 13.65 10.39 10.19
Remittances 4.67 3.65 3.91 3.98 2.18 5.08 4.50 2.10
Grant income 4.52 3.31 2.26 3.53 9.89 7.39 23.97 23.16
Income share 47.16 36.88 28.57 40.37 55.92 46.97 47.05 40.83
Inconclusive 6.32 6.88 6.44 3.80 5.99 4.91 2.02 0.62
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Observations 963 925 1 266 804 1 317 1 937 2 324 3 228
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Woolard and Klasen (2005) also analyse demographic versus income events in triggering
poverty exit. Their focus is on African households, and they use two waves of data from 1993
and 1998. The sample sizes are relatively small, with 129 households entering poverty and
18Eyal and Burns (2016) show the rapid growth in the reach and effect of the child support grant over the first
three waves of NIDS. By the third wave of NIDS 89% of those who were age and income eligible to receive
the child support grant actually received it. This equates to about 59% of all household in the third wave of
NIDS. A report by the department of social development shows that the number of children covered by the child
support grant increased from 2 million in 2002, to 8 million in 2008, to 11 million in 2011 (DSD et al., 2012).
Evidence of the effective targeting of the countrys state old age pension can be found inter alia in Abel (2013) and
Standish-White and Finn (2015).
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223 exiting poverty over the two waves. In contrast to the findings in this chapter, Woolard and
Klasen (2005) attribute most of the transitions into and out of poverty to income, rather than de-
mographic events. They find that demographic events are responsible for 27.4% of households
falling into poverty, and 23.6% of households exiting poverty. This is far less than this chapter’s
corresponding figures of 55.8% and 58.6% for poverty entry and exit respectively. Of income
events between 1993 and 1998, Woolard and Klasen (2005) find that the single most important
factors for households entering poverty are the head of the household losing a job, followed
by another household member losing a job, followed by a drop in remittances. Income events
most strongly associated with poverty exit are another household member gaining employment,
followed by the household head gaining employment, followed by a rise in remittances.
The prominence of demographic trigger events over income trigger events in explaining
paths into and out of poverty may be driven in part by the choice of the per capita equivalence
scale. In order to investigate how sensitive the results are to the choice of the equivalence
scale, Table 3.D.1 in the appendix presents the demographic and income trigger events for the
same equivalence scale used in Woolard and Klasen (2005). That is, total household income
is divided by (adults+ 0.5× children)0.9, rather than simply by household size. Note that in
comparing Table 3.7 and Table 3.D.1 we are not comparing exactly the same subsamples, as
the choice of equivalence scale has an effect on which households transition into and out of
poverty. The first thing to note about the use of the new equivalence scale is that the number of
observations falling into poverty between wave 1 and wave 4 is lower than if household income
is divided by the number of household members (479 compared to 804). The effect works in
the same way when considering those who exited poverty (5 945 using the new equivalence
scale compared to 3 228 using the old equivalence scale).
The overall effect of using the modified equivalence scale changes the relative weightings of
the demographic and income effects differently whether one considers poverty entry or poverty
exit. For the former, the share of demographic trigger events in explaining poverty entry rises
from 55.83% to 58.92% when analysing transitions between wave 1 and wave 4. However, this
is the only transition in which the demographic share rises – it falls for the wave 1 to wave 2,
wave 2 to wave 3 and wave 3 to wave 4 transitions. This increase is entirely due to the rise in
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the importance of a change in the head of the household, rather than a change in the needs to
money ratio. Continuing with the wave 1 to wave 4 poverty entry transitions, the importance of
a negative change in the labour market earnings of a household member who was not the head,
or married to the head, decreases substantially if the modified equivalence scale is used. This
change has the opposite effect on the importance of a change in grant income in the household,
with the share of trigger events attributable to this factor rising from 3.53% to 7.38%.
The dynamics underlying poverty exit are also affected by a change in the underlying equiv-
alence ratio, but the qualitative result of demographic events outweighing income events re-
mains the same. If a per capita equivalence scale is used, then 58.55% of poverty exits can be
explained by demographic events. The corresponding share if the modified equivalence scale
is used is slightly lower at 54.26%. The fall in the demographic share is due to lower weight-
ing of both components of that measure. The change in equivalence scale raises the shares of
all the items in the income change category except for changes in grant income, which falls
very slightly from 23.16% to 22.71%. In summary, the choice of whether to use a per capita
equivalence scale or the equivalence scale used in Woolard and Klasen (2005) makes very little
difference to the qualitative findings of the trigger events approach to explaining transitions into
and out of poverty.
3.6 A Markovian model of poverty transitions
We now change the focus of the chapter from descriptive statistics to a careful modelling of
the dynamics. Although it may be tempting to adopt a univariate probit approach to modelling
poverty transitions, this approach may produce biased results by not controlling for initial con-
ditions and selective attrition. In this section we model transitions while specifically controlling
for both of these factors. The model exposition and implementation closely follows Cappellari
and Jenkins (2004) and Jenkins (2011).
As noted by Jenkins (2011), much of the international literature on poverty dynamics adopts
either a hazard model approach or a variance-component approach to understanding transitions.
A third approach, and one that has not been applied very often in the international literature
3.6. A MARKOVIAN MODEL OF POVERTY TRANSITIONS 85
nor, indeed, at all to South African data, is a so-called first order Markov model of poverty
dynamics.
The Markovian approach to poverty dynamics has, as a first advantage over alternative meth-
ods, the ability to take initial conditions (the presence of a lagged dependent variable in the
model that is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity) and non-random attrition into account.
The approach, in theory, allows the researcher to overcome the biases presented by both the
initial conditions and non-random attrition by modelling both jointly with the probability of
transitioning into or out of poverty. This is not something that can easily be incorporated into a
more traditional hazard model of poverty dynamics.
The initial conditions problem in the analysis of transitions was first suggested by Heckman
(1981a). Essentially, the problem is that if we find a certain level of state dependence when
analysing poverty, it may be that those who are more likely to be permanently poor are over-
represented in the sample. Another way of thinking about the problem is that the start of
the period of analysis (in our case wave 1) does not coincide with the start of the process
that generates poverty or non-poverty outcomes. As noted in Arulampalam et al. (2000),19 a
model may control for unobserved heterogeneity, but it is also important to separate out the
effect of state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. That is, the initial condition must
be modelled explicitly as it may be correlated with the unobservables.
A second advantage of the approach is that it allows for left-censored poverty spells to be
incorporated into the model. A conventional hazard model would drop all data for respondents
who are poor in every period (almost half our sample), and data for those who are non-poor in
every period (a further 16% of our sample). This means that a lot of individuals would fall out
of the dataset, which increases the probability of the estimation sample being unrepresentative
(Jenkins, 2011). The cost of this second advantage relative to other methods is that it is gained
by the assumption that there is no duration dependence.
A third advantage that this model offers over its alternatives is the ability to circumvent
the strict exogeneity assumption made about the explanatory variables. In other words, as
noted in Biewen (2009), a Markovian approach to poverty transitions avoids having to make
19In the context of unemployment dynamics.
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the assumption that there is no feedback from dependent variables on future values of the
explanatory variables. The cost of doing so is that this approach will yield inefficient estimates
due to the fact that the longitudinal nature of the data is not fully exploited.
In summation, the use of a Markovian model to analyse poverty dynamics in South Africa
allows us to buy identification while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, non-random
attrition and initial conditions in a single framework, by making some strong distributional and
exogeneity assumptions. The estimates obtained can be used to predict poverty spell lengths
for individuals with different characteristics.20
The data suggest that controlling for initial conditions and selective attrition when modelling
poverty dynamics in South Africa is warranted.21 This is motivated by the output in Table
3.8 which shows poverty transitions for the pooled sample of respondents over the four waves
of NIDS. It is important to note that this table is different to Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, as our
modelling strategy requires us to used pooled data to model transitions, and so we do not
restrict ourselves to the balanced panel in any future analysis in the chapter.
The first panel of the table presents poverty transitions for all respondents for whom house-
hold income was recorded in two consecutive waves. Just over 29% of those who were non-
poor in year t−1 were poor in year t. Of those who were poor in year t−1, 14% were non-poor
in year t. This panel confirms the findings in the descriptive section of this chapter by showing
how the probability of being poor in a given year is highly dependent on the probability of
being poor in the previous time period. Clearly, initial conditions are important here, and state
dependence should not be ignored. Indeed, the poverty rate for those who were poor in year
t− 1 is almost 57 percentage points higher than it is for those who were non-poor in the same
year.
This ‘naı̈ve’ transition matrix presents poverty transitions without controlling for individual
and household heterogeneity, and may be thought of as reflecting ‘aggregate’ state dependence,
something to which we will return. The estimation strategy that follows allows us to control
for the determinants of initial poverty status, and allows for these determinants to be correlated
20One of the downsides of modelling poverty under the assumption of a first-order Markov process is that the
model is not fully efficient as it only uses data from t− 1 and t.
21A full summary of the descriptive statistics for the observations used in the Markovian model can be found
in Table 3.E.1 in the appendix.
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to current poverty status. This allows us to uncover a measure of ‘genuine’ state dependence -
the measurement of which we will return to after the results of the model have been presented.
While panel a) highlights the importance of initial conditions in determining poverty tran-
sitions, panel b) shows that ignoring selective attrition could be problematic at the estimation
stage. The final column in Table 3.8 shows the extent of attrition between t − 1 and t for
non-poor and poor sample members respectively. The rate of attrition from t − 1 to t differs
substantially between the initially non-poor and the initially poor, and is 23.4% and 16.5% re-
spectively. The relatively higher rate of attrition amongst non-poor sample members compared
to poor sample members may result in a selected sample that biases our estimation of poverty
dynamics.22
An overview of the nature of attrition across the first four waves of NIDS can be found in
Chinhema et al. (2016), while Baigrie and Eyal (2013) contains a more detailed analysis of the
determinants of attrition between the first two waves of NIDS. Chinhema et al. (2016) notes that
non-contact23 was the primary reason for respondents dropping out between waves 1 and 2, and
waves 3 and 4. The biggest reason for attrition between wave 2 and 3 was the refusal of respon-
dents to participate. The share of attrition attributable to respondents dying between waves
was stable at around 15% for all three wave-to-wave transitions. Attrition amongst African
respondents was mainly driven by non-contact, while the dominant reason for coloured and
white respondents dropping out of the sample was refusal to participate. The overall attrition
rate dropped from 22% to 16% to 14% for each successive wave-to-wave transition. This,
however, hides stark differences in the attrition rates of each racial group. More than 50% of
white respondents attritted in each new wave, while the rate of attrition of coloured respondents
dropped from 27% to 18% to 16%. The African attrition rate decreased significantly with each
additional wave of data - from 19% to 13% to 11%.
22Modelling non-random attrition in this way is different to correcting for attrition using panel weights, (as was
done in the descriptive sections of this chapter) because the model explicitly takes account of the unobservables.
23By this we mean the inability of enumerators to locate the panel member.
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Table 3.8: Poverty transitions with and without missing data
Poverty status at t-1 Poverty status at t
Non-poor Poor Missing





Non-poor 54.28 22.32 23.40
Poor 11.75 71.74 16.51
Total 21.68 60.20 18.12
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Pooled transitions with sample size of 40 850
individuals (panel b), and 88 090 person-waves. Rows sum to 100%.
Our estimation strategy in the chapter allows us to model poverty transitions while at the
same time accounting for initial conditions and non-random attrition. The following section
provides an outline of the theory underlying the empirics for our estimation of poverty dynam-
ics.
Theoretical background to the estimation
The Markovian approach to poverty transitions models dynamics from base period t− 1 to the
next period t. There are four components to the model which are:
• The determination of poverty status in t− 1 to account for initial conditions.
• The determination of whether monthly household per capita income is observed in peri-
ods t− 1 and t, in order to account for selective attrition.
• The determination of poverty status in period t.
• The correlation between unobservables that influence each of the three processes above.
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Initial poverty
In the base year there is a latent propensity for poverty over individuals i = 1, ..., N , individual
and household explanatory variables in the vector xit−1, parameters β and error term uit−1 =
µi + δit−1 which is distributed N(0,1) and contains an individual-specific component plus an
orthogonal white noise component:
p∗it−1 = β
′xit−1 + µi + δit−1 (3.3)
As we only observe discrete outcomes of this latent model, we define a poverty indicator
variable Pit−1 = 1 if p∗it−1 > 0 (where 0 is the unobserved threshold) and zero otherwise.
Retention
We now move to model the probability that a respondent is observed in both the base and the
subsequent wave of data. The latent propensity for retention, r∗it, is given by the relationship:
r∗it = ψ
′wit−1 + ηi + ξit (3.4)
where the error term vit is once again distributed N(0,1) and is composed of an individual fixed
effect ηi and a normal white noise error term ξit. Rit is a binary indicator for whether the
respondent is observed in both periods, and is assigned a value of 1 if r∗it > 0 where, once
again, the threshold has been normalized to 0.
Current poverty
The third part of the model is the determination of poverty in period t. Once again, we adopt
a latent variable approach with poverty status in period t being characterized by the following
relationship:
p∗it = [(Pit−1) γ
′
1 + (1− Pit−1) γ′2] zit−1 + τi + ζit (3.5)
where γ1, γ2 and zit−1 are vectors and the composite error term εit is distributed N(0,1) and once
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again comprises individual (τi) and white noise (ζit) components. The vector of covariates zit−1
contains individual and household characteristics, as well as a constant term. Finally, let the
observed poverty status Pit = 1 if p∗ > 0 and zero otherwise. This is, of course, only observed
if Rit = 1.
The specification above allows not only for base characteristics to impact poverty in the final
period, but also for a characteristic to have a differing impact on the probability of entering or
exiting poverty.
The three error terms, uit−1, vit and εit, are assumed to be distributed trivariate standard
normal. There are three important correlations that we will estimate in order to parameterize
the unobserved heterogeneity in the model. These are:
ρ1 ≡ corr(uit−1, vit) = cov(µi, ηi) (3.6)
which gives the relationship between unobserved heterogeneity determining poverty in the base
year and the probability of remaining in the sample. In this case, a positive correlation implies
that poor respondents at t− 1 are less likely to have attritted by period t.
ρ2 ≡ corr(uit−1, εit) = cov(µi, τi) (3.7)
which gives the relationship between unobserved heterogeneity that impacts on base year and
final year poverty status. If this correlation is positive then it implies that respondents who
started off poor are more likely to be poor in the next period than those who started off non-
poor.
ρ3 ≡ corr(vit−1, εit) = cov(ηi, τi) (3.8)
which is the relationship between the unobservables determining the probability of being re-
tained in the sample and poverty status in the final period. In this case a positive correlation
implies that those who are retained in the sample are more likely to remain poor or transition
into poverty than those who attrit between the two time periods.
In any event, there are some interesting testable relationships to consider. If ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 =
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0, then poverty dynamics can be estimated separately using any univariate binary dependent
variable model, such as a probit. However, if ρ1 = ρ3 = 0 then the process of attrition is
ignorable and the model to be estimated becomes a bivariate probit. Finally, if ρ1 = ρ2 = 0
then we do not have to take initial conditions into account, and the poverty status in the base
period may be treated as exogenous.
Given the descriptive statistics that have been presented, it is likely that the probability of
the unobserved factors being uncorrelated with one another is very small. Incorporating ini-
tial conditions, non-random attrition and unobserved individual heterogeneity into the model
requires the estimation of a partial likelihood estimator of the type used in Jenkins (2011) and
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004).
From panel b) in Table 3.8 we see that there are six possible outcome combinations for a
given sample member between t− 1 and t. These are, non-poor to non-poor, non-poor to poor,
poor to non-poor, poor to poor, non-poor to missing, and poor to missing. The setup of the
model implies the following equations for poverty persistence (poor in both time periods) and
poverty entry (non-poor in the first period, poor in the second) respectively:














In the two equations above Φ2 and Φ refer to the CDFs of the bivariate and univariate standard
normal distributions respectively. Note that the regressors in these transition probabilities are
measured using data from period t − 1. This allows us to calculate transitions (or persistence)
for those respondents with Rit = 0.
The sample log likelihood function contains six possible outcomes based on poverty status
in the initial wave and on sample retention. Sample members who were retained in the panel
fall into four possible outcome categories, depending on initial poverty status, while those who
attritted are only observed as either non-poor or poor in the initial period. Therefore the log
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likelihood contribution of individual i whose poverty status is observed in the initial period is
given by the following sample log likelihood function:





+ (1− Pit−1)Ritlog [Φ3(kiγ′2zit−1,miψ′wit−1, qiβ′xit−1; kimiρ3, kiqiρ2;miqiρ1)]
+ (1−Rit)log [Φ2(miψ′wit−1, qiβ′xit−1;miqiρ1)]
where ki ≡ 2Pit− 1, mi ≡ 2Rit−1− 1, qi ≡ 2Pit−1− 1. The first term in the sample likelihood
function corresponds to the contribution of an individual who was poor in the initial wave and
was retained in the sample. The second term is the contribution of an individual who was non-
poor in the initial wave and was retained in the sample. The third term is the contribution of an
individual whose poverty status was observed in the initial wave, but who was not retained in
the sample.
The presence of the trivariate standard normal distribution function in the sample log likeli-
hood function means that estimation of the model is rather complicated, and because of this we
rely on the simulation methods outlined in Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996), and presented in
the context of an endogenous switching model in Cappellari and Jenkins (2006). Our estima-
tion in this study uses the GHK simulator with 250 random draws.
One important part of the estimation process to consider is the fact that by pooling obser-
vations we are violating the maximum likelihood estimation assumption of independently and
identically distributed observations. In order to correct for this we cluster our standard errors at
the household level in the wave in which each respondent first appears in the data. For example,
if a respondent appears in all four waves, the cluster is defined as the household identifier in
wave 1. Respondents who are added to the sample from wave 2 onwards (such as TSMs) are
allocated a cluster according to the household in which they are first observed. This allows us
to account for arbitrary levels of intra-household correlation while maintaining the assumption
of independence across households.
Identification in this model can come in two ways. One can either force the cross-equation
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correlations to equal zero, or invoke a set of exclusion restrictions that impact on initial poverty
or the probability of attrition, but do not have an effect on the transitions themselves. The first
method is not attractive, as one of the strengths of this particular way of thinking about poverty
transitions is that we can, in fact, estimate these cross-equation correlations. This means we
have to argue for identification of the model through a set of exclusion restrictions that allow us
to test whether initial conditions and attrition are exogenous. If we find that ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = 0
then we can simply use univariate probit models to estimate poverty dynamics. Similarly, if we
find that ρ1 = ρ3 = 0 then we can treat attrition as random and ignorable, and our estimation
reduces to a bivariate probit model. Finally, if we find that ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, then we are able to
treat poverty in t−1 as exogenous. These are interesting questions even if asked independently
of the trivariate model itself.
The first set of exclusion restrictions requires us to find a variable (or a set of variables) that
determine initial poverty status but are unrelated to the transition into or out of poverty. To
this end we follow Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) and Jenkins (2011) who use the argument
in Heckman (1981b) that initial conditions for labour market outcomes may be instrumented
by information on the individual prior to labour market entry. In our model we use variables
of the head of the household’s parental occupation and education as instruments for initial
conditions.24 That is, these variables appear in xit−1 but not in zit−1.
The second exclusion restriction requires us to include a variable (or set of variables) in wit−1
that is not included in zit−1. That is to say we need a variable that affects the probability of
attrition, but not poverty retention or transition. We take advantage of the panel structure of
NIDS and include a dummy variable for whether a respondent is a continuing sample member
(CSM) or a temporary sample member (TSM). CSMs are sample members who appear in the
first wave of NIDS, while TSMs are those respondents who joined the household of a CSM
in waves 2, 3 or 4. CSMs are tracked from wave to wave, while TSMs are not. In using this
exclusion restriction we are asserting first that CSMs and TSMs have different probabilities of
being retained in the sample, and second that the propensity to transition into or out of poverty
24NIDS includes a module in the adult questionnaire that records the education and occupational category
of each respondent. The dummy variables include the following sectors: agriculture/elementary, professional,
semi-skilled/operator, crafts, clerks, and a dummy variable for missing occupational sector.
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is unrelated to whether a respondent is a CSM or a TSM.
The coefficient vectors in our model share a core of common variables, all of which are
contained in zit−1. The vector in the initial conditions equation, xit−1, is comprised of zit−1 with
additional variables controlling for parental education and occupation categories. Likewise,
the vector in the sample retention equation, wit−1 contains zit−1 plus a dummy variable which
identifies whether a respondent is a CSM or a TSM.
We are able to test the validity of our exclusion restrictions by treating the non-linear func-
tional form of the model as being sufficient for identification, and using the parental background
variables and CSM dummy as over-identifying restrictions for the initial conditions and sample
retention equations, respectively. The results of these tests are presented in Table 3.9, along
with our estimates of the ρ correlation coefficients.
The first panel of Table 3.9 shows the three ρ correlations that were defined earlier, all of
which are statistically significant at the 1% level. The fact that ρ1 is positive indicates that poor
respondents in the initial period are less likely to have attritted compared to those who started
off non-poor. This is unsurprising, as the disproportionate loss of wealthier households from
wave to wave has been a feature of the panel dynamics of NIDS (de Villiers et al., 2013; Baigrie
and Eyal, 2013). The correlation between unobservables affecting initial poverty and poverty
transitions, ρ2, is also positive, reflecting the fact that respondents who were poor in the initial
period were more likely to be poor in the next period, compared to those who were non-poor to
start off with. Finally the correlation between the unobservables determining the relationship
between retention in the sample and conditional current poverty status, ρ3 is negative. This
implies that, for example, for the subsample of individuals who were poor in t− 1, those who
were retained in the sample are less likely to be poor in t than those who attritted would have
been had they been retained.
Tests of the exogeneity of the different processes are contained in the second panel of Table
3.9. A Wald test of ρ1 and ρ2 is rejected at the 1% level, implying that initial conditions
are not exogenous and should be accounted for in the modelling of poverty transitions. The
null hypothesis of the exogeneity of sample retention is rejected at the 1% level (test statistic
59.73), indicating that sample retention is endogenous when modelling poverty transitions, and
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that accounting for it in the model is important. Finally, a joint test of ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 being
zero is also rejected at the 1% level, confirming that initial conditions and sample retention
are endogenous, and lending weight to our strategy of modelling poverty dynamics using a
trivariate probit.
The next part of the table presents tests of the suitability of the instruments that are added to
the vector of coefficients in the transition and retention equations. Wald tests show that parental
background variables of the household head and sample membership status can be excluded
from the transition equation both separately and jointly. In contrast, these were found to be
statistically significant in the initial conditions equation and the retention equation, respectively.
Thus it appears that the NIDS data support the use of these instruments in the estimation of
poverty transitions and that we do not have to rely solely on non-linearity as our identifying
factor. Finally, we tested for state dependence by calculating a Wald statistic for the equality
of γ1 and γ2 from the equation estimating current poverty, and the null hypothesis of no state
dependence was rejected at the 1% level.
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Table 3.9: Model correlations and test statistics
Correlations between unobservables Estimate p-value
Initial conditions and retention (ρ1) 0.039 0.000
Initial conditions and conditional current poverty (ρ2) 0.196 0.000
Retention and conditional current poverty (ρ3) -0.228 0.000
Null hypotheses Test statistic p-value
Unobservables:
Exogeneity of initial conditions (ρ1=ρ2=0) 56.06 0.000
Exogeneity of sample retention (ρ1=ρ3=0) 73.89 0.000
Joint exogeneity (ρ1=ρ2=ρ3=0) 117.47 0.000
Transition equation:
Exclusion of parental background (d.f.=10) 11.40 0.250
Exclusion of sample membership status (d.f.=2) 1.11 0.574
Exclusion of both (d.f.=12) 12.31 0.341
Initial conditions equation:
Inclusion of parental background (d.f.=5) 42.10 0.000
Retention equation:
Inclusion of sample membership status (d.f.=1) 3 439 0.000
State dependence:
No state dependence, γ1 = γ2 (d.f.=50) 5 933 0.000
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
The evidence presented suggests that our estimation strategy is sound. We turn now to the
impacts of the independent variables on the probabilities of poverty transition and poverty
persistence.
We calculate two sets of marginal effects - one set for poverty persistence and one for poverty
entry, corresponding to poverty status in t − 1. These are derived from the equations defining
sit and eit respectively. We follow Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and Cappellari and Jenkins
(2004) in defining the marginal effects of this model. The following explanation is related to
the poverty persistence equation defining sit. The corresponding explanation for poverty entry,
eit is constructed analogously. Because of the three related processes being modelled in this
estimation strategy, a marginal change in one of the components of zit−1 will also result in a
change in xit−1 because of the common elements in both vectors. This implies a change in
the denominator of sit, that is, the probability of being poor in t − 1. In order to hold this
constant in the calculation of the marginal effects we applied the following steps. We calculate
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the predicted probability of being poor in t− 1 for all those respondents who were poor at this
time. Next we take the average of these predicted probabilities which we call c. Then, into the
denominator of the equation for sit we substitute in d ≡ Φ−1(c) which gives us the expression
Φ2(γ
′
1zit−1, d; ρ2)/d. Marginal effects for continuous variables are calculated by inducing an
infinitesimal change in the covariate with all other covariates held constant at their means. For
binary variables the marginal effect is calculated as the change in sit implied by a unit change
in the variable of interest, relative to a reference person. This reference person is defined by
setting all continuous variables to their median values, and setting all binary covariates equal
to zero.
The first two columns of results in Table 3.10 present the marginal effects and associated
t-ratios for poverty in t conditional on being poor at t − 1.25 Females were four percentage
points more likely to remain in poverty than males. African and coloured sample members
had a conditional poverty probability that was around 31 percentage points higher than white
sample members. Of the household head’s characteristics, having a completed secondary or
tertiary education was associated with a lower conditional poverty probability of 13.5 percent-
age points, relative to the base category of no education. The marginal effect of living in a
household in which the head is employed is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Urban
households were 6.4 percentage points less likely to remain in poverty than the base category
of rural households. The presence of at least one employed household member is associated
with a 5.8 percentage point reduction in the probability of remaining poor, while the presence
of at least one child aged 15 or under results in a 4 percentage point increase in the probability
of being poor in both time periods.
The third and fourth columns in the table present the marginal effects of conditional poverty
entry between periods t − 1 and t. The economic significance of each individual covariate
is similar to the estimates of conditional poverty persistence, though the t-ratios of age, age
squared and the female dummy variable are three to four times smaller. Africans are almost
25The table shows that there are 40 850 individuals who form part of the estimation sample, and three pairs of
wave-to-wave transitions (wave 1 to wave 2, wave 2 to wave 3, and wave 3 to wave 4). The mapping to the number
of person-waves is as follows. Balanced panel members appear three times in the wave-to-wave pairs, and each of
these will show up in the number of person-waves considered. However, because we are using the pooled sample
of NIDS respondents over all four waves, we also include those who experience one or two transitions (appearing
in only two or three consecutive waves) in the estimation of the model.
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30% more likely to enter poverty than the base group of whites, on average, even after control-
ling for individual, household head and overall household characteristics. The corresponding
effect for coloured respondents is 23%. Living in a household with a female household head
is associated with a higher conditional probability of poverty entry of 8.5 percentage points -
more than four times larger than the effect for conditional poverty persistence. The protective
effect of having at least a matric is more than twice as strong against the conditional proba-
bility of entering poverty than it is against the conditional probability of remaining in poverty.
The largest difference in these columns compared to the previous two is that having at least
one household member aged 65 and above increases the probability of poverty entry by almost
16 percentage points, whereas the effect was not statistically significant at the 5% level in the
poverty persistence estimates.
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Table 3.10: Model estimates of poverty in t, conditional on poverty status in t− 1
Covariate at t− 1 Poor at t− 1 Non-poor at t− 1
Marginal effect |t-ratio| Marginal effect |t-ratio|
Individual
Age -0.002 (11.37) -0.003 (3.62)
Age squared 0.00004 (8.62) 0.00004 (2.12)
Female 0.040 (8.82) 0.042 (2.46)
African 0.314 (11.71) 0.294 (13.71)
Coloured 0.312 (11.54) 0.231 (10.77)
Household head
Age -0.001 (2.05) -0.005 (7.11)
Age squared 0.00002 (3.03) 0.00002 (4.92)
Female 0.021 (4.35) 0.085 (4.54)
Matric and above -0.135 (17.18) -0.279 (17.85)
Employed 0.009 (1.53) -0.039 (1.84)
Household
Urban -0.064 (10.69) -0.084 (3.77)
Farm -0.005 (0.46) -0.029 (0.78)
Adult 65 and above 0.009 (1.24) 0.157 (4.74)
Children 15 and below 0.040 (25.67) 0.028 (3.12)
Any workers -0.058 (9.88) -0.006 (0.20)
Own dwelling 0.041 (6.56) 0.006 (0.29)
Log likelihood -94 355
Model chi-squared (d.f. = 54) 4 306 (p<0.000)
No. of clusters 13 238
No. of observations 40 850
No. of observations (person-waves) 88 090
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Reference categories for binary covariates: male,
white, male household head, household head does not have matric, household head is not employed, Western
Cape province, rural area, no adults over 65 in the household, no children under 15 in the household, no workers
in the household, household members do not own the dwelling. The base wave is wave 1.
Another way of interrogating the findings is to run the full Markovian model on the subsam-
ple of African respondents only. As was shown in the poverty transition matrices earlier in the
chapter, although the African subsample drives most of the results, there are often important
differences in the dynamics between African and non-African panel members. Table 3.E.2 in
the appendix estimates the marginal effects from the same type of Markovian model that was
reported in Table 3.10, but restricts the analysis to African respondents only.26 The change in
26Full results along with the estimated correlations between the unobservables are available from the author.
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sample also implies a change in the underlying correlations between unobservables, and the
underlying distributions of the explanatory variables. The base category for the calculation of
the marginal effects remains the same except for the fact that there is no longer a base category
for race, as the variable does not vary in this subsample.
The marginal effects for poverty persistence are relatively similar when comparing the full
sample to the African subsample. However, the protective effect of a household head having
at least a matric education decreases from 13.5% to 11.5%. The marginal effect on poverty
persistence of living in an urban area, relative to the rural base category, decreases in absolute
terms from -6.4% to -5.5%, on average.
There are more differences between the samples in the poverty entry marginal effects, com-
pared to the poverty persistence marginal effects. The individual marginal effects of age and
gender for the poverty entry model are very similar for the overall sample and for the African
subsample. In the full sample having a female household head is associated with an 8.5% in-
creased probability of transitioning into poverty, on average. This decreases to 6% when the
model is estimated on the African subsample only. The protective effect of living in a household
in which the head has at least a matric is lower in the African subsample – 23.1% compared
to 27.9% in the full sample. Living in a household in which the head is employed has a larger
effect amongst Africans than non-Africans in protecting against poverty entry, and this is in
contrast to the smaller protective effect of living in urban rather than rural areas for this group.
Interestingly, for the African subsample there is no statistically significant effect of the pres-
ence of an elderly person in the household on the probability of transitioning into poverty, in
contrast to the overall effect (and therefore the effect amongst non-Africans). As was the case
previously, the presence of children in the household has no statistically significant effect on
the probability of transitioning into poverty, on average.
Although contexts and methodologies vary greatly between countries, it is worth pointing
out some of the other existing research on poverty transitions that uses a similar estimation
strategy to the one found in this chapter. The seminal Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) study uses
BHPS data for Britain. The authors find statistically significant correlations between initial
conditions and retention (ρ1), and between initial conditions and current poverty (ρ2). Although
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there is no statistically significant relationship between the unobservables affecting retention
and the unobservables affecting conditional current poverty (ρ3), the full set of unobservable
correlations are jointly significant. The results in this study suggest that living in a household in
which the head has at least completed A-levels is associated with a lower probability of poverty
persistence. The presence of children in the household significantly increases the probability of
conditional poverty persistence. In general, there are more statistically significant relationships
in the poverty entry equation, compared to the poverty persistence equation. Older respondents
and households with male heads are both associated with higher probabilities of transitioning
into poverty, as are single parent families and multi family households. Another example of a
Markovian approach to studying poverty transitions in an OECD country is Buddelmeyer and
Verick (2008) which uses the first five waves of the HILDA longitudinal dataset in Australia.
This paper finds that poverty is largely a transient phenomenon in Australia, and that having
a tertiary education is a large buffer against both poverty persistence and poverty entry. The
study also uncovers an important geographic aspect to who becomes who and who remains in
poverty, with poverty concentrated in remote and rural areas of the country.
Although there are few examples of this data-intensive approach to studying poverty dynam-
ics in developing countries, Faye et al. (2011) use the 3rd and 13th waves of a large dataset
which tracks welfare in Nairobi slums. Their results suggest that in this context, only the cor-
relation between the unobservables affecting initial conditions and the unobservables affecting
retention are statistically significant. The presence of children in the household is associated
with a higher probability of remaining in poverty, but not of entering poverty. Neither the gen-
der of the respondent nor that of the household head has a significant effect on either poverty
persistence or poverty entry. Finally, Azomahou and Yitbarek (2015) follow a sample of 837
households in Ethiopia in order to study poverty transitions. The results of this study show that
the education level of the household head is an important buffer against poverty persistence,
but that it has no significant effect on the probability of poverty entry. Perhaps surprisingly,
there are once again no gender differentials in the probability of remaining in or transitioning
into poverty.
How does estimating conditional poverty dynamics in this way change our understanding
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compared to a simple univariate probit model? Table 3.F.1 in the appendix presents results
from a univariate probit model using the same vector of covariates that as in Table 3.10, except
without controlling for initial conditions and non-random attrition. The marginal effects in the
Markovian model are generally more economically significant than they are in the probit. For
example, being female increases the conditional poverty entry probability by 4.2 percentage
points in the Markovian model, but only by 1.4 percentage points in the univariate probit.
The presence of at least one adult aged 65 and above increases conditional poverty entry in
the Markovian model by almost 16 percentage points, while the corresponding increase in the
univariate probit stands at 5 percentage points. The protective value of having at least a matric
is heightened in the Markovian estimation with a marginal effect of -28 percentage points,
compared to almost -16 percentage points in the univariate probit. One interesting point to
observe is that the sign of the dummy variable denoting the presence of children aged 15 and
below in the household switches from negative to positive as we move from the probit model
to the Markovian estimation in the poverty entry equations.
What do the results suggest about the length of poverty spells?
In an early paper using a first-order Markovian model to estimate transitions into and out of
welfare, Boskin and Nold (1975) show that the conditional probabilities of being in each state
follow a geometric distribution and can be used to generate statistics on the length of time that
each sample member can expect to be in a given state. In the South African context, Carter
and May (2001) also assume a stationary Markov process in order to try to uncover the long
run distribution of poverty status using six different categories of welfare.27 For the trivariate
case, Jenkins (2011) shows that, assuming stationarity, equations 3.9 and 3.10 can be used to
calculate the average length of time that an individual is expected to be in poverty. This is given
by 1/(1 − si), while the median duration is given by log(0.5)/log(si).28 The average length
of time that an individual will spend out of poverty is 1/(ei), with median time out of poverty
given by log(0.5)/log(1− ei). Finally, the unconditional probability that an individual is poor
27This is a slightly different application to what we are interested in, as the authors uncover the long-run
distributions of poverty classes, while we are more interested in relative poverty and non-poverty spell lengths.
28The time subscript has been omitted because of the assumption of stationarity.
3.6. A MARKOVIAN MODEL OF POVERTY TRANSITIONS 103
is expressed as ei/(ei + 1 − si). Given the way in which the model was estimated, these spell
length estimates control for the biases introduced by initial conditions and non-random attrition
by construction.
As noted in the introduction to the Markovian model, projections like these rely on the as-
sumption of no state dependence (thus allowing for left-censored poverty spells to be incorpo-
rated). In practice this means that predictions of mean and median poverty spell lengths rely
on a fundamental stationarity assumption. The choice of base category and subsequent varia-
tions in Table 3.11 therefore relies on variables that are more likely to be stable over time (for
example education of the household head, race and gender). In addition, rather than displaying
the predicted lengths of poverty and non-poverty spells, the table and discussion present the
lengths of these spells relative to the base category.
Table 3.11 presents the predicted poverty transition probabilities, steady state probabilities
and relative spell lengths of poverty and non-poverty for a range of different characteristics. In
the first case, the reference person is a 40 year old African male living in urban KwaZulu-Natal
in a household in which the household head has at least a matric level of education, in which
there are no children under the age of 15 and in which there are no adults aged 65 and over.
The poverty persistence rate associated with this individual is 0.435, while the predicted poverty
entry rate is 0.229. The predicted probability of this man being poor is just under 0.3. Given the
stationarity assumption, the average lengths of time spent poor and non-poor have both been
set to 1, so that all other results can be interpreted relative to this base category. In practice the
mean length of time spent poor or non-poor is higher than the median for the base category and
all subsequent comparisons. This reflects the relatively wide distribution and relatively long
right hand tail of poverty spell lengths for individuals with the same characteristics.
In the next row of Table 3.11 we change the sex of the reference person to female, while
keeping all other characteristics the same. This increases the predicted probability of remaining
in poverty by about four percentage points, and the predicted probability of entering poverty
by almost three percentage points. The overall probability of being poor is 33%, which is four
percentage points higher than a male with the same characteristics. This number is broadly
in line with the marginal effects presented in Table 3.10, though the reference characteristics
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are different. The implication of these relatively higher persistence and entry rates is that the
mean and median poverty spell lengths are longer, while the mean and median non-poverty
spell lengths are shorter, relative to the base category.
In the third row we keep the characteristics of the person in row 1, except for changing the
racial group from African to white. In line with the results of the model and the descriptive
statistics, this has a very large impact on the predicted poverty states. The predicted probability
of remaining poor is just under 13%, compared to 43.5% for African respondents with the same
characteristics, while the predicted probability of entering poverty is just 3%, compared to 23%
for African respondents with the same characteristics. The average length of time that a person
with these characteristics can expect to remain poor 35% lower for whites than for Africans,
and the mean length of time spent non-poor is 7.67 times longer for whites than for Africans.
The fourth row keeps the same characteristics as the first row apart from changing the edu-
cation of the household head from matric and above to less than matric. In line with the large
economic significance reported in Table 3.10, this single change increases the probability of an
individual being in poverty from 29% to 60%. The predicted poverty persistence and poverty
entry rates are higher, as are the mean and median lengths of time for the predicted spell length
of poverty, relative to the base category.
The remaining rows show that the highest probability of being poor is for individuals living
in a household with children aged 15 and under, with at least one adult aged 65 and above, and
with a household head who does not have a matric level of education. This predicted probability
is 70%, over 40 percentage points higher than the base category in row 1. The longest relative
average poverty spell is for those individuals who live in a rural household with a household
head who does not have a matric level of education (see row (8)). As can be seen in row (10),
an individual who lives in a household with children under 15 years old and elderly adults, in
which the household head does not have a matric can expect to be in poverty for 46% longer
than the base category, on average, and can expect to experience spells of non-poverty that are
only about a quarter as long as those experienced by the base category, on average. The median
poverty spell length for someone with these characteristics is 71% longer than that experienced
by the base category, while the median length of time spent non-poor is only 12% of the time
3.6. A MARKOVIAN MODEL OF POVERTY TRANSITIONS 105
that someone with the base category characteristics can expect to experience.
Table 3.11: Predicted transition probabilities, steady-state probabilities and relative spell
lengths
Characteristics Poverty Poverty Pr(poor) Poverty Non-poverty
persistence entry spell length spell length
rate (sit) rate (eit) relative to (1) relative to (1)
Mean Median Mean Median
(1) Male, aged 40, African, 0.435 0.229 0.289 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
male HHH with matric,
KZN province, urban,
no adults 65 and over,
no children 15 and under
(2) As (1) except female 0.474 0.257 0.328 1.07 1.12 0.89 0.88
(3) As (1) except white 0.128 0.030 0.033 0.65 0.41 7.67 8.58
(4) As (1) except HHH no matric 0.573 0.641 0.601 1.33 1.50 0.36 0.25
(5) As (4) except female 0.606 0.698 0.639 1.44 1.66 0.33 0.22
(6) As (4) except female HHH 0.622 0.819 0.684 1.50 1.76 0.28 0.15
(7) As (4) except with adults over 65 0.581 0.851 0.670 1.35 1.53 0.27 0.14
(8) As (4) except rural 0.627 0.775 0.675 1.51 1.78 0.30 0.17
(9) As (7) except workers in HH 0.528 0.841 0.641 1.20 1.31 0.27 0.14
(10) As (7) except with children in the HH 0.614 0.896 0.699 1.46 1.71 0.26 0.12
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. HH = household. HHH = household head.
How sensitive are our results to the choice of poverty line?
The choice of which poverty line to use always involves some level of arbitrariness, and one
obvious robustness check is to investigate how results change for different poverty lines. Using
poverty status as a binary dependent variable is very different to using other binary dependent
variables in estimation. For example, it is generally objective whether an individual is employed
or not, whether an individual receives a pension or not, or whether a child is enrolled in school
or not. Converting money metric welfare into a binary variable reflecting poverty, however,
necessarily involves some subjective judgements. This means that checking the sensitivity of
the model’s results for different poverty lines is important. The primary reason for this is so
that we are not ‘hostage to an. . . arbitrarily selected poverty line’ Deaton (1997). A second
reason for doing so is that it may be interesting in itself to see how the effect of a particular
variable on poverty transitions changes as the definition of poverty changes. For example, we
may be interested in whether the effect of having a household head with a matric education has
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an increasingly protective effect against falling into poverty as the poverty line rises.
We use a wide range of possible poverty lines in order to see both how marginal effects
change from a low to a high poverty line, and also to see how stable the marginal effects are in
the neighbourhood of our poverty line of R1 283. The lower bound for our poverty line range
is R640, which is just under half the poverty line used in the estimation. It is also close to the
StatsSA lower bound poverty line of R608 (Statistics South Africa, 2015), and it is unlikely that
any reasonable poverty line for South Africa would be below this amount. The upper bound
for our robustness check is a very high poverty line of R1 565, giving us a total window of just
over R900 in which to assess the sensitivity of our results. The poverty line of R1 283 is the
highest line in general use in the South African academic discourse, and the results for poverty
lines above this level should be interpreted with this in mind
In Figure 3.5 we show the marginal effects for the female dummy variable for poverty lines
from R640 to R1 540. Recall from the table of results that females who were poor in period
t − 1 were, on average, 4 percentage points more likely to remain in poverty than males. The
corresponding marginal effect for females who were not in poverty in t − 1 was almost the
same, at 4.2 percentage points. This small difference is reflected at the vertical line in the
figure, corresponding to the model’s poverty line of R1 283.
The female marginal effect for those who were poor in t − 1 is far more stable than the
corresponding marginal effect for females who were non-poor in t−1. In fact, any poverty line
from R950 to R1 350 would give a marginal effect of around 4 percentage points for females
who remain in poverty. The marginal effect for females entering poverty is relatively stable
in the vicinity of the R1 283 poverty line, but it explodes thereafter - jumping by over 150%
from a poverty line of R1 283 to a poverty line of R1 540. Had we chosen the StatsSA lower
bound poverty line, we would have seen female marginal effects of 3 percentage points and 1
percentage point for poverty retention and poverty entry, respectively.
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Poor in first period Non-poor in first period
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
The sensitivity of the marginal effect of having a household head with at least a matric
is interesting because it is the single largest marginal effect apart from the race categories (in
absolute terms) in both results columns of Table 3.10. While the female marginal effects diverge
for poverty lines higher than R1 283, the marginal effects of having a household head with at
least a matric begin to diverge much earlier. This can be seen in Figure 3.6, where the marginal
effects at a poverty line of R640 are identical at -6 percentage points. Had we chosen this lower
bound poverty line, we would not have been able to identify any discernible difference between
the two different states in t−1. The ‘protective’ effect against remaining in poverty of having a
household head with at least a matric increases steadily up to our poverty line of R1 283, where
it stands at -13.5 percentage points. From there the effect increases gradually in absolute terms
to -16.5 percentage points for a poverty line of R1 540. The lower line in Figure 3.6 shows very
different marginal effects across the distribution of poverty lines. These significant differences
over the range of poverty lines are likely driven by the fact that relatively few people living in
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a household in which the head of the household has at least a matric actually fell into poverty
between t − 1 and t. At our poverty line of R1 283 we find that the economic significance of
having a household head with at least a matric is double for those who were non-poor in the
first period, compared to those who were poor, on average. This difference would be zero if we
used the lowest poverty line in the figure, but would be almost of the order of 4.5 if we used a
poverty line as high as R1 540.
Figure 3.6: Household head with matric or above marginal effect on the probability of being










































Poor in first period Non-poor in first period
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
We also check the sensitivity of the results if we had ignored initial conditions and non-
random attrition, and instead estimated a probit model of poverty transitions. The marginal
effects for the female and household head with at least a matric covariates for this can be seen
in figures 3.G.1 and 3.G.2 in the appendix. In general the marginal effects from the probit
models do not change as much for higher poverty lines as they do in our Markovian model.
The marginal effect for females who were both poor and non-poor in t− 1 generally decreases
as the poverty line increases. Interestingly, while the Markovian model produced diverging
effects, conditional on initial poverty status, for those living in a household in which the head
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had at least a matric, the univariate probit model shows convergence over the same range of
poverty lines, to the point where the difference is negligible for the highest poverty line of R1
540.
Figures 3.G.3 and 3.G.4 compare the marginal effects of the African and coloured variables
for the poverty persistence versions of the Markovian and probit models respectively. In both
cases the marginal effects from the Markovian model are higher than the marginal effects of
the probit model, at any reasonable poverty line. The difference between the marginal effects
is highest at the lowest poverty line of R640 - in both cases the Markovian marginal effect is
about double the probit marginal effect. The marginal effects from both models converge as
the poverty line increases, and are quite close to one another at the highest poverty line of R1
565. As shown in Table 3.10 and Table 3.F.1, the African and coloured marginal effects are
extremely high, relative to the base category of white. On average, Africans are 31% and 24%
more likely to remain in poverty than whites according to the Markovian model and the probit
model respectively. The Markovian model shows that the marginal effect for coloured respon-
dents remaining in poverty is also 31%, relative to the base category, while the corresponding
marginal effect from the probit model is that this group is 23% more likely to remain in poverty
than whites, on average. Interestingly, although the African marginal effect is generally slightly
below the coloured marginal effect, the shape of the line of marginal effects over the range of
poverty lines is similar for both groups, whether a Markovian model or a probit model is used
in the estimation.
One of the reasons for the large differences in the marginal effects at different poverty lines
between the Markovian and univariate probit estimations is the change in ρ2 over the range
of poverty lines. Recall that ρ2 enters the calculation of the marginal effects via its presence
in the numerator of equation 3.9 and equation 3.10. That is to say, the correlation between
the unobservables affecting initial conditions and conditional current poverty changes over the
range of poverty lines. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.7, the estimated correlation is very close
to zero for the lowest poverty line, and then rises steadily until it reaches 0.196 at the poverty
line of R1 283. The growth in the correlation over the range of poverty lines shows that state
dependence becomes increasingly important as the poverty line increases, and reinforces the
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fact that our findings cannot remain agnostic to the choice of poverty line. The intuition behind
the positive slope shown in this figure is that a) a lower poverty line means fewer people will
be found to be in poverty and b) there will be more transitions out of poverty compared to
a higher poverty line, by construction. More transitions out of poverty means a lower level
of state dependence, which implies a lower correlation between the initial conditions and the
conditional current poverty status. Therefore the positive slope of the line is a result of a
higher poverty line being associated with a higher correlation between initial conditions and
conditional current poverty.
Figure 3.7: Correlation between unobservables affecting initial conditions and conditional cur-


























Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
What do the results tell us about aggregate state dependence
versus genuine state dependence?
An attractive feature of modelling poverty transitions in the way that we have is that it allows
us to distinguish between aggregate state dependence (ASD) and genuine state dependence
(GSD). ASD is simply the unconditional difference between the probability of being poor in
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t for those who were poor in t − 1, and the probability of being poor in t for those who were
non-poor in t− 1. Measuring state dependence in this way does not take account of individual
















The calculation of GSD controls for observed and unobserved individual-level heterogeneity,
and is particularly important if initial conditions matter for poverty in the current period. As
explained in Cappellari and Jenkins (2004), “the experience of poverty itself might induce a
loss of motivation, lowering the chances that individuals with given attributes escape poverty
in the future.” One possible formal test for GSD is to test the null hypothesis that γ1 and γ2
from equation 3.5 are equal. The result of this test is shown in the final row of Table 3.9, in
which the null hypothesis of no GSD is decisively rejected. Our equation for calculating GSD
involves calculating the difference between the predicted probability of being poor in t, if poor
in t − 1, and the predicted probability of being non-poor in t, if non-poor in t − 1 using the
equations defining sit and eit. This is then summed over all individuals and divided by the







[Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 1)− Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 0)]
The distinction between ASD and GSD is useful because the policy implications depend on
the relative importance of each kind of dependence. As argued in Arulampalam et al. (2000),
“Identification of the extent of true state dependence...is more than just an academic exercise.”30
If there is very little GSD of poverty at the individual level, then short-run interventions to
reduce poverty will have little impact, as poverty will mainly be generated by adverse individual
heterogeneity. However, if there is a high level of GSD, then reducing the probability of the
29In the ASD equation
∑
i
Pit−1 is the number of individuals who were poor in t − 1, as for these individuals




30Arulampalam et al. (2000) study unemployment persistence rather than poverty persistence, but their insights
generalise to our context.
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initial experience of poverty becomes crucial in the process of reducing long-run poverty in
the country. This echoes Devicienti and Poggi (2011) who argue that the greater the share
of GSD in overall state dependence, the higher the payoffs are to short-term income support
programmes that prevent people from falling into poverty today. If, however, poverty persists
mainly because of individual heterogeneity, then short-term income support schemes will have
little effect on the long-run distribution of poverty in the country.
Our model estimates a level of ASD of 0.568 and a corresponding level of GSD of 0.416.
This implies that the share of genuine state dependence in overall state dependence is very high
at 73.30%. Figure 3.8 presents three statistics of interest, ASD, GSD and the share of GSD
in total dependence across the age range of sample members.31 ASD is relatively stable and
is generally between 50 and 60, while GSD stands at about 53 for the youngest age cohort
and then drops to around 30 for those between the ages of 25 and 50. The shape of the green
line representing the share of GSD in overall dependence falls at first, in line with the decline
in GSD, and then rises for those aged 40 and above. Even at its lowest point, genuine state
dependence accounts for more than half of total poverty dependence in South Africa.
31Dependence levels were calculated for five-year age bands from 0 to 80. Those older than 80 were excluded
because of low observation numbers.
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Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Note: observation numbers for age cohorts are as
follows. 0-4 (8 193), 5-9 (8 609), 10-14 (8 706), 15-19 (8 268), 20-24 (5 136), 25-29 (4 037), 30-34 (3 861),
35-39 (3 512), 40-44 (3 372), 45-49 (3 019), 50-54 (2 612), 55-59 (1 979), 60-64 (1 486), 65-69 (1 133), 70-74
(752), 75-80 (450).
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we began our investigation into the dynamics of poverty in South Africa by using
the balanced four wave sample of NIDS comprising 17 265 respondents to analyse poverty
dynamics in South Africa from 2008 to 2014/2015. Using a poverty line of R1 283 in January
2015 rands we found that the rate of exiting poverty was higher between waves 2 and 3, and
between waves 3 and 4 than it was between waves 1 and 2. About 47% of the sample was
below the poverty line in each of the four waves in which they were interviewed. Transition
matrices showed that 54% of the balanced panel were poor in both wave 1 and wave 4, with
more than half in ‘severe’ poverty - defined as having real household income per capita of less
than half the poverty line.
The importance of demographic events in shaping dynamics was highlighted by the role of
household composition changes as drivers of poverty entry and exit. Inter-wave demographic
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changes were the main triggers for 56% of those who entered poverty and 59% of those who
exited poverty between wave 1 and wave 4. One needs panel data such as NIDS to disentan-
gle these demographic events from income events. The value of such work is shown here in
highlighting the central importance of migration and household instability in driving who gets
ahead and who falls behind in contemporary South Africa.
The increasing longer-run importance of access to government grants was highlighted, with
grant income being the main trigger precipitating poverty exit for 23% of previously poor bal-
anced panel members between wave 1 and wave 4. By implication this flags as a major concern
the muted role of the labour market in driving the dynamics of poverty exit between 2008 and
2014/2015.
We then turned our attention to modelling poverty dynamics using a Markovian approach
that simultaneously estimated poverty transitions along with initial conditions and selective
attrition. We found that if researchers ignore the correlations between unobservables affecting
initial conditions, sample retention and poverty transitions, then this could lead to substantially
biased results. We also separated state dependence into the part attributable to aggregate state
dependence and the part attributable to genuine state dependence, and found that the latter
is dominant. From a policy perspective, this implies that preventing people from falling into
poverty in the first place will likely yield greater returns in the long-run, rather than targeting
the individual correlates of poverty directly.
Taken together, our results add to the body of literature showing that even after 22 years of
democracy in South Africa, a very large proportion of its people have been unable to realise the
economic freedom that should have come with political freedom. The task of us as researchers
and policymakers is to ensure that this void is bridged as swiftly and justly as possible.
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3.A Number of months between being interviewed
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Months between wave 3 and wave 4 interview
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
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3.B Composition of household income
Figure 3.B.1: Household income composition for poor and non-poor respondents by wave
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
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3.C Transition matrices for African respondents
Table 3.C.1: Transitions into and out of poverty across waves: African balanced panel members
only
Wave 2 Wave 3
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 1 Poor 89.55 10.45 Wave 2 Poor 85.56 14.44
Non-poor 35.59 64.41 Non-poor 26.47 73.53
Wave 4 Wave 4
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 3 Poor 80.41 19.59 Poor 74.65 25.53
Non-poor 25.77 74.23 Wave 1 Non-poor 28.48 71.52
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Table 3.C.2: Poverty transitions: Proportion of sample by transition status: African balanced
panel members only
Wave 2 Wave 3
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 1 Poor 72.41 8.45 Wave 2 Poor 67.79 11.44
Non-poor 6.81 12.33 Non-poor 5.50 15.28
Wave 4 Wave 4
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Wave 3 Poor 58.93 14.36 Poor 60.36 20.50
Non-poor 6.88 19.83 Wave 1 Non-poor 5.45 13.69
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
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Table 3.C.3: Transitions with finer poverty levels: African balanced panel members only
Wave 2 Wave 3
Severe Poor Non-poor Severe Poor Non-poor
Wave 1
Severe 74.44 18.75 6.81
Wave 2
Severe 64.69 24.82 10.49
Poor 45.23 33.62 21.15 Poor 38.42 36.61 24.98
Non-poor 17.95 17.64 64.41 Non-poor 10.64 15.84 73.53
Wave 4 Wave 4
Severe Poor Non-poor Severe Poor Non-poor
Wave 3
Severe 60.92 24.31 14.77 Severe 54.67 24.29 21.05
Poor 35.71 35.67 28.62 Poor 30.23 31.79 37.98
Non-poor 12.13 13.64 74.23
Wave 1
Non-poor 11.88 16.60 71.52
Note: In this panel the cells sum to 100%
Wave 4
Severe Poor Non-poor
Severe 32.97 14.65 12.69
Poor 6.21 6.53 7.80Wave 1
Non-poor 2.27 3.18 13.69
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
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3.D Trigger events with a modified equivalence scale
Table 3.D.1: Trigger events associated with poverty entry and exit: Modified equivalence scale
Poverty entry Poverty exit
W1 to W2 W2 to W3 W3 to W4 W1 to W4 W1 to W2 W2 to W3 W3 to W4 W1 to W4
Demographic
Head changed 36.05 50.79 51.87 47.88 35.96 49.70 48.77 53.74
Needs > money 9.70 3.74 10.99 11.04 0.81 1.26 0.79 0.52
Demographic share 45.75 54.53 62.86 58.92 36.77 50.96 49.56 54.26
Income
Head labour earnings 24.64 12.14 9.38 16.79 13.49 16.99 5.28 4.52
Spouse labour earnings 2.05 5.55 2.07 1.65 2.03 2.48 3.00 1.68
Other labour earnings 11.83 12.18 11.95 6.85 24.10 14.40 12.48 12.44
Remittances 3.95 3.10 3.28 3.88 2.43 3.87 7.56 3.56
Grant income 5.65 3.31 3.09 7.38 8.85 8.74 20.06 22.71
Income share 48.12 35.85 29.77 36.56 56.21 42.98 48.39 44.92
Inconclusive 6.13 9.62 7.37 4.52 5.99 6.06 2.05 0.62
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Observations 926 1 233 1 342 479 2 122 2 855 3 990 5 945
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
3.E Descriptive statistics for sample included in
Markovian model
Table 3.E.1: Descriptive statistics for sample included in Markovian model




















W. Cape 9.04% 22.09%
E. Cape 14.06% 7.63%
N. Cape 6.82% 9.06%
Free State 5.43% 5.38%
KZN 33.27% 15.49%









Adults 65 and above 27.18% 15.82%
Children 15 and below 88.77% 61.76%
Any workers 57.90% 91.53%
Ownership




Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
Variables reported at the individual level in period t− 1.
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Table 3.E.2: Model estimates of poverty in t, conditional on poverty status in t − 1: African
respondents only
Covariate at t− 1 Poor at t− 1 Non-poor at t− 1
Marginal effect |t-ratio| Marginal effect |t-ratio|
Individual
Age -0.002 (11.91) -0.003 (4.30)
Age squared 0.00005 (9.55) 0.00006 (3.22)
Female 0.037 (8.08) 0.045 (2.82)
Household head
Age -0.001 (0.40) -0.004 (1.30)
Age squared -0.00001 (1.45) 0.000004 (0.11)
Female 0.023 (4.61) 0.060 (3.52)
Matric and above -0.115 (14.92) -0.231 (11.12)
Employed 0.022 (3.58) -0.047 (2.29)
Household
Urban -0.055 (9.70) -0.032 (1.59)
Farm -0.018 (1.72) 0.006 (0.17)
Adult 65 and above 0.007 (0.91) 0.006 (0.17)
Children 15 and below 0.034 (22.24) -0.007 (0.88)
Any workers -0.053 (9.34) 0.087 (2.56)
Own dwelling 0.049 (7.31) 0.020 (0.96)
Log likelihood -72 960
Model chi-squared (d.f. = 52) 8 644 (p<0.000)
No. of clusters 10 753
No. of observations 33 199
No. of observations (person-waves) 71 643
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Reference categories for binary covariates: male,
male household head, household head does not have matric, household head is not employed, Western Cape
province, rural area, no adults over 65 in the household, no children under 15 in the household, no workers in the
household, household members do not own the dwelling. The base wave is wave 1.
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3.F Probit model of poverty dynamics
Table 3.F.1: Probit model of poverty in t, conditional on poverty status in t− 1
Covariate at t− 1 Poor at t− 1 Non-poor at t− 1
Marginal effect |t-ratio| Marginal effect |t-ratio|
Individual
Age -0.003 (12.540) -0.001 (3.280)
Age squared 0.00003 (9.130) 0.00001 (1.520)
Female 0.028 (9.370) 0.014 (2.790)
African 0.235 (6.080) 0.220 (10.830)
Coloured 0.227 (5.830) 0.167 (7.770)
Household head
Age 0.000 (0.060) -0.006 (3.090)
Age squared -0.00001 (0.830) 0.00004 (1.810)
Female 0.018 (2.880) 0.032 (3.390)
Matric and above -0.125 (13.420) -0.157 (14.910)
Employed 0.001 (0.100) -0.021 (1.700)
Household
Urban -0.052 (6.590) -0.038 (2.840)
Farm -0.001 (0.070) -0.003 (0.140)
Adult 65 and above 0.006 (0.570) 0.051 (2.670)
Children 15 and below 0.032 (15.380) -0.031 (2.010)
Any workers -0.053 (7.000) 0.002 (0.300)
Own dwelling 0.027 (3.530) 0.000 (0.010)
Log likelihood -28 877
Model chi-squared (d.f. = 54) 6 142 (p<0.00)
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Reference categories for binary covariates: male,
white, male household head, household head does not have matric, household head is not employed, Western
Cape province, rural area, no adults over 65 in the household, no children under 15 in the household, no workers
in the household, household members do not own the dwelling. The base wave is wave 1.
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3.G Difference in marginal effects for probit model
3.G.1 Female marginal effects









































Poor in first period Non-poor in first period
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
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3.G.2 Household head with at least a matric marginal effects
Figure 3.G.2: Difference in household head with matric or above marginal effect for different






































Poor in first period Non-poor in first period
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
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3.G.3 African marginal effect: Markovian model compared to
probit model
Figure 3.G.3: Difference in African marginal effect for different poverty lines: Markovian









































Markovian model Probit model
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
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3.G.4 Coloured marginal effect: Markovian model compared to
probit model
Figure 3.G.4: Difference in Coloured marginal effect for different poverty lines: Markovian









































Markovian model Probit model
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS.
4 Patterns of persistence:
Intergenerational mobility and
education in South Africa
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4.1 Introduction
South Africa has long been highlighted as a country with some of the highest cross-sectional
inequality in the world. Studies of why the level of disparity in economic outcomes has re-
mained consistently high have touched on many areas, but it is only the recent emergence of
high quality longitudinal data that has allowed researchers to begin to unpack the role of in-
tergenerational persistence of income and earnings in shaping longer run trends. The dynamic
relationship between the earnings of parents and the earnings of their offspring shapes the un-
folding series of snapshot estimates of inequality that have been calculated for the country.
Understanding the mechanisms behind these dynamics is therefore an important part of under-
standing why inequality in South Africa has remained so high.
The degree of persistence of intergenerational earnings is often closely linked to the question
of the equality of opportunity present in society. Recently, Corak (2013) has led the cross-
country research into this relationship and has produced what has become popularly known
as the ‘Great Gatsby curve’. This curve shows a strikingly positive relationship between the
persistence of earnings from parents to children, and the level of inequality in a country. The
implication is that the closer the correlation between parental and child earnings, the higher the
level of inequality in society. The corollary is that equality of opportunity is lower in societies
with high persistence between the earnings of parents and those of their children compared to
societies with relatively lower levels of persistence. Piraino (2015) has undertaken the most
comprehensive work in this area using South African data, and has calculated the intergenera-
tional earnings elasticity (IGE) and an inequality of opportunity index for the country. He finds
that the level of persistence between the earnings of fathers and sons is very high and is com-
parable to other developing countries with high levels of income inequality. He locates South
Africa along the ‘Great Gatsby curve’ as a country with both a high level of intergenerational
persistence and a high level of economic inequality.1
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the literature on intergenerational mobility,
1A statistical link may be drawn between level of inequality of opportunity and the degree of intergenera-
tional persistence in wages in a society. Piraino (2015) shows that when the IGE is estimated using TSTSLS
methods, the two concepts are linked. This is because the larger the inequality in parental earnings across differ-
ent ‘types’ (defined on observable characteristics), and the higher the intergenerational elasticity of earnings, the
higher inequality of opportunity in society will be.
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with a particular focus on South Africa. First, it examines how to estimate and analyse intergen-
erational earnings mobility in a society that has experienced consistently high unemployment
over a number of decades. Existing estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity have
implicitly assumed that selection into employment plays no role in driving the relationship
of earnings between parents and their children. In this chapter we estimate the IGE using a
double correction which accounts for the high unemployment rates in both generations, and
has substantial impacts on the estimated IGE. Second, this chapter uses quantile regressions
to investigate non-linearities of the IGE, and presents the first evidence of the shape of the
relationship between the earnings of parents and the earnings of their children over the full
earnings distribution. This has important implications for how we think about poverty and
inequality traps in South Africa. Third, the chapter presents the first estimates of the IGE of
mothers relative to sons, in order to provide a fuller picture of the intergenerational transmis-
sion of earnings. Fourth, the estimation in this chapter takes the issue of non-random attrition
very seriously, and a set of panel weights for use over the first four waves of NIDS is created
so that we are able to construct a comparable sample of sons with earnings over the longest
possible period in the data. Finally, the chapter analyses the role of education in driving the
intergenerational transmission of earnings. This is done by uncovering the impact of education
on the intergenerational elasticity of earnings over the full earnings distribution, and then by
decomposing the IGE into relative contributions of education versus skill. The first, second and
fifth contributions are extensions to the literature in their own right, while the third and fourth
contributions can be thought of as direct extensions of Piraino (2015).2
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents three stylised facts about
the South African economy and labour market which have motivated this chapter. Section
4.3 discusses the relationship between intergenerational mobility and inequality, and outlines
the theoretical framework that will be used to measure and decompose the intergenerational
earnings elasticity. Section 4.4 describes the data and estimation procedures used in our study,
and presents some descriptive statistics. In section 4.5 we report the results from a number
of different estimations of the intergenerational earnings elasticity, and this is followed by an
2Piraino (2015) also presents an analysis of inequality of opportunity in South Africa, as well as a racial
decomposition of the IGE, neither of which form part of this chapter.
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analysis of the role of education in determining and shaping this elasticity. The final section
provides some concluding remarks.
4.2 Motivation for the study
This chapter is largely motivated by three stylised facts that have emerged from the post-
apartheid South African literature on education and economic inequality. First, there has been
an increase in the general level of educational attainment, along with a reduction in the in-
equality of education levels. Second, the last two decades have seen an increase in the returns
to matric and post-matric education relative to other education categories. Third, the levels of
cross-sectional economic inequality and unemployment have been very high and persistent in
South Africa’s democratic era.
4.2.1 Stylised fact 1: Increased educational attainment
There has been a sharp decrease in the inequality of educational attainment in the country,
and this has come about because of a general increase in the number of years of schooling
completed by South Africans. The coefficient of variation of education for working-age South
Africans fell from 0.5 in 1994 to just over 0.3 in 2011 (Lam et al., 2015). The increase in
educational attainment for working-age South Africans is confirmed in Figure 4.1 which is re-
produced from Lam et al. (2015), with the addition of data from 2014. Improvements in the
average level of education are evident in the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) from
1995 to 2014, with the increase being driven by higher proportions of the labour force com-
pleting primary school. In 1995 more than half the labour force had dropped out of school
by grade 9. By 2014 this proportion was below 30%. Though the increase in educational at-
tainment is impressive, a figure of CDFs remains agnostic as to the quality of that education.
The question of quality is analysed in van der Berg et al. (2011), who show that low quality
education in South Africa is a poverty trap, the ill effects of which are borne disproportionately
by pupils attending historically black schools. Branson et al. (2014) show that school dropout
in South Africa is largely driven by falling behind (defined as being more than two years older
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than expected for the current grade), even after controlling for socio-economic factors. Falling
behind is itself determined largely by school quality, with historically black schools lagging
particularly far behind in this regard. This reiterates the findings in Ardington et al. (2011) who
show stark racial differences in progress through school using data from the Cape Area Panel
Study (CAPS).
Figure 4.1: The increasingly educated South African labour force
Source: 1995 to 2011 based on Figure 1 in Lam et al. (2015) using the Post Apartheid Labour Market Series
(PALMS) dataset. 2014 calculated using the Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa (LMDSA) 2014 dataset.
4.2.2 Stylised fact 2: Changing patterns in the returns to
schooling
Although the average level of education of the South African labour force has increased, this
may not have been matched by a proportional increase in earnings. Keswell and Poswell
(2004) and Branson and Leibbrandt (2013) among others have found that the country displays
a strongly convex returns to education function, even once experience and educational quality
are controlled for. Figure 4.2 below is adapted from Lam et al. (2015)3 and plots the average
returns to schooling for four schooling groups from 1994 to 2011. The returns are calculated
as the weighted average of the marginal returns to an additional year of schooling for each
3Lam et al. (2015) plot only three categories – primary, incomplete secondary, and matric and above.
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year within the ranges of primary, incomplete secondary, matric and tertiary. The figure shows
that there has been an increase in the returns to matric and post-matric education relative to
the incomplete secondary and primary schooling categories. The increase in the returns to ma-
tric and above occur at the same time as a relative decrease in the returns to both of the other
categories. The full benefits from a more educated labour force are therefore not translated
into a proportional increase in earnings unless a worker has completed high school and con-
tinues into postsecondary education. This resonates with concerns about the persistent nature
of inequality, as Corak (2013) notes that relatively higher returns to tertiary education often go
hand-in-hand with high and sticky cross-sectional inequality.
Figure 4.2: Returns to schooling by schooling category
Source: Based on Figure 1 in Lam et al. (2015) using the Post Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS) dataset.
4.2.3 Stylised fact 3: Stubbornly high economic inequality
Although there is some debate as to the precise level of economic inequality in South Africa,
there is no doubt that it has been consistently high in the post-apartheid period. The Gini co-
efficient for labour market earnings in South Africa has averaged around 0.55 (Finn, 2015),
while the Gini coefficient for total household income per capita has been at 0.66 or above since
1993 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010; Yu, 2010). Although the level of inequality has remained high
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in the post-apartheid period, one important change is that the relative weight of inequality be-
tween races has decreased, while the importance of inequality within racial groups has risen
steadily (Leibbrandt et al. (2012), Finn (2015)). Part of the blame for the stickiness of inequal-
ity in South Africa comes from the dynamics of how educational attainment and labour market
earnings of parents feeds through to the educational attainment and earnings of children. Un-
covering part of this dynamic relationship is an important part of understanding inequality in
contemporary South Africa, and is the main contribution of this study.
4.3 Theoretical background
There has recently been something of a shift in the focus of the inequality literature, with stud-
ies of inequality of opportunity becoming more prevalent relative to studies of the inequality
of outcomes. A key feature of these works is the attempt to distinguish between inequality that
arises because of inherited circumstances and inequality that arises due to the application of
effort. The former, which is often subsumed in the idea of inequality of opportunity, is usually
seen as less ethically justifiable than the latter. If variables that are beyond a person’s control,
such as parental education, race or sex, do not have any bearing on their realized economic
outcome, then one may say that there is equality of opportunity because differences in eco-
nomic outcomes are driven by the effort expended by each individual, and by luck. However,
as noted by Atkinson (2015) the distinction between inequality of opportunity and inequality of
outcomes is not a clear one in either a single generational or intergenerational sense. The rea-
son for this is the fact that ‘today’s ex-post outcomes shape tomorrow’s ex-ante playing field’
(p. 11). There is no reason to think that equal opportunities will lead to equal outcomes in
a dynamic sense. Even if it were possible for an entire generation to start off with identical
opportunities, the unequal ex-post distribution of economic outcomes would mean that the next
generation would face ex-ante inequality.4 If the starting point for each generation is highly
unequal, and the transmission of economic outcomes from parents to children is largely deter-
ministic, then this has clear implications for the persistence of inequality in society. Therefore
South Africa’s, low level of intergenerational mobility has dynamic consequences for the pro-
4This presumes that the state is non-interventionist in equalizing ex-ante opportunities.
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duction of intragenerational inequality, and understanding this relationship is important from
a policy and ethical perspective.
The focus on labour market earnings is warranted because of the important role that wages
play in determining the extent of cross-sectional inequality in South Africa (Leibbrandt et al.,
2010). A better understanding of wage inequality goes a long way to assist an understanding
of household income inequality, and understanding intergenerational earnings mobility goes a
long way to explaining why inequality has been so persistent in South Africa.
The reason for focusing on education as a transmission mechanism is because education is
widely cited as being the key factor in reducing cross-sectional inequality, but an equalization
of education may not lead to lower inequality, as we have witnessed over the last twenty years
in South Africa. The impact of equalizing education, therefore, cannot be seen in isolation. It
must be understood together with the labour market outcomes associated with education. These
include the probability of finding a job and the shape of the returns to education function itself.
Another dynamic to note is that credit constraints may be significant barriers to both the
quantity and quality of education a child receives, and this can contribute to a pattern of in-
equality that is self-reinforcing. Furthermore, the higher the correlation of economic outcomes
between parents and children, the longer it takes for a society to reach the equilibrium social
status of each generation (Checchi, 1997). The introduction of public policies that lower the
explicit and implicit costs of public education, along with those that improve quality in order
to ease the transition from one level of education to the next, are therefore crucial factors in
increasing the intergenerational mobility of economic outcomes.
A seminal theoretical paper by Becker and Tomes (1979) sets about trying to explain the
dynamics of educational attainment from generation to generation.5 One of the central moti-
vations of this paper is to unify the analysis of cross-sectional inequality (inequality within a
generation) and intergenerational inequality. The persistence of income from one generation
to the next is determined by a mix of factors including the level of endowments of an individ-
ual, the inheritability of various characteristics, the propensity of each generation to invest, and
luck.
5An even earlier intergenerational transmission model along with its implications for social mobility was
proposed by Conlisk (1974), though it has received less attention in the social mobility literature.
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The Becker and Tomes (1979) framework has inspired a large body of economic theory on
the transmission of economic advantage between generations that is distinct from the sociology
literature which preceded it by several decades. Empirical applications inspired by these mod-
els soon followed and, as noted in Chusseau et al. (2013), one of the defining features of this
literature is the attempt to separate out the roles of ‘effort’ and ‘luck’ in determining social mo-
bility, and this is generally done by isolating the influence of different channels that determine
educational attainment and labour market returns.
Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) present a simplified version of the Becker and Tomes model.
Let us assume that the transmission of income or earnings from parent to child is determined
by the individual endowment of human capital, and by the innate ability of the child. The
Becker and Tomes model is built on the assumption that the child’s utility enters the parent’s
utility function, and that the child’s level of human capital is chosen by the parent as a result
of the optimal allocation of permanent income. The relationship between the child’s perma-
nent income (denoted by c) and the parent’s permanent income (denoted by p) is given by the
following equation:
Y c = φY p + θac (4.1)
In this equation the parameter φ represents the extent of the causal relationship between the
permanent income of the parent and the permanent income of the child. As noted by Lefranc
and Trannoy (2005), the source of this correlation maps to the positive relationship between
the father’s earnings and the investment in the child’s human capital. The constraint on this
investment is the amount of financial resources available to the family. This is something that
may be particularly important in South Africa, as credit constraints have been shown to be a
barrier to postsecondary enrollment (Lam et al., 2013). In addition, the constraint may bind
before postsecondary enrollment by limiting parents’ ability to send their children to a better
school that may require a higher level of expenditure.
The second term on the right hand side captures the determinants of the child’s permanent
income that are related to factors that ‘money can’t buy’. These include things like IQ, social
networks, or preferences (Lefranc and Trannoy, 2005). Becker and Tomes (1979) differentiate
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this effect from the previous effect by noting that its influence on the intergenerational transmis-
sion of income comes from earnings determinants that are independent of parental investment
decisions.
Separating out the two different types of transmission mechanisms that arise from the Becker
and Tomes model would yield interesting policy implications. If the dominant mechanism
determining intergenerational earnings transmission is parental investment in education, then
overcoming credit constraints would lead to a smaller correlation between the earnings of suc-
cessive generations, and therefore more economic mobility. If, however, the dominant mech-
anism is individual ability, then increasing social mobility by weakening the relationship be-
tween the earnings of parents and their children may be more difficult.
Much of the research that is motivated by this theoretical model does not make a distinction
between the two mechanisms explaining intergenerational earnings. In general, a simple re-
gression of son’s permanent income6 (or earnings) on father’s permanent income (or earnings)
is the preferred approach, given the data’s inability to convincingly isolate the ‘ability’ mech-
anism. Combining both mechanisms into a single coefficient will lead to an upward bias in
the estimate of the elasticity of intergenerational earnings (Lefranc and Trannoy, 2005). In this
chapter we estimate the intergenerational elasticity of earnings using a reduced form version of
this model, in line with most of the international literature. In doing so we attempt to overcome
the bias that may arise from co-resident selection, and the bias that may arise from selection
into a job in a society with a very high unemployment rate.
The canonical estimation of intergenerational mobility comes from a simple regression of
the logarithm of child’s (usually son’s) permanent income on the logarithm of parent’s (usually
father’s) permanent income.
Y ci = α + βY
p
i + εi (4.2)
β is generally referred to as the intergenerational elasticity of earnings (IGE), when labour
market returns are the focus, and is the most commonly used measure of the persistence of
6Most of the studies in the international literature focus on the correlation of earnings between fathers and
sons because of the added complication of accounting for female labour market participation decisions.
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earnings between generations. As β is a measure of persistence, (1− β) may be thought of as
a measure of intergenerational mobility. As β approaches zero, society approaches a situation
of perfect intergenerational mobility in which the earnings of the parent do not determine the
earnings of the child. Conversely, as β approaches 1, the earnings of the parent increasingly
determine the earnings of the child, and intergenerational mobility goes to zero. Though the
interpretation of the intergenerational elasticity in this model cannot be interpreted in a purely
structural sense, it is nonetheless a widely used and useful descriptive measure of how persistent
earnings are between generations.
Another descriptive statistic that has been used widely in the literature is the intergenerational
earnings correlation, ρ. As shown in Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) the relationship between the β
measure of intergenerational earnings elasticity and the Pearson product moment correlation is




where σyp and σyc are the standard deviations of log earnings in the child’s generation and the
parent’s generation respectively. This measure also highlights the link between intergenera-
tional mobility and inequality, as the numerator and denominator on the right hand side are the
log variance inequality indices for the parent’s and child’s generations respectively.
The intergenerational elasticity measure has been preferred to the intergenerational correla-
tion in much of the literature for a number of reasons. First, as noted in Lefranc and Trannoy
(2005), the elasticity may be measured independent of calculating the inequalities in each gen-
eration. Second, intergenerational elasticity is perhaps a more intuitively appealing concept
to economists than the intergenerational correlation. Consider a policy shift that reduces the
deviation from the mean of all income in the child’s generation by the same factor. The effect
of this policy should see a decrease in the persistence of intergenerational income (that is, an
increase in intergenerational mobility). Indeed, the intergenerational elasticity would decrease
under this policy, but the intergenerational correlation would not. The intergenerational corre-
lation would remain unchanged, and the increased mobility would not be reflected. Third, the
intergenerational elasticity is not biased if there is measurement error in the variable reflecting
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child’s earnings (the dependent variable in the regression), unlike the correlation (Black and
Devereux, 2011). Finally, as Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) point out, researchers may want to com-
pare their estimates of intergenerational mobility to those of other studies, and the popularity
of the measure ensures its continued use independent of any theoretical concerns.
Many studies have calculated the intergenerational elasticity of earnings in the last five to ten
years. Reviews and international comparisons can be found, among others, in Blanden (2009),
Brunori et al. (2013) and Corak (2013), which all provide tables of the intergenerational elastic-
ities for a number of countries. The international evidence lends support to the ‘Great Gatsby
Curve’, which suggests that countries with higher levels of inequality have lower levels of in-
tergenerational mobility. Countries with low levels of cross-sectional inequality - in particular
Scandinavian countries - have a higher degree of intergenerational mobility (a lower intergen-
erational elasticity) than those with a higher degree of inequality such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Italy (Corak, 2013). The Scandinavian countries have intergenerational
elasticities that are below 0.2, while for countries with higher levels of inequality the elasticity
is around 0.5.
Intensive data requirements have precluded the calculation of intergenerational elasticities
for developing countries until recently. Piraino (2015) notes that these developing countries
tend to have less intergenerational mobility than their OECD counterparts, and calculates an
intergenerational elasticity that is between 0.57 and 0.67 for South Africa, depending on the
variables used in the imputation of father’s earnings. In other examples, Hnatovska et al. (2013)
calculate an elasticity of around 0.5 for India, while Ferreira and Veloso (2006) find an elastic-
ity of about 0.58 in Brazil. Grawe (2004) calculates an elasticity of 0.54 in Malaysia and 0.67
for Peru, while Bevis and Barrett (2015) calculate separate elasticities for sons and daughters,
but find an average of about 0.5 in the rural Philippines. Recent data from urban China put
the elasticity at around 0.6 (Gong et al., 2012), though the authors find that intergenerational
persistence is far stronger for sons than it is for daughters. Asadullah (2011) calculates an in-
tergenerational wealth elasticity of 0.538 for rural Bangladesh. Recent estimates for Ethiopia
(Haile, 2016) and Vietnam (Doan and Nguyen, 2016) calculate intergenerational earnings elas-
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ticities of 0.357 and 0.48 respectively.7
The research on intergenerational income mobility in South Africa is relatively sparse, with
the first example being Hertz (2001) who uses data on co-resident fathers and sons in the
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) to calculate a range of intergenerational elas-
ticities. A problem facing any analysis of this kind is the fact that the co-residency requirement
may introduce selection bias into the estimation – the wages and characteristics of sons who
co-reside with their fathers may be different to the wages and characteristics of those who do
not.
A number of studies address this concern by making use of a two sample two stage least
square (TSTSLS) estimation in which the earnings of the fathers are imputed using a nationally
representative dataset from a previous time period. Piraino (2015) adopts this method and
locates South Africa’s position on the ‘Great Gatsby Curve’, adding further evidence to the
pattern of high-inequality societies having low intergenerational mobility. He also links the
literature on intergenerational mobility to that focusing on the inequality of opportunity, and
finds that South Africa’s inequality of opportunity index is high by international standards.
We use Piraino’s approach as a benchmark in our calculation of the intergenerational income
elasticity, and build on this to highlight the role of education in shaping the earnings dynamics
from generation to generation.
4.4 Data and estimation procedure
Calculating the intergenerational elasticity of earnings and extracting the contribution of ed-
ucation to this elasticity requires data that are not often present in a single dataset. The ideal
dataset would be a long panel that allows the researcher to calculate permanent income for both
parents and children, whether they co-reside or not.
Given that this kind of comprehensive dataset is not yet available in South Africa, in this
7Clean comparisons of the estimates of intergenerational earnings mobility between different countries are
difficult, as a variety of estimation methods are used, along with different measures of income. Estimates in OECD
countries tend to use either long panels (see, inter alia, Jäntti et al. (2006) for Denmark and Schnitzlein (2016)
for Germany) or large administrative or tax databases (see, inter alia, Nybom and Stuhler (2016) for Sweden and
Nilsen et al. (2012)). Estimates using data from developing countries tend to be derived using an instrumental
variables approach (India, Philippines and China) or a two-stage approach (Brazil, Malaysia, Peru, South Africa
and Vietnam), and may use earnings, predicted earnings, income or wealth as measures of economic welfare.
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study we make use of two different datasets that allow us to calculate the earnings of two gen-
erations. Earnings for the second (younger) generation are calculated using the first four waves
of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) which were collected in 2008, 2010/2011,
2012 and 2014/2015, respectively. NIDS contains comprehensive information about the labour
market activities and earnings of adults in the sample. Monthly earnings are calculated by com-
bining reported income from all jobs, self-employment activities, profit shares, and bonuses.
One option available to researchers who want to calculate the earnings of the parental gen-
eration is to focus on families in which children co-reside with parents. Indeed, this is the
approach adopted by Hertz (2001) using data from KwaZulu-Natal. There are at least two sig-
nificant problems with this approach. First, the subsample of co-resident parents and children
may be relatively small. Second, selection bias may be introduced by restricting the analysis
to those children who earn wages and still live with their parents. Co-resident children may
have observed and unobserved characteristics that are systematically different from those who
do not live with their parents, and this will bias our estimates of the intergenerational earnings
elasticity.
The adult questionnaire in NIDS asks respondents a series of questions about their parents
who are either non-resident or deceased.8 These include the age, education, and occupation of
the parent. Thus, even if a parent is not interviewed directly, we are able to impute the earnings
of the parent for a given set of characteristics. Following Piraino (2015) we use nationally
representative data from 1993, the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development
(PSLSD) to generate an earnings variable for the parental generation in NIDS. This Two Sample
Two Stage Least Squares (TSTSLS) approach is explained in detail below, but in summary the
following takes place. First an earnings regression is run on the PSLSD 1993 data in order
to capture the determinants of wages in the parental generation. The dependent variable is
the log of wages, and the independent variables are education categories, race, occupational
categories and province of residence. These independent variables are chosen because they are
the same as those reported by children about their parents in the NIDS dataset. Earnings for
parents in NIDS are then imputed by using the estimated coefficients from the wage regressions
8Respondents are asked about the highest level of education completed by their mother and father, and about
the current or last job in which each parent was employed. Co-resident parents are interviewed directly.
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in the 1993 data, along with parental characteristics from the NIDS data. The approach was
introduced by Klevmarken (1982) and is sometimes thought of as a ‘cold deck’ linear regression
imputation because an auxiliary sample is used to impute the missing variable of interest in the
main sample.
Drawing on the exposition in Cervini-Plá (2015) and Lefranc and Trannoy (2005), we esti-
mate the TSTSLS variant of the intergenerational earnings elasticity in the following way.9 In
NIDS - what we call our main sample - we have information about Y c, but not about Y p. NIDS
also contains sociodemographic information about parents contained in the vector of character-
istics Z. The auxiliary sample, the PSLSD 1993, contains a wage variable for parental earnings,
Y p, as well as the same vector of characteristics Z.
Let us begin by denoting the log of parental earnings at time t, Y pit as:





where the error term captures transitory shocks as well as measurement error in parental earn-
ings. We assume that the log of earnings in the child’s generation is related to the log of
permanent earnings in the same way, and that the errors from the parental and child genera-
tions are not correlated. For the vector of characteristics Zpi (in our case education, occupation,
race, and province of residence), we assume that current parental income can be written as:
Y pit = Z
p





in which the time invariant error is uncorrelated with the set of characteristics. Our first problem
is that Y pit is not available in our main sample I , in this case NIDS. However, in the PSLSD
1993, sample J , we have the same nationally representative population as in NIDS and we are
able to extract an estimate of γ, γ̂ which is obtained through estimating parental earnings in the
auxiliary sample J :
Y pjt = Z
p





9The TSTSLS method for calculating the intergenerational income elasticity first appeared in Björklund and
Jäntti (1997).
4.4. DATA AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 142
in which j ∈ J . This is then used to form a prediction of parental earnings in the main sample,
and in turn estimate β in the following way:
Y cit = α + β(Z
p
i γ̂) + ηit (4.6)
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) note that if the characteristics in Z are also determinants of the
child’s income, then the intergenerational earnings elasticity will be biased upwards. That is,
if the parental level of education and occupational category both have a positive impact on the
child’s earnings, then the elasticity may be biased upward. In this light, many calculations
of the intergenerational elasticity using the TSTSLS method can be thought of as an upper
bound for the measure of income persistence between generations (Piraino, 2015). At this
point it is useful to echo Blanden (2015) who stresses that the intention is not necessarily
to extract the causal effect of parental income on child income. Rather, the intention is to
generate a measure of persistence of earnings across generations in a similar vein to how the
Gini coefficient measures inequality in a cross-section.10
In this study we estimate the intergenerational earnings elasticity using equation 4.6. Boot-
strapped standard errors from 500 repeated processes are reported in which parents and children
are resampled separately, and both stages of the model are estimated in each repeat of the boot-
strap. We also adjust for the fact that we observe both parents and children at different stages of
their age-earning profiles using the method outlined in Bratberg et al. (2007). This is done sep-
arately for parents and children by regressing earnings on age and age squared, and then using
the sum of the constant term and the residual from that regression as the measure of earnings.
The age range for the younger generation is from 20 to 44 years old,11 while for the parental
generation in the PSLSD 1993 dataset, we focus on adult earners between 30 and 59 years of
age.
In general the focus will be on the relationship between the earnings of fathers and sons,
and mothers and sons. This is in line with most of the international literature which avoids
10Blanden (2015) draws the inequality-mobility connection succinctly in saying, ‘The Gini coefficient provides
a summary measure of cross-sectional inequality, but it does not provide any information about its source. The
intergenerational elasticity measure performs a similar function for intergenerational inequality.’
11The age interval refers to the age of the respondent in the first wave of NIDS.
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parent-daughter estimations due to the added complication of adjusting the elasticity to ac-
count for female labour market participation decisions.12 In this chapter we acknowledge the
difficulty of correcting for the bias that may arise from this process, and report both father-son
and mother-son elasticities for the most part. We also evaluate how sensitive our measures of
intergenerational mobility are in a high-unemployment labour market, and report the selection-
adjusted measures for both fathers and mothers.13
We restrict our analysis to those sample members who appear in all four waves of NIDS
as this allows us to get a measure that is as close to permanent income as possible, given
the data constraints.14 Averaging earnings across four waves for the second generation will
get us closer to this than using single points in a cross-section. We are unable to estimate
a similar averaged measure for the parental generation, and instead use the single imputed
earnings point, as described above.15 Another reason for choosing to focus on the balanced
panel members is the fact that we are able to correct for selective attrition by using panel
weights. Attrition rates between each of the waves of NIDS varied widely by racial group
and by socio-economic characteristics (de Villiers et al., 2013). White respondents were more
likely to drop out between waves than any of the other racial groups, as were those who were
relatively wealthier. We construct attrition-corrected longitudinal weights in the same way as
Finn and Leibbrandt (2013). This involves modelling attrition by running a series of unfolding
probit models from wave 1 to wave 2, from wave 2 to wave 3, and from wave 3 to wave 4. The
wave 2 longitudinal weight is constructed by multiplying the wave 1 post-stratified weight by
the inverse of the conditional probability of re-interview in wave 2. The same process is applied
12The parental sample is drawn from data from 1993, just before a surge in female labour force participation
rates in South Africa. Female labour force participation rates have changed substantially in the post-1993 period
(Casale and Posel, 2002). Much of the international literature in fact excludes mother’s earnings altogether. We
choose to contrast the intergenerational elasticity relative to both father’s and mother’s earnings as the high father
absenteeism rate in South Africa may mean that recalled information about mothers in the sample is more reliable.
In practice our sample sizes for mothers are relatively smaller, and the qualitative findings are similar whether
fathers or mothers are used.
13These are corrected using Heckman’s two-step approach, and are reported in section 4.5.
14Piraino (2015) pools the data across three waves and uses observations that appear once, twice or thrice in
the data. Like Piraino (2015) we also use average earnings in cases where respondents report earnings in multiple
waves of NIDS. Each respondent’s total earnings is divided by the number of waves in which he age eligible to
appear in the sample. If, for example, a respondent appears in all four waves and is aged between 20 and 44 in
all four waves, but only reports earning in three waves, then his total earnings will be divided by four, rather than
three.
15Using snapshots of parental earnings when estimating the intergenerational elasticity biases the elasticity
downwards because of the presence of measurement error (for example see Solon (1992).
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between wave 2 and wave 3, and between wave 3 and wave 4. The final longitudinal weight is
applied to all respondents who were successfully interviewed in all four waves of NIDS. Our
sample size is always larger than 1 200, and so we are not overly concerned about power issues
given our decision to focus on the balanced panel members. All subsequent analysis in this
chapter makes use of this weighting structure.
Table 4.1 presents some descriptive statistics for the balanced panel members that form part
of our analysis. The sample is restricted to those males between the ages of 20 and 44 who
report their earnings and who have non-missing information about their parents.
The mean age in wave 4 of the 1 785 respondents in our analysis sample is 35. About 85.5%
of those in the sample are African, and the proportion of White and Coloured respondents is
similar. The second panel of the table presents the proportion of respondents and their parents
in different education categories. Consistent with the pattern in Figure 4.1, there is a significant
increase in the level of education attainment from parents to children in the sample. Over 40%
of respondents reported having parents who had no education, while the corresponding figure
for respondents themselves was under 3%. The bulk of the shift in education attainment was to
matric and postsecondary education. 43% of respondents in the balanced panel reported having
attained at least a matric. The corresponding proportions for the fathers and mothers of these
respondents are 12.4% and 11.7% respectively.
In the next panel of the table we present the proportion of respondents, fathers and mothers
in different occupational categories. These are based on the South African Standard Classi-
fication of Occupations (SASCO) conventions and are adjusted so as to overlap directly with
the occupational categories present in the PSLSD 1993 data. These categories can be thought
of as loose proxies for occupational skill level, and mirror those used by Keswell et al. (2013)
in their study of intergenerational occupational mobility in South Africa. The categories are
rather broad and in reality each category probably covers a wide range of skill levels itself,
but they are reported here as they form part of the imputation for parental earnings in the first
stage of the TSTSLS estimation. The occupational distributions for fathers and sons look rela-
tively similar, though there are a higher proportion of sons in clerk/sales categories, and a lower
proportion in operator/semi-skilled jobs than their fathers. Almost 60% of the mothers of our
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balanced panel respondents were employed in elementary occupations - nearly three times the
proportion of sons. Interestingly, 13.2% of mothers were employed in the highest skill category
(professional/technical/manager), and the corresponding percentage for sons was lower at 8%.
Direct comparisons of unemployment rates over time in South Africa are not possible, as
noted in Kerr and Wittenberg (2016), because StatsSA changed the definition of what is consid-
ered work, as well as the criteria for being considered to be searching for employment. Bearing
these reservations in mind, the table presents unemployment rates for fathers and mothers in
1993, and for sons in 2008 and 2015. These are shown in order to get a sense of the magnitude
of the unemployment problem, rather than to indicate any trends in unemployment. There are
two unemployment rates that are generally used in South Africa. One requires active job search
in the last 14 days (narrow definition) and one which includes all those who say that they want
a job but have not actively searched in the last 14 days (broad definition). Unemployment rates
according to the latter definition are shown in the table. It is clear that unemployment was very
high in both generations - 26% for males and 33% for females in 1993. The unemployment
rate for males during the first wave of NIDS stood at 23%, and by the end of the fourth wave
this had risen to 29.6%.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the balanced panel






Education Son Father Mother
None 2.86 46.50 40.39
Primary 13.32 18.54 24.17
Incomplete secondary 40.97 22.62 23.78
Matric 21.90 8.22 6.95
Postsecondary 20.95 4.13 4.71
Occupation Son Father Mother
Elementary 21.46 23.62 59.51
Craft/trade 23.90 23.67 5.33
Clerk/sales 22.59 14.17 16.75
Operator/semi-skilled 23.96 29.33 5.21
Professional/manager 8.08 9.20 13.20





Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel. Unemployment rates from PALMS Version 3.1 are weighted using cross entropy
weights.
Five different earnings variables were created for parents, and these correspond to five dif-
ferent imputation equations in the first stage of estimation. They use the following variables
to impute parental earnings respectively: Education; education and race; education, race and
occupation; education, race and province; education, race, occupation and province. Figure
4.A.1 in the appendix shows kernel densities of the log of earnings of fathers and mothers that
were generated by the fifth imputation process. One possible way of assessing the quality of
the imputation is to compare real earnings in the PSLSD to earnings that have been predicted
using the variables in the fifth imputation procedure. Regressing age-adjusted log earnings on
education, race, occupation and province produces an R-squared statistic of 0.63 for pseudo-
fathers and 0.64 for pseudo-mothers in the PSLSD. A linear prediction of earnings from both
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of these regressions can be compared to the actual earnings variable in the data in order to get
some idea of where the two may differ. The differences between predicted earnings and actual
earnings in the PSLSD are very similar for pseudo-fathers and pseudo-mothers. Given the fact
that we use a linear prediction, the means of predicted earnings and actual earnings are iden-
tical. The median of predicted earnings is slightly lower than that of actual earnings for both
pseudo-fathers and pseudo-mothers. The most obvious difference between predicted and ac-
tual log earnings is the variance. For pseudo-fathers the predicted variance is 0.627 compared
to the actual variance of 1.00, while for pseudo-mothers the corresponding numbers are 0.669
and 1.051, respectively. Although we do not estimate measures of earnings inequality using
either predicted or actual earnings in this chapter, it is clear that inequality measures using pre-
dicted earnings will be lower than corresponding measures using the actual earnings data in the
PSLSD.
These earnings are mapped against years of education and are shown in the education-
earnings profiles in Figure 4.3. The real earnings of respondents in our balanced panel lie
above those of their parents at every education level, and the same is true for father’s earnings
relative to mother’s earnings. The convexity of the education-earnings profile of sons is evi-
dent, with a generally flat profile until the completion of secondary education, after which there
are relatively higher returns to each year of postsecondary education.
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Figure 4.3: Education-earnings profiles for the balanced panel and parents
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
We now turn our attention to the relative positions of parents and children in the distribution
of earnings. Figure 4.4 below plots the probability that a son will be in the same earnings quin-
tile as his parents.16 Around one quarter of sons whose parents were in the bottom 20% of the
earnings distribution are themselves in the bottom quintile. This proportion decreases to just
under 20% for the middle quintile. Interestingly, sons whose fathers were in the 3rd earnings
quintile are as likely to be in the bottom quintile or the top quintile themselves. There was
relatively more downward mobility for sons whose parents were in the middle of the earnings
distribution. Unsurprisingly, the highest probability of parent and child quintile matching is
at the top of the earnings distribution. This top quintile shows a difference of about 5.5 per-
centage points between father and mothers, with child quintile matches of 32.3% and 37.7%
respectively.
16The full transition matrices are presented in Table 4.B.1 in the appendix.
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Figure 4.4: Unconditional probability of a son being in the same earnings quintile as his parents
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
The general increase in educational attainment, as described in the first stylised fact in the in-
troduction, is clear if we examine an educational transition matrix for parents and their children
in the balanced panel. Table 4.2 shows the proportion of children in each education category,
conditional on their parents being in a certain category. This reflects similar findings in Keswell
et al. (2013) who use only the first wave of NIDS. The patterns for son’s educational outcomes
are similar whether we condition on the father’s or the mother’s highest attained level of edu-
cation. Over a quarter of sons who had either a father or a mother with no education managed
to complete at least a matric. There was very little downward educational mobility for sons
whose parents had either a primary or an incomplete secondary education. The sample sizes
for father and mothers with matric or postsecondary education are rather small, so the rela-
tively large downward mobility for both of these categories should be interpreted with this in
mind. It is important to note that though the increase in the general level of educational attain-
ment has been large (particularly for the lower education categories) this presentation abstracts
away from the quality of that increased education, though this is clearly an important part of
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understanding South Africa’s labour market returns (Louw et al., 2007).
Table 4.2: Education transition matrices for parents and sons
Son’s education









n None 5.9 20.3 41.1 19.3 13.3 100
Primary 0.3 9.8 49.8 18.5 21.5 100
Inc. Sec. 0.0 7.5 41.1 28.0 23.5 100
Matric 0.0 3.7 32.2 24.7 39.4 100
Postsec. 0.0 0.3 21.6 26.6 51.5 100
Son’s education










n None 7.3 20.3 41.9 18.5 11.9 100
Primary 0.7 15.1 43.1 19.7 21.3 100
Inc. Sec. 0.4 3.7 44.1 24.0 27.8 100
Matric 0.0 1.0 42.7 29.4 26.9 100
Postsec. 0.0 4.2 11.7 22.1 62.0 100
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Having shown that the increase in the level of education attained from generation to gener-
ation went hand in hand with an education-earnings profile that became more convex, we turn
now to the estimation of the intergenerational earnings elasticity.
4.5 The intergenerational elasticity of earnings
Table 4.3 below presents the estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity between sons
in the balanced panel and their fathers and mothers. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented
along with the coefficients for each of the five columns, and all data are weighted using the
attrition-corrected panel weights. Each numbered column represents a different imputation
process for calculating parental earnings, and follows a similar sequence to Piraino (2015). In
the first column the only variable used to predict parental earnings using the main and auxiliary
datasets is the education of the parent. The number of variables used in the imputation process
increases until column five, in which education, race, occupation, and province of residence
in 1994 are used. In this table we have maintained the same sample for each estimation of
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the intergenerational earnings elasticity in order to ensure the comparability of our estimates,
and to highlight the role that each additional variable plays in generating the intergenerational
elasticity. If we did not apply this restriction then differences in sample sizes would arise based
on the availability of parental information in the NIDS dataset.17 Table 4.C.1 in the appendix
shows that the unrestricted results are in line with the results in Table 4.3. For the remainder
of this chapter we will restrict ourselves to the subsamples of sons who report all imputation
variables for their parents - 1 389 fathers and 1 258 mothers, respectively. Though these sample
sizes are slightly smaller than those in Table 4.C.1 in the appendix, they are nonetheless large
enough to give us some confidence in the power of our calculations.
The elasticity relative to father’s earnings ranges from 0.613 in the first column (education)
to 0.678 in the third column (education and race). The elasticity is 0.659 if the province of
residence of the father is added to education and race as an explanatory variable in the im-
putation equation. The fullest imputation, shown in column 5, reflects an elasticity of 0.627.
Where comparable, these numbers are generally slightly lower than those reported in Piraino
(2015), though it must be restated that the two studies use different sample members in their
calculations and make different assumptions about weighting the data.
The degree of persistence relative to mother’s earnings is also high, but differs in certain
areas from the persistence relative to father’s earnings. Imputing mother’s earnings using only
education generates an estimated elasticity that is about 4% higher than the corresponding
figure for father’s earnings. This differs slightly from the calculations in Piraino (2015), which
find that the elasticity relative to mother’s earnings is always lower than the elasticity relative
to father’s earnings. In fact, we find that the elasticity relative to mother’s earnings is higher for
all imputation procedures except for when education, race and occupation are used jointly. The
difference is reinforced if earnings are imputed using all four of the available variables - from
0.627 for fathers to 0.650 for mothers.
17For example, more sons provide information about parental education than parental occupation.
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Table 4.3: Intergenerational earnings elasticities for different imputation procedures
Variables used to construct parental earnings
1 2 3 4 5
Education Education, Education, Education, Education,




Elasticity 0.613 0.678 0.674 0.659 0.627
(0.159) (0.186) (0.188) (0.187) (0.187)
N 1,389 1,389 1,389 1,389 1,389
Mother’s earnings
Elasticity 0.639 0.693 0.592 0.754 0.650
(0.184) (0.176) (0.168) (0.184) (0.170)
N 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
4.5.1 Accounting for selection into employment
The matter of selection bias is something that always underlies estimates of intergenerational
mobility. Indeed, the possible bias arising from not modelling female labour force participation
decisions is a major reason for why daughters’ earnings are usually not reported in these kinds
of studies. Another bias already mentioned is the selection bias that may arise from restricting
the analysis to children who co-reside with their parents. This is dealt with in this chapter by the
use of the TSTSLS estimator. There is, however, another selection issue that is often ignored in
the international literature that we may want to consider, and that is selection bias arising from
who finds a job and who does not. We only observe the earnings of those who are employed,
and it may be that both labour market participation decisions and finding employment are not
random. This is a particularly pertinent issue in South Africa, given that unemployment rates
are high in general, and are very high for youth in particular (Ranchhod and Finn, 2016). The
structure of the South African labour market and the relatively high demand for high-skilled
workers means that it is possible that we calculate a biased elasticity when we do not take
selection into employment into account. It is possible that those potential workers with parents
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whose earnings were low are less likely to find employment themselves. In a counterfactual
world in which we observe earnings for all our respondents (rather than only for those who
are employed), we may find that correcting for selection matters in the measurement of the
correlation between parental and child earnings. However, applying the correction only to sons
ignores the fact that the pseudo-parents in the 1993 dataset faced similarly high unemployment
rates, and that the coefficients extracted from the first stage imputation may be biased as well.
We are therefore faced with an estimating equation that requires two corrections – one in the
first stage when the parental earnings variable is imputed, and one in the second stage when the
intergenerational earnings elasticity is calculated.
Essentially the problem is as follows. What we would like is an unbiased estimate of the
relationship between parental earnings and son’s earnings. In a world without unemployment,
we would have a full set of earnings for parents and sons. However, in South Africa, with un-
employment rates being so consistently high (generally more than 25%), the subsample that we
see employed may not be random, and therefore the earnings associated with this subsample
may be biased. As noted in Vella (1998), if the subsample of the employed is a random selection
of the population, then there is no selection bias problem because the average observed and un-
observed characteristics of the subsample are the same (or in fact not significantly different) as
those of the population. Assume now that there are differences between the employed and the
unemployed, so that the subsample of the employed is no longer a random sample of the pop-
ulation. If the differences between the employed and unemployed are generated only through
observable characteristics, then one may arrive at an unbiased wage by controlling for these
observables in the wage equation. In other words, if there are observables that are correlated
with both the decision to work, and with wages themselves, then selection bias is not a problem
if those characteristics are controlled for. Finally, assume that the unobservables determining
the decision to work and the unobservables determining wages are correlated. In this case mea-
sured wages will be biased because of sample selection, even if observable characteristics are
controlled for in the wage equation.
The correction for this selection bias is implemented by deriving a fully parametric expres-
sion for the expected value of wages, via the calculation of the inverse Mills ratio, which is
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conditional both on observable characteristics and on selection into employment. What this
gives us is, in some sense, a counterfactual of what earnings would be if the wages of the un-
employed could be observed. This can also be thought of as ‘potential’ earnings. Estimating the
IGE with a double correction for selection bias can therefore also be thought of as a calculation
of the association of potential earnings between parents and children.
In this chapter we correct for possible selection bias into employment for both parents and
children by using a two-stage model of the type that was proposed for modelling selection into
employment by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974), and has been used in the intergenerational
mobility literature by Ermisch et al. (2006) among others.
In the first stage we use a probit to model whether a respondent is employed (and therefore
earning a wage) or not. Variables included in this selection equation but not in the outcome
equation are a dummy for the presence of dependent children in the household, marital status,
age, and parental earnings. The first two of these variables are included so that the model is
identified by exclusion restrictions, rather than by the non-linearity of the first stage.18 We
generate the correction term (the inverse Mills ratio) which can be thought of as capturing
the ‘surprise’ of observing an individual who is employed and earning. In other words, the
residuals from the first stage are captured by the inverse Mills ratio. For example, a respondent
who has a job but also has a low level of education will have a larger residual, and therefore a
higher inverse Mills ratio, than a respondent with postsecondary education who is employed.
Our results can therefore be thought of in somewhat clumsy terms as being derived from a two
sample, two stage, twice corrected least squares (TSTSTCLS) estimator.
Correcting for selection into employment yields elasticities that are higher than the ‘naı̈ve’
estimation for son’s earnings relative to fathers and mothers. Employment selection biases our
uncorrected elasticity downwards for fathers – the corrected elasticity is 0.678 compared to an
uncorrected elasticity of 0.627. For mothers the bias is in the same direction and of an even
greater magnitude – a corrected elasticity of 0.718 compared to an uncorrected elasticity of
0.650. The full results of this double correction are presented in Table 4.4 below. This is our
preferred set of results in general, with the elasticities in column 5 being the preferred point
18Full results are available from the author.
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estimate in particular. Once again we restrict ourselves to the subsample of sons who report full
information on parental background. The unrestricted sample estimates can be found in Table
4.D.1 in the appendix.
Table 4.4: Intergenerational earnings elasticities for different imputation procedures with a dou-
ble Heckman correction
Variables used to construct parental earnings
1 2 3 4 5
Education Education, Education, Education, Education,




Elasticity 0.612 0.718 0.697 0.723 0.678
(0.214) (0.234) (0.220) (0.204) (0.215)
N 1,389 1,389 1,389 1,389 1,389
Mother’s earnings
Elasticity 0.659 0.739 0.650 0.825 0.718
(0.225) (0.247) (0.221) (0.214) (0.220)
N 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
We can investigate our intuition that children with low-earning parents are less likely to find
a job themselves by plotting the inverse Mills ratio over the range of parental income. In Figure
4.5 the inverse Mills ratios are presented for fathers and mothers over their respective earnings
ranges. The higher the line, the more ‘surprised’ we are to see an individual in a wage-earning
job, given parental earnings. The figure accords with our intuition in that the ratio decreases as
we move rightward across the parental earnings distributions. Those with parents who earned
relatively higher salaries are more likely to be employed than those with parents who earned at
the lower end of the distribution. The inverse Mills ratio for the log of mother’s earnings drops
sharply, then flattens out, and then drops again as we move rightward along the distribution.
The pattern for fathers is slightly different as the ratio first drops, then rises, and then drops
off sharply. This suggests that the ‘surprise’ at seeing a son in employment, conditional on his
father’s earnings, does not decrease monotonically across the distribution of earnings.
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The hump in the son’s inverse Mills ratio relative to father’s earnings is driven primarily
by the role of father’s occupational category in the imputation of earnings. In particular, the
shape of this line comes from fathers who were employed in elementary occupations in 1993.
These made up almost a quarter of the fathers in our sample. The earnings for this category
are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, though it does have quite a long right tail.
The sons of fathers who were employed in elementary occupations whose earnings were at the
bottom of the distribution, were very unlikely to be employed themselves. The same is true for
the sons of fathers who were employed in elementary occupations, but who earned towards the
middle of the distribution (between ln(6.5) and ln(7.5)), but less so for the sons of fathers who
earned between ln(6) and ln(6.5).
Figure 4.5: Inverse Mills ratio over the distribution of parental earnings
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
The intergenerational elasticities that we report are high by international standards, but fo-
cusing on a single number may hide underlying patterns. The heteroskedasticity present in the
sample19 means that quantile regression analysis is a potentially useful tool in evaluating the
19The White test for heteroskedasticity rejects the null of constant variance for all specifications of the regres-
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joint distribution of parental and child earnings. To this end we run quantile regressions from
the 5th to the 95th percentile, increasing in intervals of 5. As described in Buchinsky (1998), we








(1− θ)|yi − xiβ(θ)|

where yi is son’s earnings, xi is the earnings of either the father or the mother, and θ is the
quantile being estimated.
Quantile regression analyses of intergenerational mobility in low-inequality countries have
found that the correlation between parental and child income falls over the distribution of earn-
ings. For example, Bratberg et al. (2007) use Norwegian data and find a monotonic decline in
the intergenerational elasticity for men, and a decreasing but non-monotonic fall for women in
Norway from the 5th to the 95th percentile, showing that earnings persistence is far higher at the
bottom of the earnings distribution than at the top.
Studies using data from the US consistently find that persistence is highest at the bottom
of the earnings distribution, but disagree as to what happens to the correlation as earnings
increase. Eide and Showalter (1999), using a rather small sample of American father and son
pairs, find a decreasing pattern with a slight upturn at the very top of the earnings distribution.
A relatively higher correlation between parental and child earnings at the bottom of the child’s
earning distribution in the US is also found by Lee et al. (2009) A slightly different pattern
emerges in a recent paper by Palomino et al. (2014) who use a much larger sample of US
data and find what they refer to as a ‘U’ shape, indicating that persistence is highest at the
bottom of the earnings distribution, but that there is an upturn at the top of the distribution as
well.20 It is likely that high-inequality societies produce a U-shaped relationship between the
intergenerational elasticity and earnings. High cross-sectional inequality is stable over time if
there is high persistence between both low-earning parents and their children, as well as high-
earning parents and their children. Given how high and persistent inequality in South Africa has
been over the last two decades, we might expect to see a turning point in the elasticity-earnings
sion.
20The Palomino et al. (2014) paper finds that the turning point occurs around the 70th percentile.
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relationship.
Figure 4.6, below, plots smoothed versions of the double corrected intergenerational earnings
elasticities for South Africa between the 5th and 95th percentiles of the earnings distribution. It
is clear that relying only on the conditional mean hides a great deal about the pattern of persis-
tence in the country. The intergenerational elasticity is highest at the bottom of the distribution,
and this accords with the international evidence for both developed and developing countries.
What is different about the South African case is the fact that the persistence is so high in this
part of the distribution - over 0.9 for both mothers and fathers at the lowest end. This shows that
the low-earning sons have a far higher correlation with their parents’ wages than high-earning
sons do with theirs. There is an interesting difference in the shapes of parental elasticities. The
strength of the association between son’s earnings and mother’s earnings decreases monotoni-
cally as we move rightwards across the distribution of earnings. For father’s earnings, however,
a turning point is reached at around the 40th percentile, after which there is an increase to about
0.73 at the top of the distribution.21
21Quantile graphs for all the different imputed versions of father’s and mother’s earnings are available from the
authors on request.
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Figure 4.6: Intergenerational earnings elasticity over earnings quantiles
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
4.6 The role of education in shaping intergenerational
mobility
We build on the previous section by investigating the role that education plays in shaping in-
tergenerational mobility in South Africa. The ideal set of data for getting precise estimates
of various transmission mechanisms would include child’s ability, parent’s ability and school
quality. Although we are able to make use of a rich dataset, we do not have all of these vari-
ables available and so we must find more indirect ways of getting at the relationship between
education and intergenerational mobility.
One way of doing this is to follow Palomino et al. (2014) by measuring the strength of the as-
sociation between child’s education and the intergenerational elasticity of earnings by quantiles
by including the child’s level of education as an additional regressor in the canonical regression
in equation 4.2. We can think about the effect that including child’s education would have on
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the elasticity in the same way that we think about omitted variables in OLS regressions. Re-
taining the representation of parental earnings as Y pit and using Edu
c
i as the variable indicating
child’s education22 (which is omitted from equation 4.2), we can represent the elasticity as:
plimβ̂OLS = β + βEducci ×





This equation can be used to interpret what happens to the intergenerational elasticity when
we add a control for child’s education into the estimating equation. If there is a strong positive
correlation between parental earnings and child’s education, then the elasticity as estimated in
equation 4.2 will be higher if education is not controlled for. On the other hand, if there is
a zero correlation between parental earnings and the child’s education then there will be no
change in the estimated elasticity once a control for education is included. This is true even in
the presence of the relationship between education and earnings for the child.
Including child’s education in the estimation of the intergenerational elasticity of earnings
reduces the double corrected elasticity at the mean by 41% and 39% relative to father’s and
mother’s earnings respectively. The relationship between education and the intergenerational
elasticity changes along the distribution of earnings, however, and this is shown in Figure 4.7
below.23 The estimation procedure underlying the figure is the same as it was for Figure 4.6.
Intergenerational elasticities are estimated for parental earnings from the 5th to the 95th per-
centile. The vertical axis shows the percentage difference in the intergenerational elasticity for
a regression that includes child’s education versus one that does not. The larger the negative
difference between the elasticities in a particular quantile, the higher the positive correlation
between education and parental earnings in that quantile.
The relationship between educational attainment and parental earnings follows a different
shape over the distribution of child’s earnings depending on whether we look at mother’s earn-
ings or father’s earnings. Including the child’s education as an additional control has the largest
negative effect at the bottom of the distribution for both parents - reducing the coefficient by
22Though there are a few exceptions in the data, the level of education attained by each child is time-invariant
across the four waves. Those respondents whose education status changes are generally those who move from
matric to postsecondary. For sons whose education changes over the four waves we use the level of education
reported in the fourth wave.
23As in Figure 4.6, this figure presents estimates that are smoothed using a LOWESS procedure.
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close to 50%. For mothers this effect is generally decreasing as we move up the earnings quan-
tiles, and is almost negligible at the top of the distribution. There is a low correlation between
mother’s earnings and child’s education at the top end of the distribution, and this corresponds
to the part of the earnings distribution with the lowest level of intergenerational elasticity. One
of the insights of this figure is that the further up the earnings distribution we travel, the less
important educational attainment is in explaining the level of mobility between parental and
child earnings. For fathers the pattern is slightly different. The correlation between child’s
education and parent’s earnings is strongest at the bottom of the distribution, and the strength
of this relationship decreases steadily until the 35th percentile of earnings. Thereafter it remains
relatively flat, with roughly the same correlations at the 35th and 95th percentiles.
Figure 4.7: Difference in intergenerational elasticity when controlling for education, over
parental earnings quantiles
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
Figure 4.D.1 in the appendix shows the graph for African respondents only. The effect
of education is even larger at the bottom of the African wage distribution, and the line for
mothers crosses the line for fathers at a lower percentile (the 35th) compared to the lines for all
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respondents (the 70th). In Figure 4.7 the role of education at the top of the wage distribution is
muted for mothers (-10%), but still fairly large for fathers (-32%). In the African subsample,
the effect for fathers is similar to what it was in Figure 4.7 (30%), but the effect for mothers at
-25% is much larger in absolute terms than in the corresponding figure for all respondents.
Another way of extracting the role of education in determining intergenerational mobility
is to decompose the intergenerational elasticity into a component that is due to education and
a component that is due to parental earnings. Blanden and Macmillan (2014), referencing an
earlier model by Blanden et al. (2007),24 break the estimation of the intergenerational elasticity
into two stages. This allows us to look at the relationship between parental characteristics,
child characteristics, and the labour market returns to these characteristics when the child is
working. Essentially, this is a standard path model decomposition in which the direct and
indirect effects of education on earnings are separated. These decompositions reflect some of
the earlier empirical work (for example see Conlisk (1971)) in which the estimating equation
had a very similar structure.
In the first stage we regress the child’s level of educational attainment on the log of parental
income. In the second stage we regress the child’s income on his education and parental income
- this is the same estimating equation underlying the previous figure. The two equations are:
educi = α̂2 + γY i
p + êi (4.7)
and




i + ûi (4.8)
Taken together, these two equations decompose the intergenerational elasticity into the con-
tribution of education inequality (γ̂), the contribution of the returns to education (ρ̂), and the
influence of parental income on child’s income (controlling for child’s education). Blanden
et al. (2007) show how the intergenerational elasticity can be written as:
24Originally this was done in order to separate out the relative importance of cognitive versus non-cognitive
skills in the association of parental and child earnings.
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β̂ = γ̂ρ̂+ δ̂ (4.9)
According to this formulation the contribution share of education variables25 to the over-
all intergenerational elasticity at the mean is close to 40% for father’s earnings and 43% for
mother’s earnings.
In our final decomposition we turn to the question of the intergenerational transmission of
occupational skill, and how this shapes the intergenerational earnings elasticity compared to the
role that education plays. We follow Keswell et al. (2013)26 and use the occupational codes in
the NIDS dataset as proxies for the skill level of each respondent and his parents. The skill level
is derived using the same method and variable as Keswell et al. (2013) who map the SASCO
occupational codes to skill levels. This, in turn, follows Bergman and Joye (2005) who use the
occupational codes to classify work according to a) which tasks and duties are related to an oc-
cupation, and b) which relevant skills are necessary for required for fulfilling the requirements
of each particular occupation. This enables us to transform the SASCO coded occupational
variable into a hierarchical occupational skill variable for use in the decompositions.
The original decomposition of the intergenerational elasticity of earnings into education and
skill components can be found in Bowles and Gintis (2002), and it was quickly adopted in the
economics literature (two recent examples are Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) and Cervini-Plá
(2013)). We use Lefranc and Trannoy’s notation in explaining this decomposition. It is im-
portant to note that this is not to be interpreted as a ‘causal’ decomposition in the traditional
sense, but rather as an attempt to extract the relative importance in the correlations between
parental and child education versus occupation in generating the intergenerational earnings
elasticity. It is also important to note that the equations used in this decomposition assume a
linear education-earnings profile and therefore homogeneous returns to each additional year of
education. The imposition of a linear structure on what has been shown to be a convex rela-
tionship means that the effect of education on the intergenerational transmission of earnings is
likely to be overestimated for those respondents with low levels of schooling, and underesti-
25We do not separate out educational attainment and returns to education at this stage.
26The authors link educational opportunity to the distribution of steady state occupations in South Africa using
the first wave of NIDS data.
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mated for those respondents with postsecondary education. Performing the decomposition for
different quantiles, and using more flexible functional forms of the education variable is left for
future research.
Let us assume that for g = c, p, parental and child income may be expressed as:











The TSTSLS estimate of β derived from this relationship is:
β =


































































β has been decomposed into six terms comprising the covariances of the child and parental
education and occupational skill, and the covariance of the child’s earnings residual and parental
education and skill. These are multiplied by the relevant coefficients from equation 4.10.
In Table 4.5 each row represents the contribution shares of each term in the decomposition
to the overall intergenerational earnings elasticity. The relationship between father’s education
and son’s education accounts for 37.6% of the intergenerational elasticity. The corresponding
share for the mother-son elasticity is slightly lower at 34%. The intergenerational correlation
of occupational skill is less important in determining β than the intergenerational correlation of
education - 9% for both fathers and sons and mothers and sons. These contribute approximately
the same as the ‘cross’ correlations of parental education and the child’s occupational skill. The
correlation between parental skill and child’s education is the smallest contributor to the IGE
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in both the father to son and mother to son panels. The relatively large contribution share
of education compared to occupational skill in determining the IGE is heightened when we
consider the African subsample only, as is done in the second column of results in the table. The
contribution share of the correlation between parental and child education is 44% for fathers
and sons, and almost 50% for mothers and sons. The correlations between parental education
and the unexplained (residual) part of the son’s wage equation are also large, and indeed are far
larger than the corresponding share from the correlation of parental skill with the residual from
the son’s wage equation. The contribution of the correlation between father’s education and
son’s skill is far larger than the corresponding share for mothers, and the relationship between
parental skill and son’s education is muted in both panels.
It therefore appears that the joint impact of parental education on son’s education and occu-
pational position is far larger than the joint impact of parental occupational skill through the
same channels. This is in contrast to studies in OECD countries by Cervini-Plá (2013), Lefranc
and Trannoy (2005) and Österbacka (2001) who find that parental social position, rather than
parental education, is the most important determinant of intergenerational mobility.27
27Here, social position refers to the schema suggested by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) which consists of
the following seven classes: higher-grade professionals, lower-grade professionals, routine non-manual employ-
ees (administration and commerce), routine non-manual employees (sales and service), lower-grade technicians,
skilled manual workers, semi- and unskilled manual workers.
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Table 4.5: Contribution shares to intergenerational elasticity - education versus skills
Fathers and sons
All African
Edu. father, edu. son 37.56 44.22
Skill father, skill son 8.89 4.92
Edu. father, skill son 8.62 14.34
Skill father, edu. son 2.32 2.59
Edu. father, resid. son 40.16 36.44
Skill father, resid. son 2.45 -2.52
Mothers and sons
All African
Edu. mother, edu. son 34.22 49.87
Skill mother, skill son 8.94 7.00
Edu. mother, skill son 7.91 2.98
Skill mother, edu. son 3.51 0.86
Edu. mother, resid. son 36.24 37.19
Skill mother, resid. son 9.16 2.10
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
4.7 Discussion
It is abundantly clear that there is not a level playing field in South Africa in terms of equality of
opportunity. This is manifest in the differential probabilities of finding work based on parental
earnings, as well as the high correlations of intergenerational earnings at the bottom and the
top of the distributions, as shown in this chapter. One of the key questions is why the children
of low-earning parents have been unable to translate greater educational attainment into better
labour market outcomes.
Intergenerational mobility is a complex process which is generated by individual decisions,
family and social norms, and public policies. Studying intergenerational earnings mobility is
one way of thinking about equality of opportunity, but it does not leave one with a comprehen-
sive understanding of the full process. However, an example based on our results can highlight
just how stark this immobility is.
If we assume that the long-run log earnings of fathers and sons are of equal variance, and
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are distributed bivariate normal, then we can derive some back-of-the-envelope calculations
about the probabilities of shifts in the relative distribution. For example, for our estimated
intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.678, the probability that a son is in the top half of the
earnings distribution if his father was in the 5th percentile of the earnings distribution, is just
over 5%. If the intergenerational earnings elasticity were zero, that probability would be 50%.
Alternatively, a son whose father earned at the 90th percentile of the earnings distribution, has
about a 28% chance of being in the top 10% of the earnings distribution himself, and has over
a 60% probability of being in the top quarter of the earnings distribution.
The beginning of this chapter highlighted three features of post-apartheid South African
society. These were the rapid expansion of educational attainment, the increasing returns to
postsecondary education, and the stubbornly high level of economic inequality. Although the
average level of education attained by South Africans increased rapidly, the number of South
Africans enjoying the high returns to tertiary education remains relatively low. It would seem
that the education South African children receive at primary and secondary level - both in terms
of content and quality - is simply not matching up sufficiently to what the current labour market
is demanding. It has become something of a truism in the South African discourse to say this,
but the only way that this can change is with a concentrated improvement in educational quality
and outcomes at the primary and secondary levels. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the
question of school quality plays an important role in generating differential dropout rates for
different groups of the population. These adverse effects are disproportionately born by pupils
attending historically black schools. Stopping pupils from falling behind in the first place is a
crucial part of addressing dropout and its resulting barrier to tertiary education.
Policy interventions and their ethical justification may depend on one’s assumptions about
the equal or unequal distribution of individual abilities. The South African evidence suggests
that the structural nature of immobility and inequality of opportunity has less to do with indi-
vidual characteristics and more to do with the inheritance of advantage and disadvantage.
What should the role of public policy be? Of course, there are some factors which determine
the level of intergenerational mobility that public policy can only impact marginally upon. So-
cial norms and the extent of social networks are two examples. Policy makers can prioritise
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helping the poor escape poverty, curtailing the relative advantage of the wealthy, or some com-
bination of the two. This chapter has shown that the relative lack of intergenerational mobility
is being driven by both factors: a great many South Africans are trapped in low earnings and
household poverty dynamically,28 while there is very little mobility at the top of the earnings
and income distributions. One clear role for social policy, given the findings of this chapter, is
to reform and improve the public education system of the country. Greater access to tertiary
education for given entry requirements cannot simply be imposed - it has to start with improve-
ments at primary and secondary levels. This is especially important because of the central role
that education plays in determining the intergenerational correlation of earnings (see Figure 4.7
and Table 4.5, for example).
Another option that could have implications for intergenerational mobility is for policymak-
ers to intervene directly in the labour market. The most prominent recent example of this kind
of approach (though not instituted with concerns about intergenerational mobility directly in
mind) is the youth employment tax incentive. This intervention is theoretically appealing, as
it aims to reduce the cost to employers of hiring youth for new positions, with the additional
benefit of increasing the labour market experience for the youth. However, in practice, early
results using quarterly labour force survey data suggest that the policy has not had a significant
impact on youth unemployment rates in the short term (Ranchhod and Finn, 2015, 2016).
Another recent intervention aimed directly at the bottom of the earnings distribution is the an-
nouncement of a national minimum wage (National Treasury, 2016). Although any evaluation
of such an ambitious policy intervention must take general equilibrium effects into account,
it will be interesting to see what the effects of raising the wage floor has on mobility in the
country in the medium-to-long term.
4.8 Conclusion
One of the social questions that sparked this study is why earnings inequality in South Africa
has remained so high from one generation to the next in the face of increasing educational
attainment. The dynamics of intergenerational earnings imply that the higher the intergenera-
28This links to the findings in the chapter on poverty dynamics.
4.8. CONCLUSION 169
tional elasticity, the longer it will take for a convergence in earnings in society to take place.
As a first step to uncovering some of the underlying intergenerational patterns we followed the
methodology outlined in Piraino (2015) and calculated the intergenerational earnings elastic-
ity for a balanced panel of South African males. We corrected for two kinds of bias in the
estimation of the intergenerational elasticity. The first - co-resident selection - was mitigated
through the use of a TSTSLS estimator. The second - selection into employment in a high-
unemployment society - was corrected through the use of a Heckman two-step procedure.
We found that although the intergenerational elasticity of earnings is very high (implying
low mobility) it varies markedly over the distribution of earnings. The degree of association
between parental and child earnings changes along the distribution of earnings. It is highest at
the bottom of the distribution and then falls until the middle of the distribution. For mothers
this trend continues, and the association is weakest at the top of the distribution. For fathers,
however, there is a turning point, and the correlation rises until reaching approximately 0.73
for the 95th percentile.
We then tried to reconcile the high association between parental and child earnings with the
rise in educational attainment in the country over the last two decades. Other studies have found
that although schooling attainment has increased in South Africa, the returns to education re-
main convex. This implies that even if the younger generation is more educated than the older
generation, there will not necessarily be a proportional increase in earnings. We found that the
correlation between education and the intergenerational persistence of earnings is highest at
the bottom of the earnings distribution, and that the pattern of this correlation over the first half
of the distribution is the same whether father’s or mother’s earnings are the focus. Thereafter
the correlation between education and mother’s earnings decreases steadily, while the corre-
lation between education and father’s earnings remains roughly the same. Finally, we made
use of two different decompositions of the intergenerational earnings elasticity, and found that
education accounts for around 40% of the elasticity, and that education plays a greater role in
understanding earnings persistence than does occupational skill.
One issue that we did not touch upon is the quality of education in South Africa. This
refers to both the average quality and the variance in quality across educational institutions.
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Though there has been steady growth in the access to education in South Africa, it is debatable
whether there has been a concomitant rise in the quality of that education. Given the richness of
the NIDS dataset and the possibility of linking respondents to administrative data, uncovering
the roles of the education quality versus quantity in shaping intergenerational earnings and
persistent inequality is something that may be possible in the future.
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Appendix
4.A Distributions of parental earnings
Figure 4.A.1: Kernel densities for imputed parental earnings (specification 5)
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS and the PSLSD. Attrition-corrected panel weights
applied to members of the balanced panel.
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4.B Earnings transition matrices
Table 4.B.1: Earnings transition matrices
Son quintiles








1 24.5 27.6 18.8 17.2 11.9 100
2 25.1 23.7 19.5 23.0 8.6 100
3 22.5 18.1 25.3 12.9 21.3 100
4 18.3 18.2 17.1 21.6 24.8 100
5 9.7 11.8 19.4 26.8 32.3 100
Son quintiles









1 24.6 25.1 22.6 16.9 10.9 100
2 23.5 21.9 16.8 16.4 21.4 100
3 20.6 21.6 20.8 18.8 18.2 100
4 16.2 14.3 27.4 25.1 17.0 100
5 6.9 12.9 14.9 27.6 37.7 100
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
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4.C Elasticities for different imputations and different
subsamples
Table 4.C.1: Intergenerational earnings elasticities for different imputation procedures for dif-
ferent subsamples
Variables used to construct parental earnings
1 2 3 4 5
Education Education, Education, Education, Education,




Elasticity 0.634 0.706 0.682 0.680 0.627
(0.166) (0.204) (0.205) (0.194) (0.187)
N 1,782 1,782 1,397 1,774 1,389
Mother’s earnings
Elasticity 0.615 0.689 0.601 0.723 0.650
(0.197) (0.185) (0.158) (0.181) (0.170)
N 1,698 1,698 1,266 1,690 1,258
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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4.D Elasticities for different imputations and different
subsamples with double correction
Table 4.D.1: Intergenerational earnings elasticities for different imputation procedures with a
double Heckman correction for different subsamples
Variables used to construct parental earnings
1 2 3 4 5
Education Education, Education, Education, Education,




Elasticity 0.641 0.750 0.704 0.742 0.678
(0.242) (0.241) (0.217) (0.234) (0.215)
N 1,782 1,782 1,397 1,774 1,389
Mother’s earnings
Elasticity 0.681 0.767 0.660 0.838 0.718
(0.250) (0.261) (0.215) (0.218) (0.220)
N 1,698 1,698 1,266 1,690 1,258
Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 4.D.1: Difference in intergenerational elasticity when controlling for education, over
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Source: Own calculations from the first four waves of NIDS. Attrition-corrected panel weights applied to
members of the balanced panel.
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5.1 Main findings and implications
This aim of this thesis was to investigate three distinct ideas about economic mobility in South
Africa in light of the persistently high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment in the
country. Thinking about these as dynamic, rather than static, concepts allowed for novel ques-
tions to be asked, and different conclusions to be drawn, about longer-run welfare.
Economic mobility can mean many different things, and so the main contributions of this
thesis to the South African and international mobility literature are widespread. The first main
contribution is the use of an observed counterfactual state to assess the role of a particular type
of measurement error in determining the measurement of mobility. This is combined with the
application of a useful method for researchers to assess the validity of their household and
individual survey data in a wide variety of settings. The second main contribution is more
specific to the South African literature, in that this is the first example of a multi-wave nation-
ally representative study of absolute mobility in the country. A profile of the poor, and of the
characteristics associated with poverty, is presented, along with careful econometric modelling
to uncover the processes determining poverty entry and poverty persistence. The third main
contribution is the extension of the literature on the intergenerational transmission of earnings
by going beyond a simple estimation of the intergenerational correlation of earnings. This is
done by implementing a modelling strategy that takes account of high unemployment rates in
both generations. The result is that controlling for high unemployment makes a significant
difference to our understanding of intergenerational mobility, as the shape of the intergenera-
tional earnings correlation over the distribution of wages suggests. This has wider applications
in the estimation of the intergenerational transmission of earnings in other societies that have
similarly high unemployment levels to South Africa.
Chapter 2 investigated how prevalent data fabrication is in South African household sur-
veys in general, and in NIDS in particular. It then made use of the first two waves of NIDS
to ask how the presence of such fabrication would affect the validity of empirical analyses of
labour market mobility in the country. The chapter documented how measurement error from
fieldworker cheating was identified, and noted that it affected about 7% of the sample. The
fabrication was detected while fieldwork was still on-going, and the relevant interviews were
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re-conducted. There is therefore an observed counterfactual that can be used to measure how
problematic such fabrication would have been, had it remained undetected. The chapter com-
pared estimates from the dataset that included the fabricated interviews with corresponding
estimates that included the corrected data instead. The results indicated that the fabrication
would not have affected our univariate and cross-sectional estimates meaningfully, but would
have led us to reach substantially different conclusions when implementing panel estimators.
The data quality investigation in this survey had a cost-benefit ratio of at least 24, and was thus
easily justifiable.
Chapter 3 analysed the determinants of South Africans moving into and out of poverty over
the first four waves of NIDS for the years 2008 to 2014/2015. The first descriptive sections
of the chapter focused on the balanced panel of NIDS respondents and found that a relatively
high poverty exit rate was accompanied by a substantial proportion of the population being
trapped in severe poverty. The roles of demographic versus income changes over time revealed
that changing household composition was the largest trigger of poverty entry and exit, and that
increasing income from government grants was the main trigger precipitating poverty exit for
about one quarter of our sample. The chapter then presented the results from an endogenous
switching model that controlled for initial conditions and selective attrition on the full sample
of respondents in order to better understand what traps South Africans in poverty. The findings
showed that ignoring the correlations between the unobservables affecting initial conditions,
sample retention and poverty transitions lead to substantially biased results, and that there was
significant genuine state dependence underlying poverty dynamics. This has important policy
implications, as preventing people from falling into poverty in the first place is likely to yield
greater returns than targeting the individual correlates of poverty directly. Taking a dynamic,
rather than static, view of poverty was also useful in examining who would benefit from struc-
tural interventions aimed at chronic poverty relief, versus who would benefit from some kind
of insurance to cover transitory fluctuations in income.
Chapter 4 asked how the correlation between the earnings of parents and children in South
Africa should be calculated in the presence of high unemployment, and what the role of educa-
tion is in determining this relationship. The chapter used the first four waves of the NIDS and
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the 1993 PSLSD to investigate the shape of the association between parental and child earn-
ings across the earnings distribution, and found that the correlation was strongest at the ends
of the distribution. The estimates were corrected for possible biases that arise from co-resident
parent-child pairs, and from selection into labour market participation in South Africa’s high-
unemployment society. The findings suggest that correcting for selection into employment
increased the intergenerational elasticity of earnings by approximately 10 per cent. The role of
education in determining the association of intergenerational earnings was uncovered. It was
shown that the impact was strongest at the bottom of the earnings distribution, and that educa-
tion accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the total intergenerational earnings elasticity
in the country.
There are a number of potential avenues of research that can build on and extend some of the
key findings of this thesis. Combining administrative data with NIDS offers an opportunity to
introduce a measure of schooling quality into an analysis of changing returns to education and
the determination of intergenerational earnings persistence. Greater access to South African
tax data will allow for a calibration of the earnings data in NIDS with an official source, which
will allow for a new perspective on earnings inequality, as well as cohort analyses of intergen-
erational mobility. The addition of future waves of data to NIDS presents opportunities for a
richer analysis of earnings and income dynamics. For example, as the time period covered by
NIDS increases, researchers will be able to estimate the intergenerational persistence of earn-
ings using a single dataset, rather than having to rely on an auxiliary dataset such as the PSLSD.
This will allow not only for cleaner measures of permanent income for parents and children,
but also for additional decompositions of the roles of various characteristics in determining
earnings and the transmission of economic advantage. Having more waves of data will also
allow researchers to analyse household formation and dissolution, and the role of income in
driving these dynamics. This is something that the thesis touched upon in Chapter 3, and is rich
ground for future research. Another question that could be investigated in order to expand on
this thesis is how the large post-apartheid increase in female labour force participation affected
poverty persistence and transitions, as well as the intergenerational transmission of earnings
from mothers to daughters and mothers to sons. There is also important work to be done on
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looking at how the differing intervals of time between each wave of NIDS impacts poverty
dynamics, and whether the presence of relatively long intervals means that transitory poverty
is underestimated. Finally, as more high quality longitudinal data becomes available in devel-
oping countries, there is increased scope for cross-national analysis of the different drivers of
poverty persistence, poverty transitions and intergenerational earnings.
One of the general lessons from this study is that the labour market is central to understanding
the dynamics of poverty and inequality in South Africa. Although expanding social welfare
policies has been moderately effective in alleviating money-metric poverty for some South
Africans in a static sense, the sustainability of this approach in isolation can be questioned.
Any long-run policy proposals to tackle poverty and inequality must be dynamic in nature, and
this means focusing on increasing labour market access, and increasing the wages of those who
are earning at the bottom end of the distribution. Active labour market policies may serve to
increase upward mobility for the same people over time. These need to be implemented in
conjunction with reforms to national education policies which can increase upward mobility
from generation to generation. The fact that over two decades of democracy in South Africa
have not seen a substantial reduction in the inequality of opportunity facing parents and children
speaks directly to the low quality of public education in the country. Active labour market
policies and a commitment to improving the quality of primary and secondary education must
surely be complementary foci if policymakers are to ensure that the benefits of living in a
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